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Abstract
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of resources booms on the 
process of economic adjustment in Papua New Guinea (PNG) during the period 1970- 
94. Changes in key macroeconomic variables, including the real exchange rate, savings 
and investment, induced by resources booms have significant consequences for the 
performance and structure of an economy. This thesis contributes to the analytical and 
empirical research on these issues through an in-depth case study of the PNG economy. 
The theoretical framework of the study incorporates an extended version of the core 
model of ‘Dutch disease’ and the theory of ‘construction boom’. In order to place the 
policy implication of findings in perspective, PNG’s policy responses to booms are 
compared with those of two other resource-rich countries -  Indonesia and Nigeria.
To place the empirical analysis in context, an econometric analysis has been 
undertaken of the determinants of real exchange rate behaviour. The findings suggest 
investment and mineral booms in the early 1970s caused a significant appreciation of 
the trade-weighted real exchange rate of the country. This adverse effect was 
compounded by increased government expenditure and excess monetary growth.
Following independence, PNG exercised its most prudent macroeconomic policy 
and achieved admirable economic stability during the agricultural boom in 1976-77. 
Commitment to an open trade regime, together with sound income and wage policies 
and reduced reliance on foreign aid, were instrumental in maintaining macroeconomic 
stability. Depreciation of the real exchange rate was achieved with expenditure restraint 
throughout the agricultural export boom which created a ‘reverse Dutch disease’ during
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the height of the agricultural boom in the 1976-77 period. The output of the tradable 
sector increased significantly during this period. However, the domestic price level 
began to increase at a substantially faster rate than the domestic equivalent of the world 
price of tradables from the late 1980s until 1993, greatly reducing the competitiveness 
of the economy. Real appreciation of the kina was induced by the mineral boom of 
1992-93 and aggravated by a persistent expansionary fiscal policy, making it very 
difficult for the monetary authority to reduce domestic inflation. However, the situation 
improved greatly as PNG undertook a radical labour market reform and world market 
prices for PNG’s agricultural commodities increased significantly. From 1994, a more 
restrictive fiscal stance, a large exchange rate devaluation and subsequent flotation and 
depreciation of the kina, all helped to restore the competitiveness of the economy to a 
large extent.
The results of the comparative study of the resources booms of PNG, Indonesia 
and Nigeria suggest that PNG performed much better than the other two countries. 
PNG was able to maintain a lower level of domestic inflation throughout the 1970s, 
especially in the second half of the decade. Sensible expenditure and wage restraint 
policies, and the maintenance of an open trade regime, made it possible for the economy 
to prevent erosion of the competitiveness of its tradable sector. On average, this 
outcome was reflected in a depreciation of the real exchange rate over the second half of 
the 1970s. However, a more restrictive trade regime from the mid-1980s, coupled with 
undisciplined fiscal policy, contributed to an appreciation of real exchange rates in the 
early 1990s.
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The findings of the study have a number of policy implications. First, fiscal and 
monetary discipline, combined with reduced reliance on foreign aid and grants, 
considerably reduces the pressure of a resources boom on domestic price levels and 
improves competitiveness. Second, and most importantly, a more open trade regime, 
and flexibility in the labour market, promotes stability of domestic price levels and 
improves international competitiveness, making the economy more resilient to the 
adverse effects of external shocks. The resulting depreciation of the real exchange rate 
has a positive impact on the tradable sector. Finally, perceiving the nature and duration 
of a resources boom and taking appropriate policy steps accordingly can stretch the 
economic gain from resources booms and thus enhance long-run economic growth.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and Scope of the Study
Developing countries are prone to periodic temporary external shocks. These can be 
both positive and negative and can come through a sudden change in the current and 
capital accounts of the balance of payments or can originate from internal sources. A 
positive external shock, in the form of a resources boom, enables an economy to attain 
higher levels of growth, consumption and welfare in the short run through the increased 
inflow of capital or export revenues. However, a positive external shock also poses a 
policy dilemma in management of windfall gain. A positive shock can be a mixed 
blessing for a country, because the economic changes triggered by a resources boom 
will enhance long-term growth prospects only if appropriate policy measures are taken 
by the government.
Using Papua New Guinea (PNG) as a case study, this thesis investigates the 
macroeconomic impact of a resources boom and the long-term growth implications of 
related policy choices. Like many other primary commodity exporting developing 
economies, PNG has experienced several short-lived export booms over the past two 
and a half decades. Thus, PNG provides an interesting case study of potential gains from 
resources booms and the accompanying complex problems of policy management.
For the purpose of the study, four major resources booms experienced by the 
PNG economy over the period 1970-94 are identified. The first was in 1971-72, with a
large inflow of direct foreign investment by Bougainville Copper Ltd. (BCL) in the 
construction sector. The second was a mineral boom during 1973-74, caused by the 
increased production of copper and gold after the opening of the mine, and by high 
minerals prices. The third was a major boom in the agricultural sector during 1976-77, 
induced by increased world market prices for PNG’s agricultural commodities. There 
was then an extended period of slow growth, during the first half of the 1980s, followed 
by a marked improvement in economic activity, between 1985 and 1988, reflecting the 
development of the nation’s mineral wealth and a recovery in agriculture. The fourth, 
and presumably, PNG’s largest ever mineral boom, was during 1992-93, with the 
development of an oil field at Kutubu and a new gold mine at Porgera. The above- 
mentioned booms all had different origins and the outcomes were strikingly different 
because of the adoption of different policy measures. The boom associated with the Ok 
Tedi mine establishment in the second half of the 1980s is not covered in this study 
because it is quite similar to that of 1973 mineral boom in terms of underlying causes 
and hence the related analytical interpretation.
During the twin booms between 1971 and 1974, the construction and mineral 
sectors’ share to GDP increased significantly. During these boom years, the price of 
tradable goods and services increased, due to improvements in the terms of trade (TOT) 
improving the competitiveness of the tradable sector. As a result of increased 
government expenditure, excessive money supply and rapid increases in nominal wages, 
the consumer price index (CPI) increased faster than the price of tradables causing the 
trade-weighted real exchange rate to also appreciate significantly.
During the agricultural boom in the mid-1970s, PNG undertook restrictive 
policy measures to reduce instability in domestic price levels. Loss of competitiveness 
was also avoided by the use of stricter income and wage-restraint policies and a very 
open trade regime. In fact, stable domestic price levels, compared with the increased 
price of tradables during the agricultural boom in 1976-77, depreciated the real 
exchange rate. In contrast, during the boom years of 1991-93 the government of PNG 
failed to maintain fiscal discipline. Continuing budget deficits and a more restrictive 
trade regime exerted enormous pressure on domestic price levels. As a consequence, 
over the period 1991-93, the real exchange rate appreciated and reduced the 
competitiveness of the economy.
Although the impact of these resources booms are of paramount importance for 
the PNG economy, analytical and empirical investigations of the issue are missing. This 
thesis aims to fill this void. The central objective of this study is to assess the 
magnitude of the effects of these resources booms on the real exchange rate, the 
structure of the economy and overall economic growth in PNG.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
For a small open economy like PNG, which is heavily dependent on a few minerals and 
primary commodity exports, and which is characterised by a large public sector and 
significant government intervention, the consequences of a resources boom are likely to 
be very different to those for a developed economy. Conventionally the issues of 
macroeconomic adjustment following a resources boom have been addressed in the 
context of the ‘Dutch disease’ framework, which treats the windfall as a permanent 
shock and analyses the consequences in a short-run context only. But most booms in a
primary export-dependent country are temporary in nature. Given the less developed 
nature of the financial sector of a developing economy, such temporary shocks affect 
capital accumulation through intertemporal choice between consumption, savings and 
investment. Thus, the intertemporal smoothing of windfall gains and asset behaviour in 
a developing economy calls for an analysis of long-run adjustment process. The long- 
run dynamic analysis of a resources boom adds a new dimension to the theory of 
booming-sector literature and is known as the theory o f ‘construction boom’.
The analytical framework used in this study is developed by extending the core 
‘Dutch disease’ model in terms of three types of openness in the economy. These will 
be treated as (i) openness in the labour market, (ii) openness in the capital market, and 
(iii) openness in the international trade regime. The theory of ‘construction boom’ is 
also incorporated with the theory of ‘Dutch disease’ to capture the long-term dynamic 
effects of resources booms.
The ideal methodology is to work with a comprehensive macroeconometric 
model which captures the key relationships suggested by theory. Unfortunately, this 
approach was not feasible in the context of the PNG economy given the nature of data 
availability1. Therefore, the methodology that has been chosen is a case study approach 
bringing together single equation estimates of behavioural relations involving key 
macroeconomic variables and other relevant information, both quantitative and 
qualitative, in order to shed light on the key theoretical propositions. A detailed 
discussion of major resources booms and policy responses in relation to the changes in 
the sectoral composition and long run growth of the economy has been presented in
1 Unless otherwise stated data used in this study are taken from the Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank o f Papua 
New Guinea, Port Moresby.
Chapter 6 in order to examine the key theoretical propositions postulated in Chapters 4
and 5.
This study also compares the experience of PNG in managing its resources 
booms with those of Indonesia and Nigeria -  two other oil-exporting countries with 
comparable dependence on volatile mineral exports. This comparison sheds light on the 
implications of different trade restrictions, labour market conditions and varying 
macroeconomic policy management issues on the nature of the adjustment process in 
response to a resources boom. In terms of income per head, size and stages of 
development, these three countries are quite heterogeneous. They are, however, 
comparable in terms of a dominant agricultural base and an abundance of mineral 
resources. These countries are also similar in having a significant primary sector as the 
chief source of exports and in their use of mineral rents to fund public consumption and 
capital formation. It will be argued that the main differences are the policy regimes and 
institutional structures which brought about different outcomes from resources booms 
for these economies.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on the theory of booming sector 
economics. This review includes the short-, medium- and long-run static and dynamic 
models of booming sector economics. Initially, the core model of ‘Dutch disease’ is 
discussed. The core model is then extended to incorporate the effects of different 
institutional and structural rigidities and the effects of various government policies 
during a boom cycle in the context of a small open developing economy. The extension 
takes into account the different types of openness in labour and capital markets and
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international trade regimes in developing countries. Since the intertemporal choice 
between consumption and savings is important, the theory of ‘construction boom’ is 
also discussed in an attempt to capture the long-run dynamic impact of a resources 
boom.
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the PNG economy. It describes structure, 
recent development, and changes in the sectoral composition over 1970-94. The 
movement of key macroeconomic variables, such as domestic price levels, wage rates, 
the exchange rate, government expenditure, the structure of the financial market, and the 
balance of payments and trade policy, are also discussed in order to set the stage for the 
ensuing analysis.
Chapter 4 provides an econometric analysis of the determinants of the real 
exchange rate. The theory of real exchange rate determination is used to identify the 
major real and nominal variables that determine the movements of real exchange rate. 
This extended framework of the real exchange rate model assumes a labour-surplus 
economy, in the setting of both fixed and flexible exchange rate regime, with different 
degrees of capital mobility and trade restrictions to make it applicable for the PNG 
economy.
Chapter 5 undertakes an econometric investigation of the sectoral impact of 
changes in the real exchange rate. The purpose of this chapter is to test the impact on 
sectoral growth of key macroeconomic variables, suggested by the resources-boom 
literature, in order to provide the empirical basis for the study of each major boom 
episode in the economy of PNG discussed in the next chapter. This chapter also
examines the determinants of savings and investment behaviour in PNG over the past 
two and a half decades.
Chapter 6 presents a detailed study of major resources booms experienced by 
PNG and the major macroeconomic policy measures undertaken by the government in 
the 1970s and 1990s. This chapter also attempts to identify the different nature of these 
booms, their major beneficiaries and the consequences for changes in the sectoral 
composition of the economy. The empirical analysis of this chapter makes use of the 
results of the econometric analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 7 compares the findings of the present study with those of existing 
studies of the impact of resources booms and macroeconomic adjustment in Indonesia 
and Nigeria. The basic purpose of this comparison is to shed light on the implications 
of differences in policy regimes during these resources booms for the structure and 
competitiveness of these economies.
Chapter 8 summarises the major findings of the study and draws lessons for 
PNG in capturing the maximum benefits from resources booms and avoiding their 
potential adverse consequences for both short-run stability and long-term growth. 
Prudent and judicious policies are required to counteract the adverse consequences of 
resources booms. This chapter also indicates some reservations of the study and makes 
suggestions for further research on the subject.
CHAPTER 2
RESOURCES BOOM AND MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT: A SURVEY
Introduction
During the 1960s and 1970s, several industrial countries, as well as oil-exporting 
developing countries, experienced a slump in their traditional export and import 
competing sectors following resource booms. This phenomenon is known as the ‘Dutch 
disease’ and has been the subject of a great deal of discussion and policy debate. The 
term 'Dutch disease' was first used in the 26th November 1977 issue of The Economist 
to refer to the adverse effects on Dutch manufacturing of natural gas discoveries during 
the 1960s. While strong growth in the natural gas sector had led to a large surplus in the 
Netherlands’ balance of payments, with an appreciating Guilder, the domestic 
manufacturing sector declined, due to real wage pressure, and the unemployment rate 
reached record levels. Therefore, the term 'Dutch disease', refers to a boom-induced 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (a rise in the price of nontradables relative to that 
of tradables) and a relative decline in the non-booming tradable sector (Garnaut, 
1991:19).
The objective of this chapter is to review the core ‘Dutch disease’ model 
developed by Corden and Neary (1982) and to discuss some possible modifications to 
form the basis of an empirical investigation for a developing country like PNG. In 
particular, the model will be analysed with a focus on both the comparative static and 
dynamic analysis of resources booms in the short-, medium- and long-run framework.
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This modification is justified because the core model of ‘Dutch disease’ is premised on 
the conditions prevailing in a mature economy.
Essentially, a resources boom produces a temporary shock, as opposed to the 
permanent shock predicted by the core ‘Dutch disease’ model. The intertemporal 
smoothing of a resources boom, and assets behaviour in the case of a boom, calls for an 
analysis of the dynamic adjustment process. The dynamic analysis of intertemporal 
choice between consumption, savings and investment adds a new dimension to the 
theory of resources booms and is known as a ‘construction boom’ in the literature.
In the following chapter, Section 2 reviews the short-, medium- and long-run 
‘Dutch disease' models and Section 3 introduces the ‘core model’ of ‘Dutch disease’ to 
analyse the effects of a resources boom. Limitations of the core model and the need for 
the intertemporal dynamic analysis of resources boom are also discussed in this section. 
Section 3 discusses some possible extensions of the basic model in the setting of a 
small, open, developing country. Section 4 provides a discussion of the ‘construction 
boom’ theory. Section 5 concludes with a summary of discussion.
2.2 An Overview of Booming Sector Economics
Over the years a sizeable literature concerning various macroeconomic aspects of 
resources booms has developed. Gregory’s (1976) work is considered to be the first 
initiative to analyse the adverse consequences of the Australian mineral boom on 
traditional export and import-competing sectors during the mid-1970s. However, Eide 
(1973), first described the mechanisms of how a resources boom impacts upon the other 
sectors of an economy. Since these two early papers remain widely unknown, Gregory
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(1976) has been credited with the first work on this subject. In a partial equilibrium 
framework, with a small country assumption, Gregory (1976) showed that rapid growth 
in the mineral sector leads to a lower equilibrium price ratio of traded to nontraded 
goods. He argued that both import-competing industries and pre-existing export sectors 
shrink due to a mineral boom.
Gregory’s (1976) analysis suggests that the growth of mineral exports is 
compatible with large tariff changes. The empirical findings of his study indicate that 
the impact of the resources boom in the Australian mineral sector during the early 1970s 
was approximately equivalent to a doubling of the tariff on the traditional export sector. 
The effects of resources booms on the import-competing sector was found to be 
equivalent to the removal of tariffs and the introduction of some form of import 
subsidies.
Snape (1977) extended Gregory's analysis in a general equilibrium set up and 
concluded that, though the pre-existing traded sector is expected to shrink due to a 
mineral boom, the production of some goods in this sector may rise; even if the size of 
the traditional export sector remains the same, social gain is still possible from growth 
in the mineral sector; and that, while the price of nontradables can be expected to rise, 
the output of nontradables may not expand in the short run. Similar studies analysing 
the consequences of oil discoveries in the UK have been done by Bruno and Sachs 
(1982) and Forsyth (1982).
There has since been rapid development in the literature on booming sector 
economics. Among others, the dynamic analysis of a resources boom has been enriched 
by the contributions of Buiter and Purvis (1982), Eastwood and Venables (1982),
Edwards and Aoki (1983), Neary and Wijnbergen (1984), Harvie and Gower (1993) 
and Harvie (1994). Each of these models makes use of the framework developed by 
Dornbusch (1976) to analyse the effects of an oil boom during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
these models economic agents are assumed to possess rational expectations or perfect 
foresight, financial markets are assumed to be in continuous equilibrium while product 
markets are subject to downward price stickiness. These models can be classified as 
being either short run or long run. A major contribution of the long-run models is that 
they give explicit consideration to the accumulation of physical capital stock over time 
and hence put specific emphasis on the long-run development of an economy.
The short-run dynamic models (Eastwood and Venables, 1982; Buiter and 
Purvis, 1982; and Neary and Wijnbergen, 1984) assume that windfall gains will affect 
the spending pattern of an economy. The other assumptions are: windfalls accrue in the 
first instance primarily to the private sector; the government gets a share by imposing 
various taxes on the booming sector; the country is a net oil exporter; and the country 
produces a non-oil traded good which is consumed domestically as well as exported and 
is an imperfect substitute for imported goods. A fixed exchange rate regime and no 
restriction on capital mobility are also assumed in these models.
A major shortcoming of these short-run models is that they are incapable of 
explaining the medium- and long-run adjustments towards steady state. In the short run, 
the magnitude and the length of the adjustment process is smaller and faster. 
Developments in the non-oil trade balance and foreign asset stock are not identified 
from the short-run models. In the context of the long-run models, the incorporation of a
fixed exchange rate suggests that there is greater volatility in key macroeconomic 
variables during the adjustment process in comparison with a flexible exchange rate.
Harvie and Gower (1993) and Harvie (1994) analyse the dynamic adjustment of 
oil shocks by extending the short-run models to the long-run framework. These models 
focus on the supply side of the economy with sticky quantity adjustment and incorporate 
the notion of capital stock accumulation, current account and real wealth. The long-run 
models suggest appreciation of the real exchange rate, unchanged inflation, a rise in real 
income and a rise in non-oil output. Increases in capital stock, foreign assets stock and 
private-sector real wealth are anticipated with a deterioration in the non-oil trade 
balance.
A new dimension of the study of resources booms has been introduced by Bevan 
et al. (1990) to analyse the dynamic adjustment between product and assets market and 
the intertemporal choice between consumption and savings. This dynamic model is 
known in the literature as the ‘construction boom’ and is discussed in detail in Section 
2.5.
2.3 The Core Model of Dutch Disease
A systematic analysis of 'Dutch disease' was undertaken by Corden and Neary (1982) 
using a three-sector, two-commodity, medium-term model to identify the consequences 
of a resources boom. The three sectors are (a) a booming traded sector, (b) a non­
booming or lagging sector, comprising the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and 
(c) a nontraded sector, including services, utilities, transportation and construction. 
These sectors are producing two commodities, one traded internationally at given world 
prices, the other traded domestically (nontraded) with price determined by domestic
demand and supply conditions. This model focuses on the real sectors and ignores 
monetary considerations. Only the relative price of tradables to nontradables are 
determined in this model. The model assumes there are no distortions in the commodity 
or factor markets and assumes labour to be the only mobile factor amongst the three 
sectors of the economy. The amount of capital is fixed for each sector and is non- 
shiftable in the short run. All factor prices are assumed to be flexible and factors are not 
mobile across the geographical boundary of a country.
A boom can be brought about in one of three ways. There can be (a) an 
exogenous technological improvement in the booming sector, represented by a shift in 
the production function of the country; (b) a discovery of new resources that is, the 
increase in the supply of a specific resource; or (c) an exogenous rise in the price of a 
specific export product. Corden and Neary (1982) considered the first case -  a boom 
induced by a technological improvement in the booming sector.
The initial effect of a resources boom is to raise the aggregate factor income of 
the booming sector leading to an increase in demand for both tradable and nontradable 
commodities. Since the price of tradables is determined by world price levels, a small 
booming country cannot affect the price of tradables. The excess demand for tradables 
is satisfied by increased net imports by the booming economy. The increased demand 
for nontradables is obviously satisfied domestically. Thus, short-run supply constraints 
in nontradable production increases the relative price of nontradables to tradables to 
preserve the equilibrium in the nontradable market. The relative price change is induced 
by two separate effects, a spending effect and a resource movement effect, which impact
upon the output composition of an economy. The spending and resource movement 
effects can occur independently or in combination with each other.
To the extent that the increased revenue flow generated by the booming sector is 
absorbed domestically (either directly by the factor owners or by the government which 
collects this revenue in taxes), the price of nontradables increases, provided that the 
income elasticity of demand for nontradables is positive. As a result, the nontradable 
sector becomes more profitable and draws labour from the non-booming traded sector. 
This is known as the spending effect of a resources boom. Substantial resources move 
into the booming trade sector, based on the assumption that the booming sector is not an 
enclave but requires increased factor inputs which must be bid away from other sectors. 
This situation is known as the resource movement effect.
During the boom years the marginal product of labour increases in the booming 
sector, making the sector more profitable. As a result, nominal wages rise in the 
economy. Labour mobility allows labour to move out of non-booming sectors to the 
more profitable booming sector. The labour movement out of the non-booming traded 
sector into the booming sector is known as ‘direct de-industrialisation’ and does not 
require an appreciation of real exchange rate because it does not affect the output of the 
nontradable sector.
The effects of a resources boom on the output composition of an economy 
primarily depend upon relative factor intensities among sectors. Neary (1983) 
demonstrated that if the booming sector is an enclave, that is, the booming sector does 
not compete with other sectors for its factor inputs, there would not be any ‘de- 
industrialisation’. The key adjustment in this situation is the real exchange rate
appreciation through the spending effect. However, when the demand for nontradables 
increases due to the spending effect, profitability in the nontraded sector also rises. 
Increased demand for labour, and increased nominal wages in the nontradable sector, 
pulls labour away from the non-booming traded sector and brings additional real 
appreciation. Corden (1984:361) terms this effect ‘indirect de-industrialisation’.
The output of the nontraded sector would be higher than initial output if the 
spending effect outweighs the resource movement effect. When both spending and 
resource movement effects are taken into account, the impact of a resources boom on 
overall real wages is ambiguous. As the spending effect increases demand and the price 
of nontradables in the short run, a fall in real wages is more likely if the spending effect 
is stronger and the share of nontradable goods in the CPI basket is larger. However, real 
wages may rise if the rate of increase in nominal wages outweighs the rate of increase in 
domestic price levels.
Capital immobility causes a sharp decline in returns to capital in the non­
booming traded sector and raises returns to capital in the nontradable sector. Given 
supply constraints in the short run, the domestic price level tends to increase and the real 
exchange rate, relative price of traded to nontraded, must decline. In turn, this 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, erodes competitiveness of the non-booming 
traded sector by increasing the gap between domestic and international cost-price 
differences causing the non-booming traded sector to contract. This phenomenon is 
referred to as 'tradable-squeeze effects' (Corden and Neary, 1982).
Figure 2.1 The Effect of Resources Boom on The Real Exchange Rate
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The implication of a resources boom as discussed so far, may be illustrated by 
using the well-known Salter diagram which was developed by Corden (1985) using the 
original idea of Salter (1959).
The vertical axis measures the output of nontradables and the horizontal axis 
represents the output of tradables (Figure 2.1). The initial production possibility frontier 
is represented by the curve NT-T, given the factor endowments and the existing 
technology of the country. Before the boom, the equilibrium of the economy was 
determined by the intersection of NT-T with the highest possible attainable social
indifference curve, UoUo, at point Eo. Hence, prior to the boom, the country produced 
ONTo of nontradables and OTo of tradables. The real exchange rate is represented by the 
slope of RE, the common tangent to the two curves, NT-T and UoUo, at point Eo- The 
curve OYo represents the demand expansion path when the relative prices are held 
constant at RE and income increases.
A resources boom shifts the production possibility curve to the right to NT-T' 
while the production possibility frontier for the non-booming traded and nontradables 
remains at NT-T After the boom, total production of the economy is at Ej and 
comprises NToEo of nontradable and non-boom tradable output and EoEj of boom 
output with the real exchange remaining constant at REi (REj is parallel to RE).
At this new equilibrium, desired consumption must expand to the point M along 
the income expansion path OYo. As the output of nontradables remains at ONTo, the 
boom induced increased income flow creates excess demand for nontradables of MX. 
There is also an excess demand for non-booming tradables equivalent to EoX with a 
balance of payments surplus of XEp
To restore equilibrium by reducing the excess demand for nontradables, the real 
exchange rate has to appreciate. This real appreciation arises either from a combination 
of price increases in non-booming tradables and appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate if the nominal exchange rate is floating, or through a price increase for nontradables
if the nominal exchange rate is fixed.
The new equilibrium is at E* along the new income expansion path OYi with a 
new relative price of nontradables to tradables at RE*. Increased income flow increases 
the demand for nontradables X to M, but the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
lowers the demand to M*, leaving a net increase in demand for nontradables by XM*. 
The windfall gain, on the other hand, increases the demand for non-booming tradables 
from Eo to X, and appreciation of the real exchange rate expands the demand for them 
further to X*.
The appreciation of the real exchange rate increases the profitability of the 
nontradable sector and draws resources from the non-booming traded sector, reducing 
profitability in that sector. At the new real exchange rate RE**, which is parallel to 
RE*, a new equilibrium is at E** with the old production possibility frontier NT-T. At 
this new equilibrium, with a new real exchange rate RE**, the production of 
nontradables increases from ONTo to ONT], but the output of non-booming tradables 
contracts from OTo to OTp The increased demand for non-booming tradables is covered 
by imported non-booming tradables equivalent to E**E*.
When the appreciation of the real exchange rate, induced by windfall revenue, 
increases the output of nontradables from ONTo to ONTi and the output of non­
booming tradables declines from OTo to OTi -  this effect is known as the ‘Dutch 
disease’ effect of a resources boom. The magnitude of the fall in the non-booming 
tradable sector depends on the initial production possibility frontier and the slope of the 
initial indifference curve. However, the domestic absorption (welfare) improves, as 
represented by the movement of the indifference curve from UqUo to UiUj.
2.4 Limitations and Extension of the Core Dutch Disease Model
As discussed, the core ‘Dutch disease’ model perceives a resources boom to be of a 
permanent nature and considers some of the consequences of a resources boom in a 
short-run comparative static framework. It is further assumed that both goods and assets 
markets adjust simultaneously and there are no imperfections in the labour market. 
Additionally, the model assumes that the windfall accrues primarily to the private sector 
and there is no government control over the windfall revenues. However, these 
assumptions do not hold for most developing countries.
The effect of higher wealth on output composition of an economy is inherently 
dynamic. The temporary nature of a resources boom and the presence of learning-by­
doing externalities, as well as the adjustment between product and assets market, require 
a dynamic analysis of a resources boom. A temporary shock impacts upon capital stock 
accumulation and hence on consumption, savings and investment. Thus, intertemporal 
choice between consumption, savings and investment plays a central role in these 
analyses which may have profound and longer term developmental effects on an 
economy. These long-term effects of a resources boom can only be captured by long- 
run dynamic analysis of resources booms.
The consequences of a resources boom depend upon various key factors. The 
source, size, and the nature (price and/or production boom) of the boom, the major 
beneficiaries of windfall gain (government vs. private), income and price elasticity of 
exports, factor mobility amongst sectors, factor intensity in each sector and the degree 
of substitutability between the tradable and the nontradable sectors, are the major 
factors to be considered in the analysis of a resources boom. Economy-wide fiscal,
monetary exchange rate and trade policies can also radically alter the effects of a 
resources boom.
As some modifications of the ‘core’ model are necessary to capture the stylised 
features of a primary commodity-exporting developing country, the Corden-Neary 
model will be discussed in terms of three types of openness of a country -  (a) openness 
in the labour market, (b) openness in international trade regime, and (c) increased 
mobility in capital markets.
2.4.1 Surplus Labour and International Labour Mobility
Unemployment is a prominent feature of the labour market structure of most developing 
countries. Relaxing the assumption of full employment changes the outcome of a 
resources boom in a developing country compared with a developed economy. If a 
developing country has large unemployed resources, both the resource-movement effect 
and spending effect will be weaker because labour is not a constraint on domestic 
production. Even if higher productivity and higher wage rates draw labour into the 
booming sector, the non-booming sectors can satisfy their resource demand from the 
large unemployed and under-employed labour reservoir. In the short run, these labourers 
can gain skill by a "learning by doing" process. In this situation, the resource- 
movement effect would either be insignificant or not occur at all. Since a labour-surplus 
economy can increase production without increasing the wage rate, price increases in 
the nontradable sector would be moderate. Furthermore, in a labour surplus developing 
economy, a resources boom causes minimal resource movement if the booming sector is
an enclave sector.
Relaxing the assumption of international factor immobility also changes the 
outcome of the core model. During the oil booms of 1973-82, both labour and capital 
were internationally mobile. The migrant labour flow can be considered in this context. 
Migrant labour flow from Asia to Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries is a well- 
documented phenomenon. The effect of migrant labour flow may have the same 
consequences as domestic surplus labour in moderating the resource movement effect as 
well as spending effects. Migrant labourers have a high savings ratio and remit a large 
share of their income to their home country (Chowdhury and Chowdhury, 1993). This 
reduces the spending effect, moderates the demand for nontradables and reduces 
domestic inflation. This, in turn, reduces the real exchange rate appreciation of a 
booming economy.
2.4.2 International Trade Barriers
All existing models of 'Dutch disease’ assume free trade. In reality, it is rarely 
observed. In most developing countries, government intervention plays a very 
important role in altering trade flows and thus the structure and composition of domestic 
production. By imposing price controls, tariffs, and other quantitative restrictions and 
export subsidies, governments can greatly alter the outcome of a resources boom. By 
imposing various restrictions and subsidies, the government can moderate the adverse 
effects of a boom on the non-booming traded sector by protecting this sector from 
world-market competition and enhancing the production of this sector. In fact, 
following a boom, the output of the manufacturing sector in most developing countries 
was significantly altered by existing quantitative import restrictions, and high tariff and 
price controls during the 1970s and 1980s. However, such trade restrictions have 
adverse impact on domestic price level and competitiveness of the country.
During the height of a resources boom, the growth of the manufacturing sector in 
a developing country may also be explained by relaxing the assumption of perfect 
substitutability of domestically produced traded goods and imported traded goods. 
Given qualitative trade restrictions, most manufacturing goods in a developing country 
are only semi-traded or partially traded. As in the case of nontraded goods, the 
domestic price of these traded goods is determined by domestic demand and supply 
rather than international prices. The imperfect substitutability of importable to import 
moves these traded manufacturing goods to the nontradable category and results in an 
expansion of the manufacturing traded sector. Thus, contrary to the prediction of the 
core model, the manufacturing traded sector can expand as well. As the agricultural 
export sector is usually less protected than the manufacturing sector, the agricultural 
traded sector contracted in the developing countries during the resources booms of 
1973-82. The agricultural sector may be hit twice, once by real appreciation and then 
by direct resource loss to the import-substituting manufacturing sector (Corden, 1984). 
Therefore, the degree of openness in the international trade regime plays a significant 
role in this context. On the other hand, the output of non-booming tradables declines 
due to domestic price and cost increases and they lose their competitiveness in the world 
market.
2.4.3 Domestic and International Capital Mobility
The nature of restrictions on international capital mobility also changes the outcome of 
the core model. If capital is mobile within the economy, capital-intensive production 
will be more profitable during the boom period. In this case, both the resource 
movement and the spending effects need not occur. Relaxing the assumption of capital 
immobility leads to another dimension to the study of booming sector economics. The
theory of ‘construction boom’ (Bevan et al., 1990) takes into account not only the 
intertemporal choice between consumption and savings but also the possibility of capital 
movement between domestic nontradable sectors and across national boundaries.
The ‘Dutch disease’ theory treats a resources boom as a permanent shock and 
explains the consequences of shocks essentially in a comparative static framework. 
However, most resources booms are temporary in nature, and last for only a few years, 
making short-run dynamic effects important in assessing the consequences of these 
shocks. If these booms are perceived to be temporary the increase in domestic savings 
may be greater than expenditure, and the spending effects of ‘Dutch disease’ would be 
minor. Part of the windfall savings that comes to the domestic financial sector reduces 
the pressure on the domestic interest rate. Thus, increased domestic savings reduces the 
cost of funds for investment. In this case, a resources boom is likely to lead to higher 
investment instead of consumption of nontradables and the ‘spending effect’ may not 
occur at all.
In the absence of a developed capital market, in most developing countries, both 
government and private agents would try to invest their savings on nontradable capital 
goods. This, in turn, transmits encouraging price signals to nontradable assets such as 
buildings and construction, and raises the price of these assets, generating a 
‘construction boom’.
2.5 The Theory of Construction Boom
The intertemporal choice between consumption and investment, due to the temporary 
nature of a resources boom, is systematically analysed by Bevan et al. (1990). They
disaggregated the nontradable sector into nontradable capital and nontradable 
consumption goods sub-sectors. The nontradable capital goods sector includes a range 
of activities, which may vary between economies, but the most common activity in this 
sector is ‘construction’. The major emphasis in this theory is the relationship between a 
resources boom and domestic investment in nontradable capital goods.
A resources boom increases the demand for both tradable and nontradable goods 
and thus increases investment demand. A construction boom is usually induced by two 
routes: (a) through permanent increases in consumption, and (b) through temporary 
increases in savings. A boom usually increases consumption via increases in windfall 
income. The increased demand for nontradable consumption goods increases the 
production of the nontradable consumption goods sector. This, in turn, raises 
construction activities and generates the construction boom.
An increase in savings is a rational outcome of a resources boom where the 
boom is perceived as short-lived and temporary. If the capital market is perfect, and 
future prices are known, the windfall gain will increase temporary savings but not 
investment. Thus, when a boom is perceived to be temporary, the increased revenue 
gain is seen to be transient and has virtually no impact on changing the sectoral 
composition of domestic production. However, in the absence of a developed capital 
market and capital mobility in most developing countries, a temporary boom provides 
incentives to smooth consumption over the longer period, which raises savings. 
Increased domestic savings reduce the cost of funds by increasing the base money, 
thereby stimulating domestic investment due to a lower cost of availability of funds. 
Unless tradable and nontradable capital are perfect substitutes in the production process,
the increased propensity to invest out of the windfall revenue flow increases demand for 
nontradable capital goods, such as ‘construction’, relative to consumer goods. This 
sector becomes more profitable and draws resources from other sectors. With a given 
level of capital in the nontradable sector, a resources boom raises the marginal physical 
product of capital while labour moves into the nontradable sector. This increases the 
efficiency of capital and directs post-shock investment to the nontradable capital sector. 
Thus, the allocation of capital goods between productive sectors affects relative prices 
by altering the supply conditions of capital (Bevan et al., 1990).
The intertemporal choice between consumption and savings, and their impact on 
the relative price of nontradables to tradables, can be illustrated using Figure 2.2. The 
nontradable sector is disaggregated into nontradable capital (NK) and nontradable 
consumption (NC) goods to analyse the effects of a temporary resources boom on 
domestic investment. The relative price of the nontradable capital to the tradable goods, 
Pnk/Pt? is given in the vertical axis. The horizontal axis measures the relative price of 
nontradable consumption goods to tradable, Pnc/P t- The NC locus depicts the 
equilibrium for the nontradable consumer good (such as services) and the NK locus 
shows the equilibrium for the nontradable capital good (an example could be the stock 
of buildings).
Along a ray from the origin, the price of the nontradable capital good relative to 
tradable would rise more and the price of the nontradables consumption good stays 
constant relative to the price of the tradables. Therefore, the NC locus must be steeper 
and the NK locus must be flatter than the ray through the origin.
Figure 2.2 The Effects of Temporary Boom on Nontradable Sector
PNK
Adapted from Bevan et al. (1990), Figure 4.2, p 102 
Note: NC = Nontradable consumption goods
NK = Nontradable capital goods
PNK = Price nontradable consumption goods
PNK = Price nontradable capital goods
Py = Price of tradables
The initial equilibrium, Eo, combines the pre-boom price loci NC and NK. A 
temporary positive shock increases the demand for, and the price of, the nontradable and 
shifts both NC and NK to the right. Due to correct perception of the temporary nature 
of a resources boom, and imperfections in the capital market in most developing 
countries, the propensity for a rise in demand for nontradable capital goods is higher 
than the propensity for a rise in demand for nontradable consumption goods. Thus, the
demand for nontradable capital goods, such as buildings, rises relative to nontradable
consumption goods, such as services. This raises the NK locus proportionately upward 
more than the rightward shift of NC locus and shifts the equilibrium to Ep At this new 
equilibrium, Pnk/Pt increases more than Pnc/Pt and raises the relative price of 
Pnk/Pnc higher than pre-boom level.
2.5.1 Effects of a Construction Boom
The rise in the price of nontradable capital to tradable (Pnk/P t) relative to price of the 
nontradable consumption to tradable (Pnc/Pt) has significant distributional effects 
besides the usual effects on domestic demand and supply. The initial spending out of 
the windfall comes to the suppliers of nontradables as rent. Thus, part of the windfall 
gain, in the form of increased income, is transferred to other agents within the economy 
through the spending effect. As a consequence, the incidence of gain distributed 
between the urban and rural sectors of an economy changes. The increase in the relative 
price of nontradable capital relative to nontradable consumption reduces the quantity 
demanded for nontradable capital. When the price of nontradable capital goods is fully 
accounted for by rents, there will not be an economy-wide income effect, since the 
purchasing power of the windfall of the initial recipients is already being reduced. On 
aggregate, therefore, the windfall from asset accumulation will have only substitution 
effects (Bevan et al., 1990).
The impact of the relative price increase fully reflects on the upward-sloping 
supply curve of nontradables due to increased resource cost and income effect. Since 
the nontradable supply in the short run is less elastic, due to lags in the production 
process, and administrative difficulties in absorbing rapid changes, it would be costly to 
attempt to absorb a windfall gain into the domestic economy too quickly. At the same
time, it might also be too costly to invest a windfall gain too slowly, since they can only 
earn a relatively low lending rate of interest if they are held in the form of foreign 
financial assets over a long period (Bevan et al., 1990).
The role of foreign assets is another major building block of the theory of 
construction boom. If there is no impediment to international capital mobility, it will be 
efficient to invest the windfall gain in foreign assets instead of investing in the domestic 
economy. The price of domestic capital goods rises sharply during a construction 
boom, since capital goods are partly nontradable. If there is no imperfection in the 
capital-market, the domestic rate of return will exceed the world deposit interest rate, 
making it optimal to invest the windfall savings domestically. However, there are 
capital market imperfections in most developing countries and the price of capital goods 
rises during a construction boom. Therefore, investing in foreign assets would be 
optimal, as the real value of the windfall gain is protected by holding foreign assets and 
repatriating them when the capital goods price drops at the end of the boom period. 
Thus, the investment boom can be spread out over a longer period and the relative price 
of ‘construction’ can be moderated by building up foreign financial assets during the 
boom years. Repatriated foreign assets can also be used in the post-boom period to 
finance a higher level of consumption. Hence, access to the world capital market raises 
welfare compared to a closed capital model in two ways. First, domestic investment is 
subject to diminishing returns while the interest rate on foreign assets is constant. 
Second, it offers the possibility of postponing investment until the price of domestic 
capital goods has fallen, reducing the spending effect , and dampening the symptoms of 
'Dutch disease' as well as ‘construction boom’.
2 Cameroon provides an example of avoiding the spending effects o f resources boom by investing abroad (Benjamin 
etal., 1989) .
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2.5.2 Private versus Public Savings
In most economies, the government plays a central role in determining the overall 
response to a resources boom. As a result, the consequences of a boom are borne 
differently by different agents in an economy. In many developing countries private 
agents are not allowed to hold foreign financial assets directly. They can either match 
their savings to domestic capital formation continuously or they can hold foreign assets 
indirectly, by acquiring financial claims on government which then effectively holds 
foreign assets on their behalf. Even if windfall revenue does accrue directly to the 
private sector, the government is likely to control this by various policy measures, thus 
altering the consequences of a resources boom. Governments can sterilise the foreign 
exchange flow by increasing the required reserve ratio of the banking system, thereby 
eliminating excess demand for money. Governments can also invest the revenue gain in 
foreign financial assets received from private agents in exchange of domestic currency. 
These actions can moderate the effects of a construction boom, stretching the 
investment boom into a savings boom (Bevan et al., 1991:107).
Even where the windfall accrues to private agents, in the absence of government 
intervention to manage it, a change in tax and public expenditure management is an 
obvious passive participation of government in response to a positive trade shock. As 
national income increases permanently following a resources boom, tax revenues also 
increase, lowering the public sector’s deficit. Public expenditure is expected to rise if 
the elasticity of ‘desired’ public expenditure is positive with respect to permanent 
national income. Governments can choose to spend the windfall on capital goods and 
thus increase capital formation. They can also choose to spend the windfall earnings on 
consumer goods, which tends to reduce the propensity to save as well as invest.
In many developing countries the government is the major 'share holder' of the 
booming sector and the windfall assets automatically accrue to the government. In this 
case, the government has to decide how to share the gain between the private and public 
sectors. The government can reduce taxes, give subsidies to private production or 
consumption, or purchase goods and services on behalf of the private sector. In the case 
of production subsidies, private suppliers can share the benefit through higher income 
and enjoy lower prices, in the case of price subsidies given by government in an attempt 
to transfer the windfall gain. When government purchases goods and services for the 
public sector, the benefit to the population depends partly upon whether they desire it 
and partly upon the nature of the goods (Bevan et al., 1991). The population can enjoy 
the benefit of the windfall if increased government expenditure leads to greater 
availability of public goods, such as medical facilities, education, roads etc, through 
which a higher factor incomes and higher standard of living can be provided.
2.6 Summary and Conclusion
The study of the effects of a booming sector, which was initiated by Gregory and 
subsequently developed by various economists in short, medium and long-run contexts, 
was formally integrated by Corden and Neary and is known as the ‘core’ model. The 
major prediction of the model is that appreciation of the real exchange rate induced by a 
resources boom reallocates productive resources and changes the structure of an open 
economy. However, the outcomes of the core ‘Dutch disease’ model may not 
materialise in a developing country with unemployed resources and a restricted trade 
regime. Therefore, some modifications have been suggested to deal with the various 
inadequacies of the ‘core’ model of ‘Dutch disease’. These amendments are likely to
generate different outcomes in the process of economic adjustment towards long-run 
equilibrium.
While this extended version of the 'Dutch disease’ model shows the linkage 
between movements of the real exchange rate and macroeconomic adjustment, the 
‘construction boom’ theory analyses the dynamic adjustment of the goods and assets 
market in response to a resources boom. As in the static case, the resulting 
‘construction boom’ does not constitute a ‘disease’, if the nature of the shock is 
correctly perceived, and if agents are free to adjust their portfolio of foreign and 
domestic assets. Just as the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ is not a disease, so a 
‘construction boom’ may be the appropriate response to a trade shock in a developing 
country.
The main objective of this study is to analyse the outcomes of a resources boom 
in a developing country context, given a condition of openness in labour, capital and the 
international trade regime, by studying the PNG experience over the past two and a half 
decades. It incorporates the extended version of the ‘Dutch disease’ model, and the 
theory of ‘construction boom’, in an attempt to analyse macroeconomic adjustment with 
emphasis on the major linkages between the real exchange rate movement, sectoral 
transformation and the long-run growth of PNG in response to resources booms over the
study period.
CHAPTER 3
AN OVERVIEW OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA ECONOMY
Introduction
In order to provide the setting for studying the problems and issues raised in Chapter 1, 
the objective of this chapter is to provide a broad description of the economy of Papua 
New Guinea. It provides information about the resources base, structure of the 
economy, institutional settings, characteristics of the labour market, importance of 
foreign trade and the major macroeconomic policies.
The chapter is organised into ten sections. Section 2 discusses political 
background; Section 3 sketches economic performance; Section 4 presents the structure 
of the economy; Section 5 discusses the characteristics of the labour market; Section 6 
describes the role of the public sector; Section 7 provides a financial sector overview; 
Section 8 describes external trade patterns; Section 9 discusses macroeconomic policies; 
and Section 10 summarises the economy’s key features.
3.2 Political Background
Papua New Guinea comprises the eastern half of the island of New Guinea, called the 
mainland, the Bismarck Archipelago, and the northern part of the Solomon Islands, 
together with hundreds of small offshore islands. PNG was colonised at various times 
by Australia, European powers and Japan.
A Papua New Guinean-controlled central government was formed in 1972, and 
on 1 December 1973, the territories of Papua and New Guinea became a self-governing 
country. On 16th September 1975, PNG became fully independent from the Australian 
administration, although the ties between PNG and Australia remained very close. The 
British monarch, represented by a Governor-General, is head of state, but the real 
leadership is exercised by the Prime Minister. The country consists of twenty provinces
with a central government in Port Moresby. The National Parliament, a Westminster-
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style structure, consists of one hundred and nine representatives, democratically elected 
every five years.
3.2.1 Geography and Resource Base
New Guinea is located in the second largest island in the world, with a land area 
totalling 462.8 thousand square kilometres and a sea area of 3.1 million square 
kilometres. Most of its total land area is situated on the eastern half of the island of 
New Guinea. The main island is divided between PNG and Indonesia.
PNG is in the humid tropics and displays little variation in temperature. Its land- 
mass is dominated by rugged mountainous terrain which means that many villages and 
clans are isolated from each other. Approximately 30 per cent of the total land area of 
460,000 square kilometres is classified as suitable for agricultural development but only 
about one quarter of this is regularly used for agriculture, representing about 7 per cent 
of the total land area. Nearly 360, 000 square kilometres of forested area covers about 
78 per cent of the country (AIDAB, 1991).
The total population of PNG was around 4.1 million in 1993, is predominantly 
Melanesian, rural-based, and growing at about 2.3 per cent per annum. More than 700 
different local languages and dialects are spoken with allegiances closely tied to 
villages. English, Tok Pisin and Motu are the official PNG languages. The education 
system is controlled by the government but primary education is not compulsory. As a 
result primary school enrolment is much lower (only 73 per cent in 1992) compared to 
other lower-middle income countries (100 per cent in 1992) as shown in (Appendix 
Table A3.1)
PNG is abundantly endowed with renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources. This abundance of natural resources has given the country considerable 
developmental potential in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, tourism, minerals and 
petroleum, and agro-processing activities. PNG has some of the world’s richest gold 
and copper deposits, and recently became a producer of oil. PNG also has good 
potential for the supply of liquefied natural gas and methanol (A1DAB, 1994:183).
3.2.2 Stages of Social Development
According to the Human Development Report 1995, published by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), PNG is ranked 126th out of 174 countries, based on a 
human development index, a composite measure of income per capita, life expectancy 
and literacy rates (AusAID, 1996). With a GNP per capita estimated at US$950 in 
1992, Papua New Guinea is ranked as a lower-middle income developing country 
(World Bank, 1994). Its middle income status is somewhat misleading, however, in 
terms of some basic social indicators, PNG more closely resembles countries which are 
classified as low-income economies (GNP per capita of $650 and below).
Life expectancy is about 56 years, the adult literacy rate is below 52 per cent, 
and primary-school enrolment is about 73 per cent. These social indicators are 
substantially below those seen in PNG’s major neighbouring countries in the South 
Pacific and South-east Asia (for example, Fiji, Tonga, Thailand and Malaysia). 
However, PNG has achieved reasonable improvement in some key social indicators, 
compared with other low-income countries, including female and male life 
expectancies, infant mortality rates, and crude birth and death rates (Appendix Table 
A3.1). Furthermore, the country is not suffering from the kind of widespread poverty 
prevalent in comparable countries at a similar stage of development (AusAID, 1996).
PNG faces enormous economic and social problems in its efforts to develop its 
physical and human resources. PNG is characterised by its poor infrastructure. Only 
two third of the population is within the reach of a road. The rugged terrain, widely 
dispersed population centres, and low level of market oriented activities of the country 
present barriers to effective and low-cost transport and communications. As a 
consequence, fragmentation of the domestic market has increased production costs. The 
short supply of basic human skills, capital and entrepreneurship has resulted in a heavy 
dependency on external investment and highly paid foreign skilled workers.
The concept of private property is not well established. The traditional 
redistribution system of “Wantok” provides a valuable safety net for the community in 
times of sickness and distress, but also reduces individual incentive, in terms of 
entrepreneurship and wealth accumulation. About 97 per cent of land is owned in the 
traditional manner with the remainder owned by the government. The availability of 
land is limited because of the disorganised administration of land tenure arrangements.
Traditional owners of land have only agreed to a small portion of land in the major 
cities being converted from customary ownership to a leasehold form. There is no 
formal market for small pieces of land. As lenders prefer secure collateral, the 
insecurity of land tenure also limits access to finance. There is under-utilisation and 
under-investment in improving the productivity of land due to major divergence 
between private and social value of land (Jarrett et al., 1985). In addition to these 
limitations, increased social tensions and serious law and order problems remain a major 
impediment to both private investment and development in general. The provision of 
law and order services suffer from lack of proper management, poor training and skills, 
inadequate supervision, poorly articulated policies and implementation of policies in a 
timely fashion. Thus lack of law and order condition escalates the cost of providing 
other critical services. The problem of lawlessness is not only confined to the towns. 
Increased incidence of robberies on the HighLand Highway during the harvest season 
also directly reduce the income of rural people (Jarrett et al., 1989).
3.3 Economic Performance
Prior to independence, the economy of PNG achieved an average annual growth rate of 
6.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1965 and 1973, spurred by 
rapid growth in aid-financed public expenditure and by the establishment of the BCL 
mine. In the first few years after independence real GDP growth was moderate and 
PNG maintained a stable macroeconomic environment. The growth of per capita GDP 
was slow during the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to Jarrett et a l (1989) this 
poor performance of PNG economy was greatly influenced by the incidence of 
expatriates leaving the country taking their savings and skills.
Table 3.1: Economic Growth in PNG and Middle Income Economies
Papua New Guinea L o w e r
in c o m e
m id d le
e c o n o m ie s
M id d le
in c o m e  e c o n o m ie s
1970-80 1981-93 1970-80 1981-93 1970-80 1981-93
Annual % growth in GDP 2.2 3.1 5.1 1.6 5.5 2.2
GNP per capita (US$)a 260 1130 170 1590 1140 2840
A n n u a l %  g r o w th  in  G N P  p er  c a p ita 3 6.6 2.1 1.4 -0.5 3.6 0.2
Notes: a. GNP is calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, which adjusts the standard measure for recent 
changes to the exchange rate.
Source: AusAID (1996), Table A3, World Bank (1981).
However Garnaut and Baxter (1984) indicated a substantial increase in the share of 
market GDP accruing to the nationals in the late 1970s and by the end of the 1970s, 
nationals’ share of production was stabilished at a high level. However, PNG 
experienced an appreciable increase in growth from the mid-1980s, owing particularly 
to strong world market prices for its mineral resources and a marked improvement in the 
agricultural commodity export sector. The country faced an enormous setback in 1989, 
through the forced closure of the BCL mine, due to the secessionist rebellion, and a 
significant decline in world market prices for its major agricultural and tree crops 
exports.
The gloomy scenario was somewhat mitigated by strong growth in the petroleum 
and mineral sectors from the early 1990s. During the early 1990s, substantial expansion 
in the mineral and petroleum sector contributed to a relatively large growth in GDP. In 
1993, PNG’s per capita GNP amounted to an estimated US$1,130. Over the period 
1991 to 1994, an average annual growth rate of 10.6 per cent was achieved (Appendix 
Table A3.2).
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3.3.1 Investment and Savings
PNG’s ratio of gross investment to GDP has been comparable to other lower middle- 
income countries over the years. Investment is dominated by the mining sector, most of 
which comes through foreign companies. The mining sector’s contribution to gross 
capital formation averaged between 19.6 per cent and 56.8 per cent over 1984-94 and 
remained buoyant, although it fluctuated considerably over the years. Over 1970-94, 
gross domestic investment (GDI) accounted for about 26 per cent of GDP on average.
Table 3.2: Investment And Savings 1970-1993
(K million, current prices and percentage of GDP )
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1993
G r o ss  d o m e s tic  in v e s tm e n t 187.9 221.9 456.3 500.7 751.9 1017.4 1018.0
Gross fixed capital formation 182.4 186.5 395.2 466.9 772.9 1032.4 943.0
Changes in stocks 5.5 35.4 61.1 33.8 -21.0 -15.0 75.0
G r o ss  n a tio n a l sa v in g s 19.8 164.2 321.9 299.9 8.6 485.2 1434.0
D o m e stic  r e so u r c e  g a p -168.1 -57.7 -134.4 -200.8 -743.3 -532.2 416.0
G r o ss  d o m e s tic  sa v in g s 105.8 238.0 381.1 299.8 638.9 266.1 1575.0
P e r c e n ta g e  sh a r e  o f  G D P
Gross domestic investment 35.4 22.1 26.3 21.9 24.6 29.9 18.8
Gross national savings 3.7 16.4 18.5 13.1 18.7 19.4 44.0
Gross domestic savings 19.9 23.7 21.9 13.1 20.9 23.4 31.4
Source: World Bank (1995), AusAID (1996), Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 
various issues.
During the early 1970s, high investment activities were associated with mining 
and construction-sector investment. The sharp drop in aggregate investment in the mid- 
1980s was mainly due to the completion of major construction activity at the Ok Tedi
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mine, but gross domestic investment increased sharply from 1990 onwards, due to an 
upsurge in construction activity on the Kutubu and Porgera projects.
The share of non-mining investment fell from about 14 per cent of GDP in 1981 
to 8 per cent in 1991. However, since the early 1990s forestry has been attracting 
significant foreign investment. Investment in forestry and construction has greatly 
influenced the present steady performance in non-mining private investment. Higher 
investment in the construction sector also resulted from mineral booms during the early 
1990s. Investment in the manufacturing sector is not high except in some protected 
industries. A large portion of PNG’s investment has been financed by foreign sources.
Figure 3.1: Gross Domestic Investment and Gross Domestic Savings 1970-93
(percentage of GDP)
45 .
GDI as % GDP 
GDS as % GDP
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Year
Source: Constructed from various tables in World Bank (1995), (1991), AusAID (1996).
The performance of public savings in PNG has been very poor. Lower public 
savings is one of the major reasons why total domestic savings stays at a low level, 
averaging 13 per cent of GDP from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Despite a large 
capital outflow in 1992-93, as a result of openness in the capital market, private saving’s 
contribution to investment was remarkably high and averaged around 30 per cent of 
GDP over the 1991-93 period. As measured by the resource gap, PNG’s dependence 
upon foreign savings dropped sharply in 1993, as a result of strong growth from the 
early years of the 1990s ( Table 3.2).
Australia is the largest foreign investor in both the mining and non-mining 
sectors of PNG. Development of new mines such as Ok Tedi (copper and gold), Hides 
(gas), Kutubu (oil), Lihir (gold), Porgera (gold) and Misima (gold) have also attracted 
USA, UK and Canadian mining interests. Malaysia has become a significant investor in 
fisheries, timber and other trade and construction sub-sectors.
3.3.2 Inflation
From the mid-1970s, PNG was a low-inflation country. The average annual rate of 
inflation between 1975-79 was around 4.7 per cent, which was well below the level of 
PNG’s major trading partners.
During the 1980s, a moderate increase in inflation was due mainly to increased 
prices for food, raw materials and petroleum products, and a weaker kina. Between 
1990 and 1994, the average annual CPI-based inflation rate was around 5 per cent.
Figure 3.2: Inflation in Papua New Guinea 1970-94
(percentage change in CPI and GDP-deflator)
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Source: Appendix Table A3.2
Favourable external factors also contributed positively to the decline in inflation, 
including low international inflation, particularly in Australia, the major source of 
PNG’s imports (imported products carrying a weight of 50 to 60 per cent in the CPI).
3.4 Structure of the Economy
Data on sectoral growth and the changing composition of GDP are given in Table 3.3. 
The exploitation of abundant natural resources has led to the development of a dualistic 
economic structure dominated by a significant agricultural and forestry sector, and a 
capital intensive oil and minerals sector. Agriculture accounts for approximately one 
third of GDP1, and virtually all non-mineral exports, as well as providing the livelihood
1 As Levantis (1997) indicated that the reliability of this figure is poor since information on aggregate subsistence 
production and production marketed in the informal domestic markets is largely non-existent and hence this is an 
underestimate.
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for about 80 per cent of the population. There are two types of cash crop grown; those 
grown specially for the export markets and food crops grown for sale in the local 
market. Food crops consist mostly of vegetables and fruit, and constitute about half of 
this sector’s output. In the early 1960s, the agricultural sector accounted for more than 
50 per cent of GDP. The GDP share of agriculture (including forestry and fishery) 
declined from 40 per cent in 1970 to about 27 per cent in 1993. The share of forestry 
accounted for about 8 per cent of GDP in 1993.
Table 3.3: Sectoral Composition of GDP, Selected Years
(as percentage of GDP)
Y ear 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1995 (p ro jected)
A g r ic u ltu r e 40 30 33 33 29 27 31
M in e r a ls  a n d  P e tr o le u m 0.1 13 13 10 15 30 25
M a n u fa c tu r in g 5 7 10 12 9 9 8
C o n str u c t io n 13 7 4 5 5 4 5
S e r v ic e s 42 43 40 40 42 30 31
Source: Constructed from AusAlD (1996), AIDAB (1991), Bank of PNG, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 
various issues.
In terms of investment, exports, and net contributions to the balance of payments 
and government’s fiscal revenues, the mineral sector consisting of copper, silver, gold 
and oil production, is the dominant sector of the PNG economy. Data on sectoral 
growth indicates spectacular growth in the mining sector over the past two and a half 
decades. The mining sector's share (copper and gold) of GDP increased from 0.1 per 
cent in 1970 to about 30 per cent in 1993. Mineral and oil exports constituted over 73
per cent of total export earnings in 1992 compared with 18 per cent in 1972. The sector 
is represented by four active establishments , consisting of the copper and gold mine at 
Ok Tedi in Western Province and the gold mines at Misima, Milne Bay and at Porgera 
in Enga Province. Ok Tedi, Misima and Porgera have more than made up for the 
closure of Panguna. Although the mineral sector is overwhelmingly foreign owned, the 
government has reserved the right to acquire a 30 per cent equity in mining projects and 
22.5 per cent in petroleum (AIDAB, 1991). The Kutubu oil project was the first oil 
development in PNG and its first exports were shipped in July 1992. Further 
developments are occurring in the Gobe Main and Southeast Gobe fields.
The manufacturing sector includes food, soft drinks, beer, food canning and 
tobacco processing. Furniture making has been a minor feature of the sector. Small- 
scale engineering and metal processing, clothing and other light industries are also 
included. The sector is dominated by capital-intensive activities and is foreign owned 
and managed. The share of the manufacturing sector in the economy is small and has 
been stagnant over the past two decades. The expansion of manufacturing has been 
hampered by the shortage of entrepreneurial, managerial and labour skills, especially by 
the high cost of labour relative to productivity (Goodman et al., 1985). Over the period 
1970-95, its contribution to GDP has varied in the range of 5 to 12 per cent.
Over the 1970s and the 1980s, the services sector accounted for more than 40 
per cent of GDP on average and declined to 31 per cent in 1995. This sector includes all 
economic activities such as electricity, gas and water, transport and communications, 
trade, finance, insurance, real estate, community, social business and personal services.
A large new gold company, the Lihir Gold Ltd, commenced production in 1997.
The construction sector grew rapidly in the early 1970s, with the establishment 
of BCL, followed by a declining trend over the 1980s. The major cause of this fall was 
the failure to implement infrastructure projects. The contribution of the construction 
sector settled at around 5 per cent of GDP during the first half of the 1990s.
3.5 Labour Market
Data on employment are very scarce as there is no comprehensive reliable series of 
wage employment data in PNG. Major studies (Garnaut et al., 1977; Lodewijks, 1987; 
McGavin, 1993, 1991, 1986; Levantis, 1997) on PNG’s labour market indicate that the 
concept of employment is of limited relevance in PNG, since the majority of the 
population works in the non-monetised economy.
According to the 1971 census, less than one third of the population above the 
age of ten was in the work force, and less than one quarter of the labour force worked 
mainly in money-earning activities. In 1979, formal employment was about 15 per cent 
of the total economically active population. The labour force grew at about 1.5 - 2.2 per 
cent per annum over the 1980s. The 1990 census estimated the total labour force at 1.6 
million, or 46 per cent of total population. The total increase in unemployment between 
1980 and 1990 grew at an annual compound rate of 16.3 per cent, and was 27 per cent 
for males in 1991 (McGavin, 1993:59 ). Lack of formal job opportunities in the rural 
area and the large wage disparity between rural and urban minimum wages until 1992 
induced large scale rural to urban migration and increased urban unemployment which 
was 29.3 per cent according to 1990 Census (Levantis, 1997). A detailed discussion of 
wage structure in PNG is presented in Section 3.4.3.
The predominance of self-employment in the agricultural (35.5 per cent of total 
labour force in 1980) and subsistence sector (41.2 per cent of total labour force in 1980) 
indicates that wage employment in rural areas of PNG is relatively unimportant 
(AIDAB, 1991). Agriculture is the main source of employment, employing nearly 80 
per cent of the total labour force. In the formal sector , the private sector is the largest 
employer, providing almost 60-70 per cent of all formal jobs. Available data on 
employment over the period 1970-91 indicate no growth in formal-sector employment 
in the non-agricultural and mining sectors, although agricultural employment grew by 
3.7 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1991 (McGavin, 1991:66). After the labour 
market reforms in 1992, employment in the private sector grew about 8 per cent by 1994 
(AusAID, 1997).
PNG suffers from short supply with regards to high skilled labour. This short 
fall is normally satisfied by recruiting skilled expatriates. Expatriates labourers mainly 
come from Australia. Naturally, the wages and salaries to such high skilled labour are 
considerably high. However, the domestic supply of skilled labour has increased over 
time in response to high returns. As a result, expatriates labour supply in the formal 
wage employment has fallen from 7.3 per cent in 1980 to 3.6 per cent in 1990 (Levantis, 
1997).
Over the past three decades the growth rate in formal-sector employment has not 
kept pace with labour-force growth. Between 1970 and 1993, the annual growth rate of 
the labour force was 2.3 per cent, whereas the growth rate of formal wage employment 
was estimated at only 0.7 per cent. The breakdown of formal wage employment
Formal sector comprises the agriculture and plantation, the public services, mining, manufacturing and services.
indicates that the share of public-sector employment declined from 26.6 per cent of total 
wage employment in 1975 to 24 per cent in 1991 (Appendix Table A3.6).
Employment in the mining sector has remained at about 3 per cent of total 
formal employment since independence. Several other industry groups, mainly finance, 
communication and social service, and building and construction registered significant 
employment growth in the 1990s. However, despite high economic growth urban 
employment has been falling in the 1990s, adding to the number of unemployed persons 
in urban areas.
3.6 Public Sector
PNG inherited a relatively large public sector from the colonial era which occupies a 
prominent position in the economy. Between 1970 and the early 1990s, government 
expenditure constituted about one third of total GDP on average and about 40 per cent 
of non-mining GDP. The government’s share in total non-mining investment was 41 
per cent of GDP over the 1970s and 1980s, which is high compared with other low 
middle-income developing countries. The public sector provides more than 40 per 
cent of all jobs in the formal sector.
Despite its large size, the public sector has not been able to contribute much to 
sustainable economic growth in PNG. A major share of government expenditure has 
been directed towards consumption rather than investment, with nearly 85 per cent of 
total expenditure absorbed by wages and salary and various kinds of administrative 
activities. Capital expenditure represents a small proportion of total expenditure, 
resulting in a failure to meet the basic infrastructure needs of the private sector. 
Expenditure on operations and maintenance of capital and basic institutions has been
neglected, resulting in a perpetual reduction in the efficiency of infrastructure, 
investment and public services.
3.7 Financial Sector
PNG’s financial system is controlled by the Bank of Papua New Guinea (BPNG). The 
sector consists of five commercial banks, five merchant banks, sixteen active savings 
and loan societies, four financial companies, government-controlled pension and 
investment companies, nine insurance companies, a merchant bank and the Central 
Bank. The five commercial banks own over 80 per cent of the sector’s assets. Since 
independence, development in the financial-services sector has remained limited, and 
access to financial services in rural areas is particularly poor. Only the savings and loan 
societies function with some degree of effectiveness. The Rural Bank was established 
in 1994 from an old Development Bank and is targeted at the rural sector’s financial 
facilities. In recent years, the PNG government has undertaken various measures to 
deepen capital markets and create a more favourable climate for the financial sector to 
diversify and extend its reach to the rural population. Although the financial sector of 
PNG is relatively small, contributing less than 1 per cent of total non-mining GDP, the 
modern monetary economy has grown strongly with the mining sector's development.
3.8 Foreign Trade
The economy of PNG is highly dependent on international trade. Merchandise exports 
account for about 40-50 per cent of GDP, and are concentrated around a small number 
of mineral and agricultural commodities. In the mid-1960s, coffee was the major 
export. In the 1970s, the main sources of export earnings were mineral and agricultural 
commodities, among which palm oil became a significant export earner. Agricultural
exports are dominated by tree crops, such as coffee, copra, cocoa, coconut and palm oil 
and palm kernel, which constitute over 95 per cent of agricultural export earnings. 
From the early 1990s, the combination of higher prices and volumes increased the value 
of log exports more than five-fold and accounted for almost 20 per cent of the export 
value in 1994.
From the early 1990s, the dominance of mineral exports in total exports 
continued to increase, from 53.0 per cent in 1985 to 72.0 per cent in 1995. The mineral 
and petroleum sector accounted, on average, for more than 35 per cent of GDP per 
annum during 1992-95.
Australia is the major trading partner, accounting for 47 per cent of total trade. 
Japan is another significant trading partner, accounting for 27 per cent of total trade in 
1990. Over 40 per cent of PNG's imports come from Australia. Japan and the United 
States are also important sources of imports.
Non-mineral Exports
Non-mineral exports, which include exports from agriculture, forestry, fishery and 
others, contributed significantly to total exports in 1977-80. The share of agricultural 
exports in total export earnings was depressed over the first half of 1980s due to low 
world market prices for PNG’s major agricultural export crops. Total export revenues 
from the agricultural sector improved significantly in the mid-1980s and accounted for 
about 36 per cent of total exports but declined after 1985 because of a decline in 
production and falling prices (Table 3.4). The situation began to improve after 1992, 
due to an improvement in world prices for PNG’s agricultural exports and a 10 per cent
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nominal devaluation of the kina in 1990. Agricultural exports increased almost 330 per 
cent in 1994 from the 1990 level in real terms and accounted for 33 per cent of total 
exports. Since 1992, the export volumes of all major agricultural commodities 
increased significantly, with the exception of copra, rubber and tea.
Table 3.4: Minerals and Agricultural Exports of PNG, 1971-94
(current prices, Kina million)
Year Mining
exports
Agriculture
exports
Non-mining
exports41
Total
exports
1970 — 75.3 92.8 99.0*
1975 240.1 131.2 162.5 402.6
1980 322.4 230.3 319.4 704.2*
1985 489.9 330.2 436.3 926.2
1990 758.0 205.0 365.0 1123.0
1991 1005.4 204.6 384.6 1390.0
1992 1371.5 224.0 491.1 1862.6
1993 1767.8 270.0 759.2 2527.0
1994 1783.0 375.0 899.0 2682.0
1995 2435.0 498.0 965.0 3400.0
Note: a. Non-mining exports include the export value o f  agriculture, forestry, marine and other re-exports, * some total 
export entries are not equal to the sum of mining exports and non-mining exports because of omission of 
other minor exports items and re-exports.
Source: AusAID (1996, 1997), Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues.
Mineral Exports
Both the volume and value of minerals exports have grown significantly since the early 
1970s after the establishment of the BCL mine. The mineral sector’s contribution to 
total exports increased dramatically from virtually nothing in 1970 to nearly 60 per cent
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of total export earnings in 1975. From the mid-1980s, the share of exports as a 
proportion of GDP grew rapidly (Table 3.4).
In 1989, copper, gold and coffee alone generated 72 per cent of total sales. In 
1992 mineral exports accounted for 73.6 per cent of total merchandise exports compared 
to 53 per cent in 1985. The increase was due to the combined effects of the 
commencement of crude oil exports in June 1992 and increases in the value of gold 
exports, reflecting increased production at the Porgera and Misima mines. In 1993, 
export revenues from minerals and petroleum accounted for 35 per cent of GDP and 70 
per cent of total merchandise exports. Total exports accounted for 52 per cent of GDP 
between 1993-95.
Terms of Trade
The prices of PNG’s export commodities exhibited a great deal of volatility in the world 
market. PNG’s terms of trade remained at a high level during the 1970s and then fell 
substantially over the early years of the 1980s. TOT improved greatly in 1984 as the 
world market prices of PNG’s export commodities improved from the depressed 
situation of the early 1980s. TOT started to fall from the mid-1980s (with an exception 
in 1988) and remained low until 1992. The situation improved in 1993, with increased 
world market prices for agricultural commodities.
3.8.1 The Balance of Payments and International Reserves
In the 1970s, PNG's balance of payments (BOP) was generally in surplus. During the 
1980s, a positive BOP was achieved during 1983-85, but deteriorated in 1989, 
following the closure of the Bougainville mine and a drastic decline in PNG’s 
agricultural commodity prices. From 1992, both the trade and current account went
dramatically into surplus, due largely to the contribution from the Kutubu petroleum 
project and increased gold and log exports.
International Reserves
PNG’s international reserves, which include actual holdings of gold, SDRs and foreign 
exchange assets, plus the reserves position at the IMF, have fluctuated sharply over the 
years. Due to an unfavourable external situation, international reserves for PNG fell to 
K272.2 million at the end of 1982. The reserve position improved substantially in 1985 
and covered 5.8 months of total import bills. The large growth in liquidity created a 
continual decline in the international reserve level between 1990 and 1994. However, 
the level of international reserves improved at the end of 1995 to K357.4 covering 2.6 
months import bill (Table 3.5).
Table 3.5: International Reserves and Import Ratio 1975-95
(Selected Years, K million)
Y ear 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
In ternationa l R eserves/a 140.1 300.4 464.3 377.9 309.0 244.0 137.9 112.4 357.4
Im port R atio /b 4.1 4.8 5.8 4.3 2.4 2.5 1.6 1 2.6
Note: a/ Reserves are the actual holdings of gold, SDRs and foreign exchange assets plus the reserves 
position at the IMF, which are available to the monetary authorities to meet balance of payments needs, 
b/ The import ratio shows the number of month’s of import that the international reserves could purchase 
using the previous three months imports as the base.
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, various issues.
3.8.2 Foreign Aid
Foreign aid (including grants) plays an important role in PNG’s economy. The country 
has always had access to international sources of finance and generous concessionary
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finance for public-sector activities. The contribution of foreign aid averaged about 11 
per cent of GDP between 1977 and 1993.
The major share of foreign aid to PNG comes from Australia. However, the 
share of Australian aid to total foreign aid declined from 85 per cent in 1982 to 73 per 
cent in 1993, compared with 100 per cent of total aid in 1970 (Appendix Table A3.7).
Table 3.6: Foreign Aid to PNG 1970-94
Y e a r T otal Aid ( U S $ ) Aid p er  ca p ita  ( U S $ ) S h a r e  o f  Aid to  G D P  (%)
1970 112.4 46.1 17.3
1971 135.2 54 .5 18.8
1972 148.6 58 .5 17.4
1973 208 .6 80 .2 15.9
1974 307.2 115.1 20 .8
1975 322.1 118.0 23 .7
1976 283 .9 101.8 18.7
1977 238 .0 83.2 14.5
1978 263 .5 89.9 13.6
1979 270 .6 90.2 11.8
1980 326 .0 106 .2 12.8
1981 336.0 107 .0 13.4
1982 310.7 96.8 13.2
1983 333.0 100.9 12.9
1984 324 .3 95 .9 12.6
1985 259.2 74 .9 10.7
1986 263 .9 74 .3 10.0
1987 321.9 88.7 10.3
1988 374.7 101.8 10.3
1989 336.5 89.5 12.4
1990 413.1 107.6 12.9
1991 397.2 101.1 10.5
1992 443 .4 110.3 10.4
1993 303.2 73 .8 5.9
1994 326.0 77.6 6.3
Source: Constructed from World Bank (1981), World Bank (1995) and AusAID (1995, 1996, 1997).
Net official assistance declined sharply from 24 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 14.5 
per cent of GDP in 1977 and then continued to fall more steadily until 1990. The share 
of total aid accounted for only 5.9 per cent of GDP in 1993, with a significant decline in
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budget support from Australia. This decline in the share of foreign assistance to GDP 
was offset by increased gains from export revenues and taxes from external trade during 
the early 1990s. Other major donors are the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan, the European Union and Germany.
3.9 Macroeconomic Policies
The objectives of macroeconomic policies can be described as the establishment and 
maintenance of external balance and internal balance (including price stability), with an 
efficient allocation of resources. The most difficult task confronting policy makers is to 
achieve several goals simultaneously. Thus, the common practice is to identify 
particular instruments which are most effective in achieving particular desired goals. 
Economic theory suggests that in a small open economy the instrument of expenditure 
policy could be assigned to the external-balance objective, the wages policy to the 
internal-balance objective and the exchange rate to the price-stability objective (Garnaut 
and Baxter, 1984). Trade and exchange rate policy can also play a powerful role in 
determining relative prices, profitability and production of traded goods, as well as 
providing incentives to domestic producers in external trade. PNG pursued active 
macroeconomic policies for stabilising the economy. These policies are discussed in the 
following sub-sections.
3.9.1 Fiscal Policy
PNG’s administration earned a reputation for prudent macroeconomic management 
during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s. Cautious policies were pursued with 
respect to external borrowing, domestic absorption and the exchange rate.
Table 3.7: Central Government Revenues and Expenditures 1970-1994
(percentage share of GDP)
Share of GDP (per cent) 1 9 7 0 -7 4  1 9 7 5 -7 9 1 9 8 0 -8 4 1 9 8 5 -8 9 1 9 9 0 -9 4
T o ta l r e v e n u e  and  gran ts 31 3 7 3 5 3 4 2 9
In tern a l r e v e n u e 13 16 21 2 3 2 3
M R S F - 5 5 4 1
F o r e ig n  g ra n ts 18 16 9 7 5
T o ta l e x p e n d itu r e 3 5 3 5 3 6 3 2 3 2
C u rren t e x p e n d itu r e 2 6 31 3 0 3 0 2 8
C a p ita l e x p e n d itu r e 9 4 6 2 4
O v e r a ll su r p lu s /d e f ic it -4 -2 -1 2 -3
S o u r c e : C o n str u c te d  fro m  A u s A I D , 1 9 9 6  an d  W o r ld  B a n k  ( 1 9 9 1 ) ,  v a r io u s  ta b le s .
Throughout the period 1976-82 fiscal restraint was the most important
instrument through which external balance was sought. As a result, the budget deficit, 
as a ratio to GDP, declined to 2 per cent in 1975-79 from a budget deficit of 4 per cent 
in 1970-74 (Table 3.7). The declining trend in the budget deficit continued until the 
mid-1980s when the deficit was only 1 per cent of GDP.
From 1989-90, the fiscal deficit rose significantly to a new peak of 6 per cent of 
GDP due to the closure of the Panguna mine in Bougainville and the subsequent fall in 
PNG’s agricultural-commodity export prices in the world market. The fiscal deficit 
widened considerably due to indiscreet fiscal actions. As a result, the budget deficit 
averaged 4.75 per cent of GDP per annum over the 1990-93 period. However, due to 
fiscal restraint the budget deficit declined to 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1994.
Stabilisation Funds
Cushioning the economy against the destabilising effects of external shocks has been an 
important objective of government policy. Two types of stabilisation fund were 
established to deal with the impact of fluctuating mineral and commodity prices. The 
Mineral Resources Stabilisation Funds (MRSF), established in 1974, receives all 
government revenues from the minerals sector. Originally it released them to the 
government budget, according to a formula designed to reduce fluctuations that would 
otherwise occur. In the early 1980s with the depressed world prices for PNG's exports, 
the MRSF contributed between 16 to 21 per cent of the central government's internal 
revenue. In 1992, the MRSF contribution declined to 7 per cent of government internal 
revenue. Legislative changes in the mid-1990s allowed more direction in the flow of 
funds to the budget.
Operated by the Commodity Boards, the Commodity Price Stabilisation Funds 
(CPSF) for three major agricultural export commodities aims to stabilise the prices 
along a moving long-term average export price. The major objective of CPSF is to 
provide price support to producers during difficult periods. CPSF receives the levies 
paid by exporters and holds these deposits, returning them to producers during periods 
of low prices.
3.9.2 Monetary Policy
The Bank of Papua New Guinea is responsible for the conduct of monetary and 
financial policies. Monetary policy has been geared towards financial stability, by 
neutralising the impact of temporary fluctuations in liquidity originating from external 
shocks, whilst ensuring the availability of sufficient liquidity and credit to assist the
growth of the non-mining sector. The use of open-market operations is not a viable 
option, as the market for government securities is too small. In the absence of open- 
market operations, the BPNG relies on credit ceilings, changes in liquidity requirements 
and moral suasion on interest rates.
During the 1970s, monetary policy was somewhat passive, because of 
constraints imposed by the fixed exchange rate regime. Through tight monetary policy, 
monetary stability was achieved over the 1980s and the money supply remained stable, 
at around 33 per cent of GDP, well below the 44-per-cent average for comparable low 
middle-income countries (AIDAB, 1993).
Table 3.8: Monetary Conditions
Selected Years 1982-94
Year 1982 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
V olu m e o f  M oney (kina million) 
Total Money supply (M3) 568 814 1082 1273 1432 1812.5 1853.6
Growth rate of M3 (%) 2.4 8.7 4.3 17.7 12.5 26.6 2.3
In terest R ates (% per annum) 
Commercial lending rate n.a. 16.1 16.0 15.2 13.8 10.7 10.0
(weighted average)
182 day Treasury Bills 11.7 12.25 10.50 10.5 6.50 6.02 8.75
Term deposits (weighted average) n.a. 16.4 9.90 9.6 6.6 4.6 4.5
L iquid  A ssets R atios (all 
commercial banks)
Actual 19.4 13.9 15.0 13.5 19.2 28.9 31.7
Minimum 16.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 11.0 26.0
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, September 1991, June 1993 and 
December 1994.
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Between 1991 and 1993, the money supply grew much faster than GDP. A 
deterioration in fiscal management was mainly responsible for monetary growth in the 
early 1990’s. Domestic debt rose to K1606 million in mid-1994 due to a high level of 
government borrowing from the domestic banking system. Interest rates were below 
Australian levels through the period of price stability in the 1970s and middle of the 
1980s, rose sharply through the exchange rate crisis of the early 1990s, and 
subsequently eased but remained substantially above international levels.
After flotation of the Kina in 1994, the conduct of monetary policy changed 
substantially. Under the floating exchange-rate regime the BPNG has greater control 
over the conduct of monetary policy as there is no direct link between money supply 
and international reserves.
3.9.3 Wages Policy
The concept of paid labour and cash were introduced in PNG with the establishment of 
plantation in the nineteenth century. PNG has a long history of official intervention in 
the labour market, primarily through the setting and indexation of minimum wages, 
public-sector wages and employment policies. During most of the colonial period, the 
main objective of labour-market intervention was to attract and protect new entrants in 
the formal sector (primarily in plantations), leading eventually to the introduction of a 
system of cash wage employment and a legal minimum wage.
Figure 3.3: Nominal and Real Urban and Rural Minimum Wages 1967-93
(Weekly Wages, real wages are at constant 1977 prices)
m
I
70
I I Rural nominal
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Source: World Bank (1991) Table 4.2, p.75 and AusAID (1995) Table A22.
Wages in the formal sector are set by the Minimum Wage Board (MWB), 
formally established in 19724, based on a tripartite board of employers, employees and 
government, in contrast to the Australian system of compulsory arbitration (AIDAB, 
1994). In 1974, the MWB was institutionalised, following the Australian practice of 
six-monthly automatic cost-of-living indexation. This system of full and automatic 
indexation to the cost of living continued until 1983.
Between 1972 and 1975, minimum urban wages increased three-fold, in nominal 
terms, and 50 per cent in real terms. Consequently, rural-urban wage differentials
4 Governmental interventions in the labour market by introducing the minimum wages was first set in 1945. The 
structure now in place was established between 1972 and 1975 (World Bank, 1981:19).
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increased sharply, creating unrealistic expectations about job prospects in urban centres. 
The consequent influx of population to city centre increased the urban unemployment 
rate as well as contributing to a deterioration in law-and-order. The PNG government 
froze urban wages temporarily in 1976. From 1983, partial indexation has been followed 
which has served to moderate real wage increases. Despite the worsening employment 
situation, real minimum wages remained remarkably constant until the early 1990s.
There is a large gap between wages in the formal and informal sectors. Limited 
data on informal market wages were available, prior to a 1990 urban survey, which 
found that average weekly wages for the informal market was 62 per cent of the 
minimum hourly rate and 84 per cent of the minimum weekly rate for urban wages, and 
average earnings for the self-employed was 52 per cent of the minimum weekly wage 
(AID AB, 1993).
The urban wage rates were also much higher in PNG compare to other 
developing countries. The urban minimum wage in the late 1970 in PNG was double 
than that in Malaysia and Western Samoa, four times that in the Philippines and 
Thailand and about ten times that in Indonesia and Sri Lanka (McGavin, 1986:152). 
This high minimum wages contributed largely to unemployment problem and hindered 
the development of manufacturing sector (Goodman et al., 1985)
In August 1992 the centralised wage-fixing system was abandoned in favour of a 
system whose focused on productivity, which unified the dual system of rural and urban 
minimum wages and introduced a national youth wage set at 75 per cent of the new 
national minimum. In 1993, this resulted in a 4.7 per cent decline in real wages,
followed by a further decline of 2.8 per cent in 1994 and 14.7 per cent in 1995 
(AusAID, 1996).
3.9.4 Trade Policy
During the 1970s and early 1980s, PNG had a fairly liberal trade regime. Taxes on 
imports were quite low on average, at about 5 per cent, during the 1970s. In the early 
1980s, a protective tariff of 10 per cent was provided to import-competing industries. 
Since the mid-1980s, increased protection in the form of tariff and import bans has been 
prominent. These interventions were motivated by an assortment of revenue collection 
and distributional objectives to discourage imports and encourage domestic production 
(import substitution).
The 10 per cent tariff was subsequently increased to 17.5 per cent in the mid- 
1980s, and raised again to 30 per cent in the early 1990s, for all goods where there was 
domestic production. Import taxes on luxury goods and other consumer goods were 
imposed at higher rates of 50 to 80 per cent. A few other items, such as tobacco, wine, 
beer and spirits, soft drinks, motor vehicles and petroleum products were subjected to 
even higher import taxes and sometimes even to penal import duties. Poultry, pork, 
sugar, flour, animal feed, canned meat, fruit, vegetables, honey, toilet soap, matches, 
wooden doors and plywood were protected by quotas or by a complete ban on imports.
From the early 1990s, the protection accorded sugar and cement, for example, 
led to higher consumer prices and a reduction in general welfare. Import taxes on 
essential consumer items, such as canned fish and rice, and other non-competing inputs 
to domestic production, were exempted or reduced. Effective protection for the 
agricultural sector, especially for food items exports, is low or negative. While inputs
to domestic production of food items are taxed substantially, imports of canned fish and 
cereals are exempt from duty and the domestic production of luxury and ‘special’ items 
-  such as cigarettes, soft drinks, spirits, beer, and tobacco -  has been given major 
incentives.
In the early 1990s, the effective rate of protection on most locally manufactured 
goods ranged between approximately 60 to 160 per cent (AusAID, 1996). Final 
products were protected at rates of 30 to 80 per cent. The protection rate for imports of 
non-competing inputs was zero, which accounts for about one-half of the value of 
imports.
3.9.5 Exchange Rate Policy
Before independence, PNG was a part of the Australian monetary system and had no 
foreign-exchange requirements of its own. The Central Bank of the country was 
established and a set of exchange regulations was formulated and introduced prior to 
independence. The BPNG issued PNG’s first currency, the ‘Kina’, on 19th April 1975 
on a par with the Australian dollar. PNG’s monetary system became independent from 
the Australian monetary system on 1 January 1976.
Between Independence and the end of 1981, the kina was revalued by 30 per 
cent against the Australian dollar, by 15 per cent against the import-weighted basket, 
and by about by 9 per cent against a trade-weighted basket (Garnaut and Baxter, 
1984:15). The method of setting the exchange rate daily, and quoting daily to some 
variant of a trade-weighted basket, by the BPNG against the Australian and US dollar,
was introduced actively after 1980.
Figure 3.4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate* in PNG 1970-94
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Note: Three different nominal effective exchange rate indices are constructed by using import share, 
export share and trade share as weights. The three measures show a similar pattern in their movements.
Source: Appendix Table A4.1.
The movement in the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) over time is 
shown in Figure 3.4. In the 1970s, PNG pursued a ‘hard kina’ policy to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate, while utilising appropriate monetary and fiscal policies to achieve 
external and internal balance.
The major aim of the ‘hard kina’ policy was to maintain a strong balance of 
payments with manageable levels of foreign debt through restraint on the real level of 
domestic expenditure and wages (Garnaut and Baxter, 1983:1). Until the mid-1980s, 
PNG maintained a convertible currency and reasonably low inflation by world
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Standards. The policy of 'hard kina’ had been pursued actively until fiscal policy 
became lax from the early 1980s.
There was a significant policy shift with a 10 per cent devaluation against the 
Australian dollar in March 1983, followed by another 10 per cent in January 1990. By 
the beginning of 1994 foreign exchange reserves had been under persistent pressure and 
were rapidly depleted due to widening of current account deficit which was mostly 
reflection of unsustainable fiscal policy. In October 1994, in the face of the worsening 
foreign exchange crisis, after a brief suspension of convertibility, the government 
decided to float (managed float) its currency.
3.10 Summary and Conclusion
PNG is a developing country with substantial economic potential. Abundant precious 
natural resources, and a small population, provide opportunities for economic 
development, provided there is prudent economic management coupled with political 
stability. The sectoral composition of GDP indicates structural changes have taken 
place in the economy from the early 1970s. The economy is dominated by the 
agricultural and mineral sectors with the manufacturing and services sectors declining 
over time and the minerals and petroleum sector’s contribution to GDP on the increase.
Overall, PNG’s growth has been marked by periods of high and low (even 
negative) growth. Gross domestic investment accounted for about 26 per cent of GDP 
on average over 1970-94 and the average annual contribution of gross domestic savings 
was more than 20 per cent of GDP between 1970 and 1994. Low inflation was 
maintained until the mid-1980s but increased substantially thereafter.
Population growth is moderate but unemployment is on the rise, due to the non­
expansion of wage employment. Wages in PNG were subject to a large degree of 
centralisation, with wage rates for the formal private sector determined by the MWB. 
The large urban-rural wage differential that existed for a long time but reduced by the 
wage policy reform of 1992 when PNG abandoned its centralised wage-fixing 
arrangements for a more flexible, productivity-based market-determined wage system 
which improved labour-market conditions and the competitiveness of the economy to a 
large extent.
In the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, PNG followed a cautious fiscal stance 
but. in the later part of the 1980s and early 1990s, fiscal indiscretion resulted in a 
blowout in the budget deficit. In terms of monetary policy, to a large extent, the BPNG 
has been able to maintain stability in monetary aggregates and contain interest rates and 
inflation.
Following a foreign exchange crisis in 1994, PNG moved away from the fixed 
exchange-rate regime to a managed float system. Trade policy was liberal until the 
early 1980s when it began to be slowly replaced by quantitative trade restrictions and 
higher tariffs. The current government has reaffirmed its commitment to broad-based 
tariff reform. In recent years, PNG has attempted to reduce its reliance on foreign 
assistance, which is expected to reduce instability in the domestic price level by 
reducing the spending effect on the domestic nontradable sector.
CHAPTER 4
THE DETERMINANTS OF REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the real exchange rate -  the price ratio of tradable to 
nontradable goods -  is the key link between resources booms and their impact on the 
performance of an economy. Like other relative prices, real exchange rates are affected 
by real and nominal disturbances which may be either long lasting or transient. A real 
exchange rate reacts to a series of real and nominal disturbances, including international 
terms of trade (TOT) shocks, government expenditure patterns, trade restrictions, net 
capital inflow and technological progress, as well as to domestic credit creation and 
nominal devaluation.
The objective of this chapter is twofold: to construct a real exchange rate index 
and to identify the major determinants of real exchange rate behaviour using a dynamic 
model of real exchange rate determination. Section 2 of this chapter presents the 
general concept of the real exchange rate; Section 3 constructs several series of real 
exchange rates for PNG using secondary data, discusses the problems of constructing 
such indices, and offers alternative measures to overcome the problems; Section 4 
develops a dynamic model of real exchange rate determination, to analyse how the long- 
run equilibrium real exchange rate reacts to a series of real disturbances, and also 
attempts to develop a monetary model incorporating variables determining the
movements of the actual real exchange rate; Section 5 presents an empirical model of 
the real exchange rate using the theoretical model developed in Section 4; Section 6 
presents the data sources and the different measures of variables employed; Section 7 
shows the econometric procedures used; Section 8 presents the empirical results; and 
section 9 summarises conclusions.
4.2 Concept of Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate (RER) can be defined as the ratio of the relative price of 
tradables (PT) with respect to nontradables (PNT). This ratio, which is also known as 
“Salter ratio”, can be written symbolically as follows:
_ Price of Tradables _ PtRER — ----------------------------  — ----
Price of Nontradables P nt
It is clear from the above definition that real exchange rate is a concept that 
measures the relative price of two goods as opposed to the nominal exchange rate which 
is a measure of two monies (Edwards, 1988b). International competitiveness is usually 
measured in terms of real exchange rate movements. The definition of the RER focuses 
on the rate at which tradables are exchanged for nontradables, or the cost of 
domestically produced tradables (Edwards, 1988b). A fall in this ratio represents an 
appreciation of the RER, induced by an increase in the price of nontradable goods, 
and/or by a reduction in the relative price of tradables to nontradables. Real exchange 
rate appreciation is synonymous with a deterioration in a country’s international 
competitiveness, as it increases the profitability of the nontraded sector and attracts 
resources from other traded sectors, as well as increasing the domestic cost of producing
tradable goods. By contrast, an increase in this ratio represents a real depreciation, or an 
improvement in the international competitiveness of tradable production.
It is important to recognise a fundamental notion about the concept of the RER. 
It is not unique for every sector of an economy. Within the tradable sectors, different 
real exchange rates can be observed for import substitutes and for exportables. For 
example, an exporter’s real exchange rate can be significantly different to the real 
exchange rate for an importer, because of costs and productivity differences in these 
sectors. For these reasons different RER indices are used separately to identify the 
changes in the competitiveness of importable and exportable sectors of an economy.
4.3 Real Exchange Rate Indices
Construction of a RER index is difficult, since the exact counterpart of the price of 
tradables (PT) and nontradables (PNT) is not directly observable. Furthermore, in the 
presence of trade restrictions, some potentially tradable sectors behave as nontradable 
sectors. Thus, disaggregation between these sectors becomes less meaningful. 
Empirical study to examine the theory of the real exchange rate in the tradable and 
nontradable spheres has always lagged behind due to the limitations of precise variable 
measurement and difficulty in obtaining data along tradable and nontradable lines.
The most direct measure of the RER can be constructed by disaggregating GDP 
between the tradable sector and nontradable sector and deriving the price ratio of these 
two sectors to observe RER movements. GDP and imports of goods and services are 
divided into two broad divisions of tradables and nontradables. Tradable goods are 
defined as goods and services that are either traded internationally or could be traded at
some ‘plausible range of variation in the relative prices’ (Goldstein and Officer, 
1979:415). Therefore, tradable goods have a wider scope than traded goods and their 
prices are determined by world prices and exchange rates. Nontradables are those 
goods and services that, for reasons (such as transport costs) cannot be traded 
internationally. Their prices are determined by the interaction of domestic demand and 
supply conditions. Goldstein and Officer (1979) suggest three criteria to draw the 
distinction between tradable and nontradable goods. First, tradable goods have a higher 
degree of foreign trade participation rate than nontradables. Secondly, correlations of 
price changes for tradables are much higher across countries than for nontradables, and 
finally, tradables are closer substitutes for traded goods than are nontradables.
The method of disaggregating GDP into tradable and nontradable sectors has 
two fundamental drawbacks. First, in most developing countries this disaggregation of 
GDP between tradables and nontradables is too broad to compare across sectors. 
Second, in the presence of trade restrictions, some tradable sectors behave as 
nontradable sectors and, in this case, the existing disaggregation between tradable and 
nontradable sectors does not provide a meaningful comparison. In any case, since PNG 
does not publish estimates of current and constant price of GDP by production sectors it 
is not possible to use this method.
A more practical proposition is to construct the real exchange rate index by 
disaggregating the components of the CPI into tradable and nontradable categories. 
Housing, rent and power components of domestic CPI can be commonly used as 
proxies for nontradable prices1. This method also has some drawbacks, because,
1 Warr (1986) computed the index o f the relative PT to PNT for Indonesia, taking the ratio o f the wholesale price of 
imported commodities to the Indonesia-wide CPI component which belongs to nontradable categories.
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although this price index of nontradables includes most of the nontradable elements, it 
also incorporates some tradable items such as fuel and household equipment. Another 
problem with this index is in selecting appropriate weights to be attached to each 
component of this proxy. Furthermore, with very few exceptions, disaggregated CPI 
data are not readily available on an annual basis in most developing countries, including 
PNG.
Given the practical limitations of direct measures, the RER is usually proxied by 
the following measure:
eP-r*
RERppp =
where e is the nominal exchange rate defined as a domestic currency price of foreign 
*
currency, PT is the foreign price, and P is the domestic price level. The PT is a 
composite price measure of exportables and importables and the domestic price level 
measures the domestic PNT. Therefore, the real exchange rate is the ratio of foreign 
prices measured in domestic currency to the domestic price level.
The problem with constructing the above index starts with the choice of an 
appropriate nominal exchange rate. Should the nominal exchange rate be with respect 
to a single foreign currency, that is, bilateral exchange rate, or does the nominal 
exchange rate have to be a weighted average of bilateral exchange rates of major trading 
partners? Then comes the problem of choice of weights. Traditionally trade weights 
are popularly used to capture the trading pattern of a country. Corden (1991) 
conjectures whether services and remittances should be included alongside the
merchandise trade weights. The problem is further complicated by the existence of 
multiple exchange rates systems in some developing countries.
Several alternative price indices for the PT and PNT have been suggested as 
possible candidates for the construction of a PPP-based RER. The popular and common 
practice is to construct a real exchange index by deflating the trade-weighted nominal 
exchange rate adjusted for foreign price by a proxy for domestic nontradable price. The 
most widely used proxy for tradable and nontradable price is CPI. This measure is 
popular, since almost every country publishes CPI on a regular basis.
But the foreign CPI index has a major drawback as a fair proxy for the PT. The 
deficiency of using this index is that CPIs include large elements of nontradable prices. 
If, for example, the price of foreign nontradables increases relative to the price of 
tradables, then this increase in the PNT will reflect on the foreign CPI. Therefore, 
foreign CPI, as a proxy for tradable prices, is not appropriate as it may overstate the 
relevant foreign inflation and thereby overstate the depreciation of the real exchange 
rate (Little et al., 1993:259).
Because of the problem associated with the use of CPI as a proxy for the PT, the 
use of the foreign wholesale price index as a proxy of PT to measure the RER is the 
most common practice and this measure of real exchange rate (RERl)is used for this for 
study. Therefore, the trade-weighted real exchange rate is defined as:
WPI *RER1 = e m ----—
P
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where WPI* is the foreign wholesale price index proxied for the world PT, is the 
trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate and P is the domestic price level 
representing the price of domestic nontradables. Using average trade-weighted WPI*s 
as proxy for tradables solves some of the problems arising from using foreign CPIs, as it 
is heavily weighted with tradable items and does not include services. There may arise 
some possibility of double counting while using WPI as a proxy for the price of 
tradable, since WPI measures commodity prices at varying stages of production. 
Despite this minor limitation, WPI is considered to be a reasonable proxy for the world 
price of tradables.
Domestic CPI is the standard proxy for the PNT since the major components of 
the domestic CPI basket comprises nontradable goods and services. The price deflator 
for GDP is another common proxy that is used for the PNT. Neither CPI nor the GDP 
deflators are appropriate indicators of the price of nontradables, since both of these 
indices measure the price movement as an aggregate of tradable and nontradable goods 
and services and do not just represent independently the separate price movement for 
nontradables. The GDP deflator has one advantage over the CPI index as it captures all 
domestic price movements on a value added basis (Goldstein and Officer, 1979). To 
overcome the limitations of CPI and GDP deflators as a proxy for the PNT, some 
authors disaggregate the CPI components into tradable and nontradable goods and 
services and then take the weighted average of the nontradable components of CPI to 
construct a price index for nontradables. This index, represents the proper price 
movements for nontradables, and is the most appropriate method if data is available.
So far, the PT has been considered as a composite price of importables and 
exportables, as in Salter’s (1959) dependent economy model. But a distinction between 
the price of importables and the price of exportables is necessary as different trade 
controls and changes in international prices can affect the price movements in 
exportables and importables quite differently. Moreover, domestic trade restrictions can 
affect the price of importables more than exportables and may change some import 
substitutes into nontradable categories. Therefore, it has been argued that it is more 
appropriate to use the export price index (EPI) and import price index (IPI) separately as 
proxies for the world price of exportables and importables. This division of EPI and IPI 
clearly reflects the price movements of goods and services that are actually traded.
Therefore, two other commonly used direct measures of the real exchange rate 
can be defined as the ratio of the relative price of exportables to nontradables (proxied 
either by the domestic CPI or GDP deflator or by the weighted average of nontradable 
components of CPI):
RER2 P exp
P nt
and the ratio of domestic relative price of importables to nontradables,
RER3 P imp
P nt
which can serve as direct measures of competitiveness in the tradable sectors of an 
economy. But the use of these indices to proxy the world price of tradables has also 
faced some criticism, as it is argued that these indices have well known deficiencies as
measures of price of heterogeneous commodity groups and are generally expressed in 
unit value terms. It is, therefore, not surprising that there exists quite a number of 
different measures of the real exchange rate, given that there could be several possible 
proxies used to represent the PT and nontradables.
The next sub-section attempts to construct the three indices -  RER1, RER2, 
RER3 -  for PNG.
4.3.1 Real Exchange Rate Indices for Papua New Guinea
Three alternative measures of real exchange rates have been constructed namely RER1, 
RER2 and RER3. RER1 is reported in Tables 4.1. In Table 4.1 the trade-weighted 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of PNG has been multiplied by the weighted 
average of the wholesale price indices of PNG’s major trading partners (Australia, 
Japan, UK, US and West Germany). As discussed earlier, this measure represents the 
index of trade-weighted world price of tradables (PT-trade) converted in terms of PNG’s 
domestic currency (kina) value. With respect to the domestic price of nontradables, 
PNG’s consumer price index has been used as an approximate measure of the PNT. The 
world price of tradables is then deflated by the domestic CPI to construct the index of 
the trade-weighted real exchange rate (RER1) for PNG. Trade shares of major trading 
partners in 1990 have been used as weights in the calculation.
Some substantial exchange rate movements, as reflected in the trade-weighted 
NEER, resulted from discretionary exchange rate policy measures.
2 Shares of export and import of major trading partners in 1990 have also been used separately as weights. The 
calculation (Appendix Table A4.1) shows that there is very little difference between export, import and total trade- 
weighted series and they follow a similar trend.
Table 4.1 Trade-weighted Real Exchange Rate (RER1) Index 1970-94
( 1990=  100)
Y e a r N E E R
(trade- weighted)
W P I*
(trade-weighted)
P T
(trade-weighted)
C P I R ER 1
1970 93.29 32.72 30.52 24.97 122.25
1971 93.19 33.45 31.17 26.37 118.24
1972 92.98 34.36 31.95 27.29 117.07
1973 89.82 38.41 34.49 35.78 96.41
1974 88.71 47.00 41.69 38.47 108.36
1975 92.01 50.55 46.51 41.77 111.34
*1976 85.53 53.98 46.16 43.34 106.51
1977 85.65 56.80 48.65 43.52 111.79
1978 81.85 58.30 47.72 45.93 103.89
*1979 78.21 64.12 50.15 48.35 103.71
1980 77.33 73.53 56.87 54.82 103.74
1981 76.94 77.75 59.82 61.33 97.55
1982 75.94 81.58 61.95 63.42 97.69
#1983 82.92 83.66 69.38 72.36 95.88
1984 83.03 85.96 71.37 79.07 90.27
1985 85.50 88.13 75.35 77.55 97.17
1986 86.64 86.79 75.19 78.35 95.97
1987 91.09 88.52 80.63 81.87 98.49
1988 91.03 92.43 84.15 89.30 94.23
1989 88.37 96.29 85.09 94.02 90.51
#1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1991 101.07 101.55 102.64 105.42 97.36
1992 99.09 102.22 101.29 109.91 92.16
1993 100.22 102.61 102.83 117.82 87.28
#1994 134.27 102.78 138.00 123.20 112.01
Notes: * = discretionary revaluation and # = discretionary devaluation.
NEER = nominal effective exchange rate; WPI*= world wholesale price index; PT= price of tradable; 
CPI= domestic consumer price index; RER1 = Trade-weighted real exchange rate.
Source: Author’s computation using data from World Bank World Tables, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins, various issues.
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Figure 4.1: Price Index of Tradables and Domestic CPI
(1990= 100)
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Source: Table 4.1.
The NEER index for PNG indicates a significant appreciating trend in the post­
independence period between 1975 and 1982. This nominal appreciation reflects PNG’s 
‘hard kina’ strategy to insulate the domestic economy from imported inflation by 
revaluation of the kina several times after monetary independence in 1976. 
Discretionary depreciations of the kina by 10 per cent in 1983 and 10 per cent in 1990 
are reflected in the overall depreciation of the NEER during this period. Then a gradual 
appreciation from 1991 to 1993 occurred before 1994’s sharp depreciation of the NEER, 
which mostly resulted from official devaluation of the kina by 12 per cent followed by 
the subsequent floating of the kina. Over the 1970s and the 1980s, the price index of 
tradables moved very close to the domestic CPI (Figure 4.1). During the 1970s, the PT 
were on average higher than the price of domestic nontradables.
Figure 4.2: Real Exchange Rate (RER1) Indices of PNG
(1990= 100)
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Note: Three different real effective exchange rate indices are constructed by using import share, export share and 
trade share as weights. The three measures show a similar pattern in their movements.
Source: Author’s computation using data from World Bank World Tables, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
Bank o f PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins, various issues.
However, the domestic CPI started to rise from the early-1980s and continued until the 
early-1990s. During this period the change in the PT remained lower than domestic 
inflation. In 1994, the PT started to rise higher than the domestic price level and to a 
large extent the economy regained its competitiveness in the world market, as seen in 
Figure 4.1.
The trend in the real exchange rate of PNG is shown in Figure 4.2. During the 
construction boom and minerals boom in 1971-73, the domestic wage-price increased 
faster than the price increase in tradables, which is clearly evident in the real exchange
— Import-weighted 
Export-weighted 
—a— T rade-weighted
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rate appreciation in 1973. The index of RER declined sharply by about 18 per cent in 
1973 from the previous year.
The commodity boom of 1976-77 had more moderate effects on real exchange 
rate movements, due to cautious macroeconomic policies and a gradual reduction in 
foreign aid flows. Foreign aid fell by about 26 per cent in 1977 from the period of 
independence (Appendix Table A3.7) which helped to depreciate the RER. This real 
depreciation in 1977 indicated a “reverse resources boom ’ in PNG.
While the RER1 of PNG appreciated during 1973 because of relatively high 
inflation in PNG compared with its major trading partners, the rate depreciated 
significantly in 1977, due to virtually imperceptible domestic inflation maintained by 
prudent macroeconomic policy. A more stable real exchange rate movement from the 
mid-1970s to the late 1980s was consistent with the objectives of macroeconomic 
policies intended to control inflation and ensure a stable macroeconomic environment.
The real appreciation from 1990 to 1993 was due to a combination of several 
external and internal factors. During the early-1990s, PNG’s inflation rate increased 
rapidly relative to its major trading partners’ inflation rates. The resources boom in 
PNG’s mining sector over this period also impacted upon the PNT which had been 
fuelled by expansionary fiscal stances. This increased the relative PNT proxied by the 
domestic CPI more rapidly than the PT and appreciated the trade-weighted real 
exchange rate (RER1) during this period (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.3: Export Price Index, Import Price Index and Price of Nontradables
(1990= 100)
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Source: Table 4.2
The export price index (EPI) and import price index (IPI) have been deflated by 
the price index of nontradables (constructed by taking only the weighted average of 
nontradable items in the CPI basket) to construct the real exchange rates for exportables 
(RER2) and for importables (RER3) for PNG. These direct measures are reported in 
Table 4.2 and shown in Figure 4.4. In general, all indices of the real exchange rate 
(RER1, RER2, RER3) moves quite differently over 1970s. Then the rest of the period
they follow a similar pattern (Figure 4.4).
Table 4.2: Real Exchange Rate Indices for Export and Import Competing Sector
(1990 = 100)
Y ear EPI IPI PNT RER2 RER3
1970 39.36 22.82 27.65 142.37 82.55
1971 36.70 25.23 28.28 129.78 89.21
1972 40.54 26.22 29.08 139.39 90.17
1973 66.22 33.03 31.63 209.39 104.44
1974 81.96 48.38 36.46 224.78 132.68
1975 74.98 49.21 41.88 179.02 117.50
1976 88.46 48.46 44.43 199.11 109.09
1977 110.70 51.29 45.31 244.31 113.19
1978 103.12 59.75 48.84 211.12 122.33
1979 119.55 71.45 52.56 227.46 135.94
1980 118.17 84.98 57.82 204.40 146.98
1981 104.20 86.47 62.18 167.58 139.07
1982 103.41 80.66 66.47 155.58 121.35
1983 104.00 77.68 69.51 149.63 111.75
1984 109.22 75.35 73.45 148.70 102.59
1985 98.20 74.52 77.53 126.67 96.13
1986 97.51 76.02 85.23 114.41 89.19
1987 98.40 82.99 87.54 112.40 94.80
1988 114.17 89.05 91.03 125.42 97.82
1989 95.72 94.02 94.11 101.71 99.91
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1991 99.10 99.00 105.39 94.04 93.94
1992 100.89 101.66 109.42 92.20 92.90
1993 112.83 98.17 113.00 99.58 86.88
1994 131.56 99.92 114.36 115.04 87.37
Note: EPI = price index of exportable; IPI = price index of importable; PNT = price index of
nontradable; RER2 = real exchange rate for export industry; RER3 = real exchange rate for import 
competing industry.
Source: Author’s computation using data from World Bank World Tables, IMF International Financial Statistics, 
Bank o f PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins, various issues.
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Figure 4.4: Trade-Weighted Real Exchange Rate and Real Exchange Rate Indices 
for Export and Import Competing Sectors 1970-94
(1990= 100)
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Source: Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.
Between 1972 and 1979, the RER2 and RER3 indices show strong depreciation 
(with an exception in 1975) whereas the trade-weighted real exchange rate (RER1) 
indicated a significant real appreciation during 1973. RER1 appreciated due to the rate 
of increase of domestic CPI being higher than the PT, whereas RER2 and RER3 
depreciated because export and import price indices were higher than the domestic price 
of nontradables in the early-1970s (Table 4.2). Over the 1980s, all measures of the RER 
appreciated on average, due to a declining trend in PNG’s export price index and rapid 
growth in the domestic price level. After 1992, PNG’s export price index increased 
significantly and brought about a real depreciation of RER2 over 1993-94 and improved 
competitiveness for the export sector. But RER1 and RER3 appreciated between 1991-
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93 before starting to depreciate in 1994, due to flotation and a large depreciation of kina 
and increase in price of tradables relative to domestic price level (Figure 4.2 and 4.4).
Now we proceed to develop a theoretical model in order to shed light on the 
possible determinants of the real exchange rate which might have impacted upon the 
movement of PNG’s real exchange rate.
4.4 Theoretical Framework
The basic theoretical framework used in this study has been adopted from Edwards’ 
(1989) model of real exchange rate determination. The model captures most of the 
stylised features of a small open developing economy, including the existence of 
exchange and trade controls. This model allows only the ‘fundamentals’ or real 
variables to play a role in determining the long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, 
whereas both real and nominal factors influence the actual real exchange rate in the 
short run.
The model assumes a small, open economy which produces and consumes two 
goods -  tradables and nontradables. Importables and exportables are aggregated into 
one tradable category. The government sector consumes both tradables and 
nontradables and finances its expenditures by non-distortionary taxes and domestic 
credit creation. The country holds both domestic money and foreign money. At a later 
stage of the study it is assumed that there are no capital controls, and that there are some 
capital flows in and out of the country. The nominal exchange rate of the economy is 
fixed with a basket of currencies of its major trading partners. It is also assumed that
there is a tariff on imports. The price of tradables in terms of foreign currency is fixed 
and equal to unity that is, PT = 1. Finally perfect foresight is assumed in this model.
The model is represented by the following equations:
Portfolio Decisions:
A = M + FM (4.1)
a = m + fm where a = A/E, m = M/E, fm = FM/E (4.2)
F M  * 0 (4.3)
Demand Side:
e = E*Pt/Pnt (4.4)
Cx = CT (e, a) SCx/8e< 0; SCx/8a > 0 (4.5)
C]\jX = CNX (e, a); SC^/Se > 0; 8C^jX/8a > 0 (4.6)
Supply Side:
Sx = Sx (e ) ; 8Sx/8e > 0 (4.7)
SNX = (c) ; SSjvj'p/Se < 0 (4.8)
Government Sector:
G — PNX Gnx + E*GX (4.9)
g = gT + gNT; where g = G/E; gx = Gx ; gNX = PNXGNX/E = GNX/e (4.9')
E*GX/G =  X (4.10)
G = t + DC (4.11)
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External Sector:
CA = ST (e) - CT (e, a) - GT (4.12)
KA = f (i - if) (4.13)
R = CA + KA (4.14)
M = DC+ ER (4.15)
Equation (4.1) defines the total assets, A, as the sum of domestic money M  and 
foreign money FM. Equation (4.2) defines real assets (a) in terms of tradables, where E 
is the nominal effective exchange rate (foreign currency value in terms of domestic 
currency). Domestic money (m) and foreign money (fm) are also defined in terms of the 
nominal exchange rate in this equation. Equation (4.3) shows there is international
capital mobility, therefore, F M  * 0.
The demand side of the economy is given by equations (4.4) to (4.6). The real 
exchange rate, e, is defined as the ratio of foreign price in terms of domestic currency to 
the price of domestic nontradables in equation (4.4). Demand for tradables and 
nontradables is determined by the real exchange rate and the level of real assets. 
Demand for both tradables and nontradables is positively affected by the asset level 
whereas real depreciation reduces the domestic demand for tradables and increases the 
demand for nontradables, which is shown in equation (4.5) and (4.6).
Equations (4.7) and (4.8) summarise the supply side of the economy. The 
supply of tradables and nontradables is solely determined by the real exchange rate. An 
appreciation of the real exchange rate reduces the supply of tradables and increases the
supply of nontradables. To keep the model simple the tax function is not included 
(equations 4.5-4.8) in the demand function and the tariff function is not included in the 
demand for importables.
Equations (4.9) to (4.11) summarise the government sector, where GNT and Gr 
are government consumption of nontradables and tradables, respectively. Equation 
(4.9') is the real government consumption of tradables and nontradables in terms of 
tradable. Equation (4.10) defines the share of government consumption of tradables to 
the total government expenditure as X, which is equal to (gj/g) in real terms. Equation 
(4.11) represents the government budget constraint where government consumption is 
financed by taxes (t) and domestic credit creation (DC).
The external sector is represented by equations (4.12) to (4.15). Equation (4.12) 
defines the current account as the difference between the output of tradables and both 
private and public consumption of tradables expressed in foreign currency. Equation 
(4.13) indicates that there is inflow and outflow of capital. The capital account is 
defined as a function of interest rate differentials between domestic and foreign 
economies. Equation (4.14) defines the change in stock of international reserves. 
Finally the model is closed with equation (4.15) which shows that the change in
domestic money (m ) is determined by changes in domestic credit creation and changes 
in international reserves.
Long-run equilibrium is attained when the nontradable goods market and 
external sector are simultaneously in equilibrium -  which implies that the current 
account is equal to the capital account in the long run. However, in the short and
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medium run, there can be departures from CA = KA which will result in the 
accumulation and decumulation of international reserves. Therefore, the long-run 
steady state is attained under four scenarios which can be summarised as follows:
(1) there is internal equilibrium or equilibrium in the nontradable sector;
(2) there is external equilibrium so that R = 0 = CA = KA = m ;
(3) the government runs a balanced budget such that G = t and DC = 0, that is, fiscal 
policy is sustainable; and
(4) portfolio equilibrium holds.
The real exchange rate attained under these steady-state conditions is known as the 
long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, ERER, that is, ERER = e* = E*Pj/Pnt (4.16)
The nontrable market clears when
Q sit (e> a) + Snt (e) -  SNT (e) (4.17)
The real government consumption of nontradables in terms of tradables has been 
defined as gNT. Thus, the PNT can be expressed as a function of a, gNT, PT and x (trade 
restrictions).
PNj = n (a> gNT? Pt> t ) (4-18)
where, 8n/8a>0; 8n/8gNT>0; Sn/SPT>0, 8n/8x>0
Equilibrium in the external sector requires that m = 0 . The following equation of m
can be derived from earlier equations as
m — (S j (e) - Cx (e, a)} - KA. + gNX - t/E (4.19)
When government expenditures are fully financed with taxes, the R = 0 will coincide 
with the m = 0.
From (4.18) and (4.19) it is possible to find an equilibrium relation between e, a, gNT 
and T.
ERER = e* = x (a, gNT, PT and x ) (4.20)
where, 5x/6a<0; 5x/8gNT<0; 8x/5PT>0; 5x/5x<0
An increase in m, domestic money in terms of foreign currency, results in higher 
real wealth and a current account deficit. To restore equilibrium real wealth, the price of 
nontradables will rise (4.18). Thus, an increase in the value of real assets increases the 
price of nontradables and appreciates the RER to maintain long-run equilibrium. 
Increases in government expenditure on nontradables (gNT) have the same effects on the 
equilibrium RER. A rise in the PT (through an improvement in TOT due to an increase 
in the price of exportables) generally depreciates the RER, given that the price of 
nontradables and the nominal exchange rate remain constant. However, if the increase 
in the PT increases export earnings, and is spent in the nontradable sector, the demand 
for and price of nontradables increases more than the PT causing a RER appreciation. 
The total effect of an import tariff depends on the initial expenditure on domestic 
nontradables and importables. An increase in the tariff on importables worsens the 
current account by increasing import bills, lowers the demand for tradables, raises the 
demand and price for nontradables and tends to appreciate the long-run real exchange 
rate. But if an increase in tariff worsens the current account balance without any 
substitution effects, it will increase the composite PT alone and may depreciate the real
86
exchange rate. It is therefore, possible to observe, simultaneously, a real depreciation 
and a worsening of the current account. So the increase in the PT and changes in trade 
policies can have either positive or negative impacts on the RER.
Equation (4.20) stipulates that the long-run equilibrium RER is a function of real 
variables only. The value of real assets, government consumption, price of tradables 
and trade restrictions in this equation are normally influenced by changes in other real 
variables such as TOT shocks, changes in government expenditure, technological 
progress, and changes in trade and capital restrictions. Changes in these real variables 
can cause the actual RER to deviate from its equilibrium level. However, changes in 
nominal variables, such as domestic credit expansion, and changes in the values of the 
nominal exchange rate, also affect the path of the actual RER in the short run. The 
impacts of real and monetary disturbances on the RER, both in the short and long run 
are discussed in the next section.
4.4.1 Real Disturbances and Misalignment of Real Exchange Rate
Changes in the long-run sustainable values of real variables have important effects on 
the equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) and can cause it to deviate from its 
equilibrium level. This is commonly known as structural misalignment of the real 
exchange rate. In fact, the movement of the ERER from its sustainable long-run 
position has significant consequences for policy evaluation as it can imply either gain or 
loss of external competitiveness. According to the purchasing power parity version of 
the real exchange rate, this movement of ERER is considered a disequilibrium situation. 
But according to recent developments in the theory of the real exchange rate this 
movement of ERER does not necessarily reflect a disequilibrium, since the change in
ERER is induced by changes in fundamentals, that can represent a new long-run 
equilibrium for the real exchange rate (Edwards, 1988b). This section attempts to 
analyse the ways in which the equilibrium RER reacts to a number of real disturbances.
Real exchange rate fundamentals are often categorised as external and domestic 
fundamentals. Domestic fundamentals can be divided into policy-related and non­
policy-related fundamentals. The most important external fundamentals which affect 
the RER in the long run include international terms of trade, and international transfer, 
including foreign aid and world real interest rates. Included among policy-related 
domestic fundamentals are import restrictions, export taxes or subsidies, exchange and 
capital controls, and government consumption expenditure. Technological progress and 
productivity improvement are the two most important domestic non-policy 
fundamentals. The role of these fundamental factors are discussed below.
Terms of Trade Disturbance: International TOT is one of the most important external 
real exchange rate fundamentals and is often included as one of the major determinants 
of RER in the literature, since foreign price shocks have accounted for large fluctuations 
in RERs of both developed and developing countries. The overall effects of TOT on the 
real exchange rate is ambiguous. The price of tradables is a weighted average of the 
price of exportables and importables. TOT may have two different effects on the real 
exchange rate, namely, substitution and income effects. The income effect results when 
an increase in export prices, or a fall in import prices, raises the income of an economy 
and increases demand for nontradables. This, in turn, tends to reduce the relative price 
of tradables to nontradables and so appreciate the RER. On the other hand, the 
substitution effect can be observed due to relative cheapness of nontradables. An
88
improvement in TOT due to an export price increase brings about a RER depreciation 
for given levels of nominal exchange rate and nontradable prices. However, if the 
improvement in TOT is brought about by a fall in the price of imports alone, then the 
improvement in the current account balance would increase income and the aggregate 
PNT and cause an appreciation of the RER. The income effect would be more 
prominent in this case. Because of the ambiguity about the final effects of a TOT shock 
on the RER, the price of importables and exportables should be regarded as two separate 
variables in determining real exchange rate behaviour.
Government Expenditure: Government expenditure is another fundamental real
variable which can cause the real exchange rate to deviate from its equilibrium value. 
Increases in government expenditure increase the demand for nontradables if the major 
portion is spent on nontradable goods and services. In the short run this excess demand 
for nontradables bids up their price and results in RER appreciation. However, there 
will be depreciation of the RER if the larger share of government expenditure is spent 
on the tradable sector rather than on consumption of nontradables. Thus, the sign of this 
variable can be either positive or negative in determining behaviour of the equilibrium 
real exchange rate.
Trade Restrictions: Trade restriction in the form of tariff generally cause a RER
appreciation. If tariff worsens the current account position and increases the demand for 
and price of nontradables, the RER appreciates. An increase in binding quantitative 
trade restriction (import quota) also increases the demand for import substitutes, which 
behave as nontradables due to imposition of quantitative trade restrictions during boom 
period (Warr, 1986). This results in higher prices and profitability for nontradables and
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leads to a long-run equilibrium real appreciation. In these cases, the increase in the PNT 
due to trade restrictions is higher than the increase in the composite PT. However, if 
trade restrictions lead to a worsening of the current account deficit and reduce the 
demand for nontradables, there will be RER depreciation. In this case negative income 
effect will overweight the positive substitution effect.
Exchange and Capital Controls: Relaxation of capital controls may affect the
movement of RER in either way. If liberalisation of capital control increases net capital 
inflow, it leads to expansion in the monetary base. This raises current expenditure over 
income and increases the demand for nontradables, resulting in an appreciation of the 
equilibrium RER. A fall in world real interest rates or a rise in international transfers, 
such as aid flows, also affects the equilibrium RER in a similar way to net capital 
inflow. If the major share of foreign aid is spent on nontradables, thereby pushing down 
the price of tradables, relative to nontradables, which tends to appreciate the RER.
Technological and Productivity Improvement: The non-policy domestic
fundamental variable, namely, technological advancement (growth rate of real GDP), 
generally increases the efficiency and productivity of the tradable sector. Increased 
productivity induced by technological progress increases factor availability. By 
reducing the cost and price of tradables, increased productivity makes the tradable sector 
more competitive and tends to depreciate the RER of the sector. In this situation, 
supply effects of technological progress offset the demand effects according to the 
Rybczynski principle (Edwards, 1989:48). But if the advancement in technology 
increases income, which, in turn, increases demand for and price of nontradables 
relative to tradables, there will be a real appreciation. In this case, the demand effects
of technological progress are greater than the supply effects and this is known as the 
Ricardo-Balassa effect (Edwards, 1989:136).
4.4.2 Nominal Determinants and Real Exchange Rate Misalignment
The real exchange rate often departs from its equilibrium values influenced by 
macroeconomic pressures which is commonly known as macroeconomic policy induced 
misalignment of the real exchange rate. The effects of macroeconomic policies and 
changes in the nominal exchange rate on the real exchange rate will now be discussed.
In order to maintain a sustainable macroeconomic equilibrium in an open 
economy, fiscal and monetary policies must be consistent with the exchange rate 
regime. Misalignment of the real exchange rate occurs due to inconsistencies between 
macroeconomic policies and the official exchange rate policy. Under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, expansionary monetary or fiscal policy raises the real stock of money, 
increasing demand for both tradable and nontradable goods and financial assets. The 
excess demand for tradable goods results in a higher trade deficit and loss of 
international reserves, whereas the increased demand for nontradables raises their price 
and tends to deviate the actual RER further from its equilibrium value. The over­
valuation of the RER, which is a fall in the actual real exchange rate from its long-run 
equilibrium, will be short-lived and the economy adjusts through reduction of the 
money stock. The higher demand for nontradables induced by the higher stock of 
money, would require a higher (actual) RER to re-establish equilibrium in the 
nontradables market. The stock of international reserves will fall by the decline of the 
real domestic money. The actual RER will continuously depreciate through reductions 
in the price of nontradable goods and revert towards the long-run sustainable 
equilibrium RER position in the long run.
The time involved in the readjustment of a misaligned RER to its long-run 
equilibrium depends on the original stock of money as well as a number of other 
variables. Adjustment of the nominal exchange rate (devaluation/revaluation) could be 
one possible strategy to speed up this readjustment. In the case of an over-valued real 
exchange rate, a nominal devaluation reduces the stock of money since m=M/E and thus 
reduces the real value of financial assets. This induces expenditure reducing effects, by 
reducing expenditures on both tradable and nontradable goods. A nominal devaluation 
also induces expenditure switching effects by reducing expenditure on tradables. It also 
tends to increase the production of tradables, since the PT are relatively higher and the 
exportable sector is more competitive following a devaluation. This depreciates the 
RER resulting in an expansion of the export sector. Expenditure switching effects tend 
to increase the demand for nontradables but expenditure reducing effects may reduce 
their price. Therefore, following a nominal devaluation, the demand for nontradables 
increases and the price falls to re-establish equilibrium in the nontradable market, and 
this induces a real depreciation.
Following a nominal devaluation a number of policies can lead to an increase in 
the price of nontradables, most obviously expansionary monetary and/or fiscal policy 
and wage indexation policy. However, if a nominal devaluation is accompanied by 
restrained fiscal and monetary policies in the absence of wage indexation, the nominal 
devaluation will probably succeed in generating a real devaluation and achieving 
competitiveness in the tradable sectors. Simultaneous imposition of an import tariff and 
an export subsidy can affect the RER in the same way as a devaluation. While export 
subsidies increase demand for and domestic price of exportables, a tariff increases the 
price of importables, so that the composite price of tradables as a group will increase in
this situation. The relative price of exportables and importables will not be affected as 
long as the rate of tariff and subsidy is the same, but the price of tradables (as a 
composite measure of exportables and importables) will rise relative to nontradables as 
in the case of devaluation. However, while devaluation does not affect fiscal policy 
directly, a tariff with subsidy policy has a direct impact on the government budget. 
Furthermore, while a tariff with subsidy policy only affects the domestic price of 
tradable goods and services, a devaluation affects the domestic price of both tradable 
goods and tradable assets. Accordingly, while the expectation of further devaluation 
may affect the domestic interest rate, the tariff with subsidy policy, does not have any 
direct effect on the domestic interest rate (Edwards, 1988b:31).
4.5 Empirical Model
The purpose of this section is to analyse empirically the relative importance of real and 
nominal variables in explaining the real exchange rate movements in PNG, as reported 
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. In an attempt to estimate the dynamics of the real exchange rate, it 
is necessary to specify an empirical equation for the equilibrium real exchange rate et*. 
Based on the theoretical model developed in Section 4.4, the equilibrium real exchange 
rate is exclusively determined by real variables. According to the discussion in Section 
4.4, the most important ‘fundamentals’ in determining the RER are:
(1) international terms of trade;
(2) government expenditure;
(3) trade restrictions;
(4) exchange and capital controls; and
(5) technological progress and productivity gain.
Incorporating the above-mentioned ‘fundamentals’ a model of equilibrium real 
exchange rate was formulated in the following equation.
log et* = ßo + ßj log (TOT)t + ß2 log (GEX)t + ß3 (NKI)M + ß4 log (AID)t_,
+ ß5 log (OP)t + ß6 log (TECP)t + ut (4.21)
The following notations have been used in the above model: 
e* : equilibrium real exchange rate 
TOT : barter terms of trade, defined as Px*/Pm*
GEX : share of government expenditure to GDP 
NKI : net capital inflow (proxied for capital control)
AID : foreign aid and grant
OP = (X+M)/Y : trade restrictions substituted by the openness of an economy
TECP : measure of technological progress 
ut : error term
The actual RER is a function of both real and nominal variables. Three major 
factors determine the dynamics of actual RER and are specified by the following 
equation:
where, e is the actual real exchange rate, and e* is the equilibrium RER, which is a 
function of real variables as specified in equation (4.21). The second determinant of 
the actual RER in equation (4.22) is MPt, which states that if macro policies are
log et = a  (log et*} - X {MPt} + y (log Et - log EM} (4.22)
The limitations of this measure are discussed in p.97.
unsustainable in the long run under a fixed rate, there would be a tendency for the RER 
to appreciate. A large X represents a large over-valuation of the actual RER from its 
long-run equilibrium value. Finally, RER movements are affected by the changes in the 
nominal exchange rate (log Et - log EM ). A nominal devaluation has a short-run 
positive impact on an over-valued RER in restoring a misaligned real exchange rate 
towards its equilibrium value. The actual magnitude of a short-run depreciation of the 
RER depends on the parameter y. The long- and medium-run effects of changes in the 
nominal exchange rate would depend on the initial condition of the equilibrium real 
exchange rate, log e*, and on the accompanying macroeconomic policies of credit 
creation. The parameters a, X, y are positive and capture the most important dynamic 
aspects of the adjustment process.
The term, MPt , in equation (4.22) indicates the role of macroeconomic policies 
in determining real exchange rate behaviour. If macro policies are unsustainable in an 
expansionary direction, the real exchange rate would tend to appreciate, given that the 
other variables remain constant. To capture the impacts of macro policies, 
macroeconomic policy behaviour was proxied in two ways. Firstly, by the excess 
supply of domestic credit, measured as the rate of growth of domestic credit minus the 
rate of growth of real GDP.
EXMS = [A log domestic credit - A log GDPt]
Secondly, the rate of growth of domestic credit is used to measure the macroeconomic 
policy impacts on real exchange rate movements.
By successive substitution for log e*, the macroeconomic policy variable by 
excess supply of domestic credit, the rate of growth of domestic credit and the change in 
nominal devaluation by NDEV in equation (4.22), the following estimable equation for 
the actual RER is given by:
log et = 0, log (TOT)t + 02 log (GEX)t + 03 (NKI)M + 04 log(AID) t + 05 log (OP)t
+ 06 (DTR)t + 07 log (TECP)t - EXMSt - X2 DCRt + y NDEVt + ut (4.23)
where 0s are the combination of as and ßs.
The above model incorporates the real and nominal factors affecting the 
observed RER both in the short and long run. The “fundamentals” or the real variables 
affect the equilibrium RER in the long run whereas the nominal variables impacts on the 
RER only in the short run. An improvement in TOT can result in either real 
depreciation or real appreciation, and so is the outcome of an increase in government 
spending. Relaxation in exchange and capital controls tends to increase capital inflow 
given the political and economic stability of a country. It will appreciate the RER, if the 
major share of this capital flow is spent on the domestic nontradable market, thus raising 
the price of nontradables relative to tradables. Increased openness in international trade 
policy tends to depreciate the RER if the changes in trade policies reduce the price of 
nontradables. Moreover, if openness in the trade regime brings more competition in the 
tradable sector by reducing the domestic price of tradables in line with the world price 
level, a real depreciation will occur. But outwardness in international trade policies may 
appreciate the RER if it improves the trade account by reducing import bills and 
increasing demand for and price of nontradables relative to tradables.
Since a resources boom can be reflected in an increase in TOT, government 
expenditure or capital inflow, a positive change in any of these 'fundamentals’ under the 
most plausible conditions will increase the relative price of nontradables to tradables 
and tend to appreciate the RER, as postulated by the discussion of booming sector 
economics in Chapter 2. A more restricted trade regime would worsen the situation by 
increasing demand for and price of semi-traded and import substitutes, since they 
behave as nontradables, as their prices are determined by domestic demand and supply 
conditions during the boom years.
The model predicts that an expansionary macro policy associated with domestic 
money creation would widen the current account deficit, deplete international reserves 
and cause a RER appreciation. Thus, a restrictive wage and income policy can slow 
appreciation of the RER by reducing demand for and price of nontradables. A change in 
the nominal exchange rate can help to restore the misaligned real exchange rate towards 
its equilibrium value. A nominal devaluation helps to prevent erosion of 
competitiveness in the export sector by reducing the foreign currency price of exports in 
the world market. The effectiveness of a change in the nominal exchange rate 
correcting a misaligned real exchange rate would be more powerful and long lasting if 
they are accompanied by appropriate macroeconomic policies. These two assumptions 
of nominal determinants of the real exchange rate portray most of the stylised features 
of macroeconomic policy options available for a small open developing economy such 
as PNG to correct a misalignment of the real exchange rate.
4.6 Variable Definition and Measurement
The real exchange rate model in equation (4.23) is estimated over the sample period 
1970-1994 using annual data. In this section, data sources are listed and the method of 
data transformation adopted and its key limitations are discussed. All variables, except 
net capital inflow, are measured in natural logarithms.
The real exchange rate series presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 have been 
constructed from the available secondary data sources in the absence of ready-made data 
for the key dependent variable, the real exchange rate (log et). The explanatory 
variables are extracted from a variety of sources including The World Bank World 
Tables, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic 
Bulletin and from National Centre for Development Studies International Economic 
Data Bank.
Before estimating equation (4.23), a number of issues relating to data availability 
should be mentioned. One of the major obstacles faced was the non-availability of 
annual data for most of the real exchange rate fundamentals. External TOT is the only 
real variable for which data are readily available. Therefore, some proxies had to be 
constructed to estimate the real exchange rate equation (4.23). Government expenditure 
is included in the model as a ratio of GDP (GEX). It is possible for this ratio to increase 
with a reduction in government consumption on nontradables. Thus, the actual sign of 
GEX can be either positive or negative depending on its share in the nontradable or 
tradable sector.
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Exchange and capital mobility is represented by the lagged long-term net capital 
inflow (NKI). Net capital inflow is defined in the World Tables as ‘residents' long-term 
foreign liabilities less long-term assets’. Changes in capital control affect the flow of 
capital and any relaxation of capital controls will increase the inflow of capital in 
principle. This, in turn, increases international reserves and would be expected to 
appreciate the RER. For PNG, as in most developing countries, capital inflow is 
induced by a resources boom, direct foreign investment or international grants and aid 
flows. Therefore, foreign aid flows have been included as a separate variable in 
equation (4.23) since they are not included in the long-run capital inflow. Foreign aid is 
usually increases the expenditure on nontradable sector and is expected to appreciate the 
RER.
It is difficult to find a good proxy for trade policy due to the non-availability of 
consistent and longer period data on tariff rates or tariff revenues as a proportion of 
imports. The standard practice in the literature is to proxy exchange and trade controls 
by the degree of openness of the economy. This is given by the expression [(X+M)/Y] 
and used as an indicator of trade policy restrictions such as tariffs and quotas. It should 
not be overlooked that a less restrictive trade regime is only one of the major factors of 
openness, as international trade is also determined by other factors affecting imports and 
exports, including the RER itself (Cottani et al., 1990). For example, a increase in 
import quotas reduces openness and is usually expected to lead to an appreciation of the 
RER, whereas more openness in the trade regime tends to depreciate the RER by 
reducing the price of nontradables to tradables. A dummy variable has also been 
included to capture the effects of broad trade policy responses. This dummy variable,
DTR, takes a value of 1 for years 1983-94 for increased trade restrictions and 0 for 
1970-82 when PNG had virtually no restrictions in its trade regime.
Technological progress (TECP) has been used as an explanatory variable to 
capture the Ricardo-Balassa effect on the equilibrium RER and is proxied by the rate of 
growth of real GDP4. According to this hypothesis, productivity improvement in 
rapidly growing economies tends to be concentrated in the tradable sector and usually 
accounts for an appreciation of RER through increasing the income and PNT (Balassa, 
1964).
Regarding the dependent variable, the trade-weighted real exchange rate (RER1) 
and real exchange rates for the export sector (RER2) and import competing sector 
(RER3) are used as alternative measures.
4.7 Econometric Procedure
The conventional approach to time-series econometrics is based on the implicit 
assumption of stationarity of time-series data. A recent development in time-series 
econometrics has cast serious doubt on the conventional time-series assumptions. There 
is substantial evidence in the recent literature to suggest that many macroeconomic 
time-series may possess unit roots, that is, they are non-stationary processes. A time- 
series integrated of order zero, 1(0), includes a white-noise series and a stable first-order 
autoregressive AR (1) process, while a random walk process is an example of time- 
series integrated of order one, 1(1). Thus, a time-series integrated of order zero, 1(0), 
series is stationary in levels, while a time-series integrated of order one, 1(1), is 
stationary in first differences. Most commonly, series are found to be integrated of
4 This is admittedly a weak proxy because factor accumulation itself can increase GDP with little technical progress.
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order one, or 1(1). The implication of some systematic movements of integrated 
variables in the estimation process may yield spurious results. In the case of a small 
sample study, the risk of spurious regression is extremely high. In the presence of 1(1) 
or higher order integrated variables, the conventional t-test of the regression coefficients 
generated by conventional OLS procedure is highly misleading (Granger and Newbold, 
1977).
Resolving these problems requires transforming an integrated series into a 
stationary series by successive differencing of the series depending on the order of 
integration (Box and Jenkins, 1970). However, Sargan (1964), Hendry and Mizon 
(1978) and Davidson et al. (1978) have argued that the differencing process loses 
valuable long-run information in data, especially in the specification of dynamic 
models. If some, or all, of the variables of a model are of the same order of integration, 
following the Engle-Granger theorem, the series are cointegrated and the appropriate 
procedure to estimate the model will be an error correction specification. Hendry 
(1986) supported this view, arguing that error correction formulation minimises the 
possibilities of spurious relationships being estimated as it retains level information in a 
non-integrated form (Hendry, 1986:203). Davidson et al. (1978) proposed a general 
autoregressive distributed lag model with a lagged dependent variable, which is known 
as the ‘error-correction’ term. Hendry et al. (1985) also advocated the process of adding 
lagged dependent and independent variables up to the point where residual whiteness is 
ensured in a dynamic specification. Therefore, error correction models avoid the 
spurious regression relationships.
Mindful of these considerations, the estimation process was begun by testing the 
time-series properties of the data series. Many test procedures are available for testing
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non-stationarity in a time-series. In this study, the Dickey-Fuller procedure was used
with Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics to test the null hypothesis of a unit root 
against the alternative of stationarity of data series. The results from these tests 
suggested that all the variables used in this model do not have the same order of 
integration. The key dependent variable (RER) and some of the explanatory variables 
are found to be stationary. The test results are reported in the Appendix Table A4.2.
To guard against the possibility of estimating spurious relationships in the 
presence of some nonstationary variables, estimation was performed using a general-to- 
specific Hendry-type error correction modelling (ECM) procedure. This procedure 
begins with an over-parameterised autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) specification of 
an appropriate lag. The decision on lag length is determined by the consideration of the 
available degrees of freedom and type of data. With annual data, one or two lags would 
be long enough, while with quarterly data a maximum lag of four can be taken. Under 
this ECM procedure, the long-run relationship is embedded within the dynamic 
specification. Therefore, the general model of real exchange rate can be specified as 
follows:
where a 0 is a vector of constants, Yt is a (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables, Xt is a 
(k x 1) vector of explanatory variables, and oq and ßj are (n x n) and (n x k) matrices of 
parameters. As annual data are used for the model, one period lag is assumed. When 
the lag length is one, the general model can be written as:
Yt = a 0 + £ cqYt.i + £ ßjX^ + ut (4.24)
Yt -  a 0 + cqYj.j + ßiXt + ß2XM + ut (4.25)
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Now we can consider the error correction version of the model can be considered as:
AYt = cx0 - (1-ctO Yt.j + ß,AXt + (ß1 + ß2)X t.1+ u t (4.26)
The above equation can be reparameterised in terms of differences and lagged levels so 
as to separate the short-run and long-run multipliers of the system:
A Yt = ß, A Xt - (1-oc,) [Yt.j -Yl -y2 XM ] + ut (4.27)
where the new parameters
Yi = a o / - 0 _ai)
72 = ßl + ß2 / '  0 " a l)
In equation (4.27) short-run relationships are captured by the coefficients on differenced 
variables, while long-run relationships are captured by the coefficients on lagged level 
variables, namely by Yl andy2.
The error correction specification for the different versions of the real exchange 
rate model can be represented by the following equations with one period lag as annual 
data has been used for the model estimation:
ARER1 = f (ATOT, AGEX , ANKI, AOP, AAID, AEXMS, ANDEV, TOTt.b GEX M, 
NKIm, OPt.b AIDm , EXMSm, NDEV m, DTR, RER1 M) (IV.4.1)
ARER2 = f (ATOT, AGEX , ANKI, AOP, AAID, AEXMS, ANDEV, TOTM, GEX M, 
NKIM, OP M, AID M , EXMS M, NDEV t.„ DTR, RER2 M) (IV.4.2)
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ARER3 = f (ATOT, AGEX , ANKI, AOP, AAID, AEXMS, ANDEV, TOTt_„ GEX M,
NKIM, OP M, AID M , EXMS M, NDEV M, DTR, RER3 M) (IV.4.3)
The following notations have been used in these above equations:
Dependent variables:
RER1 = Trade-weighted real exchange rate 
RER2 = RER for export sector (EPI/PNT)
RER3 = RER for importable sector (IPI/PNT)
Independent variables:
TOT = international terms of trade (1990 =100)
GEX = government expenditure to GDP 
NKI = net capital inflow
OP = (X+M)/Y : index of trade restrictions substituted by the openness of an economy
AID = flow of foreign aid and grant
EXMS = excess supply of domestic money supply
NDEV = nominal devaluation
DTR = a dummy variable which takes 0 for the years (1970-82) of an open trade 
regime and 1 for years 1983-94 with increased trade restrictions.
All variables, except NKI which takes negative values in some years, are 
measured in natural logarithms. NKI is in terms of millions of kina.
The above equations are “tested down” using OLS by dropping statistically 
insignificant differenced and lagged terms. The testing procedure continues until a 
parsimonious error correction representation is obtained which retains the a priori
104
theoretical model as its long-run solution. The selection of final equations is made after 
careful diagnostic tests on the OLS error process.
4.8 Results
The estimates of parsimonious dynamic Error Correction Models are reported in Table 
4.3 together with the most common diagnostic tests. The long-run elasticities relating to 
the key explanatory variables and their t-ratios are reported in Table 4.4. While the 
long-run elasticities are derived from the short-run estimated equations, their respective 
standard errors are derived by using Kmenta’s (1986) formula5.
The adjusted R is quite high and suggests the model has a fairly good fit. The 
model is also statistically significant in terms of the standard F-test. The lagged error 
correction term for the real exchange rate equation (IV.4.1) is statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level and has the expected negative sign. The computed value for the 
Jarque-Bera test for normality of the residuals is JBN-x2(2) = 0.05 and is much smaller 
than the critical value of JBN-x (2) = 9.21 at a one per cent significance level, 
indicating normality of the residual errors. The computed value for Lagrange multiplier 
test of residual serial correlation is LM-x (6) = 3.99 in equation (IV.4.1), which is 
smaller than the critical value of LM-x (6) = 16.81 and indicates no serial correlation 
among the residuals in the real exchange rate model. A residual correlogram of up to
s As Kmenta (1986:486) writes “The formula refers to the general case where an estimator, say a, is a function of k 
other estimators such ß,, ß2, ... ßk ; that is,
a  = f(  ß„ ß2, ... ßk )
Then the large sample variance of a can be approximated as
Var (a) = L[8f / 8ßk]2 Var (ßk) + 2 L[8f / 8ßj] [Sf / Sßk] Cov [ßj, ßk] ( j, k = 1, 2 ........  k) ( j < k )
(The approximation is obtained by using Taylor’s expansion for f (ß,, ß2, ... ßk ) around ß,, ß2, ... ßk dropping 
terms of the order two or higher and then obtaining the variance by the usual formula)”.
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six years was estimated for each equation, with no evidence of significant serial 
correlation in the error terms. The equations also comfortably passed the CUSUM test 
on recursive residuals and the CUSUM test on backward recursive residuals. The 
ARCH-x test for error variance shows that the computed value of ARCH-x“(l)=0.95 is 
smaller than the tabulated value ARCH-x (1)=6.63 at a one per cent significance level. 
Thus, the results suggest the error variances are not correlated in equation (IV.4.1).
The equation also passed the specification choice in terms of joint variable 
deletion tests against the maintained hypothesis of the theory of the real exchange rate. 
Ramsey’s RESET test for specification error indicates that the calculated F value F(l,
13)=0.32 in equation (IV.4.1) is much smaller than the critical value F(l,13)=9.07 at a 
one per cent significance level. Hence, the computed RESET-F value for the equation is 
not significant, indicating the equation is not misspecified. The equation passed the 
Chow tests for parameter stability as the computed F-value of Chow-test for the 
equation is CHOW-F(l 1,12)=0.67 for equation (IV.4.1) is smaller than the critical value 
CHOW-F(l 1,12)= 4.22 at a one per cent significant level which indicates parameter 
stability for the model.
Equations (IV.4.2) and (IV.4.3) in Table 4.3 are also statistically significant in
terms of the standard F-test. The adjusted R are fairly high (ranging between 0.72 to 
0.80) for both real exchange rate models suggesting that the models have a fairly good 
fit. They also perform well by all other diagnostic tests. The Jarque-Bera test statistic for 
residual normality for the equations are less than the critical value for a chi-square 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, indicating normality of residuals of the models 
of the export sector real exchange rate (equation IV.4.2) and real exchange rate for the
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import-competing sector (equation IV.4.3). ARCH-x test for error variance shows that 
in both models computed values of ARCH-x (1) are smaller than the tabulated value of 
ARCH-x2(1)=6.63 at a 1 per cent significance level. Thus the computed statistics 
suggest that error variances are not correlated in these equations.
Both models passed the specification choice in terms of joint variable deletion 
tests against the maintained hypothesis of the theory of the real exchange rate. Ramsey’s 
RESET test for specification error indicates that calculated F values are much smaller 
than the critical value at a one per cent significance level. Hence, computed RESET-F 
values for the equations are not significant, indicating the equations are not 
misspecified. A residual correlogram of up to six years was estimated for each 
equation, with no evidence of significant serial correlation in the error terms. The 
equations comfortably passed the CUSUM test on recursive residuals and the CUSUM 
test on backward recursive residuals. The Lagrange multiplier LM-x test for residual 
serial correlation also indicates the calculated x values in equation 4.2 and 4.3 are much 
smaller than the tabulated value. The calculated LM-x value=2.37 and 11.0 are much 
smaller than the tabulated value LM-x =16.81 at a one per cent significance level, 
indicating no serial correlation in residuals. Both equations passed the Chow tests for 
parameter stability as the computed F-values of Chow-test are insignificant. The 
coefficients of the technological progress variable (TECP), the openness in trade regime 
(OP) and the growth of domestic credit (DCR) were consistently insignificant in 
experimental runs and dropped from the final equations.
Equation IV.4.1 indicates the an improvement in external TOT does not have 
any significant long-run impact on the trade-weighted real exchange rate.
2
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Real Exchange Rates in Papua New Guinea 1970-94
Trade-weighted real exchange rate (Equation IV.4.1)
ARER1 = 3.28 + 0.61 ANDEV + 0.10 T O T - 0.28 NKI - 0.23 AID,., - 0.01GEX 
(3.57) (1.56) (1.73) (1.85) (1.12)
- 0.03 E X M S - 0.06 DTR + 0.63 N D E V - 0.81 RER1 
(1.68) (1.92) (3.92) (3.90)
Adjusted R* 12 3= 0.82 F(8,14) = 13.5 JBN-x2(2) = 0.05 LM-x2(6) = 3.99
ARCH-x2(l) = 0.95 RESET(2)-F(1,13) = 0.32 CHOW-F(l 1,12) = 0.67
Real Exchange Rate for Export Sector (Equation IV.4.2)
ARER2 = 2.63 + 0.66 ATOT + 0.39 TOT M -0.27 AID t_, -0.09 EXMS t_, 
(4.57) (2.01) (2.11) (1.88)
- 0.20 GEXt_, -0.15 DTR +0.12 NDEV t_, -0.64RER2M 
(1.93) (2.12) (1.94) (4.52)
Adjusted R2 = 0.80 F(8,14) = 15.6 JBN-Z2(2) = 0.58 LM-x2(6) = 2.37
ARCH-x2(l) = 0.29 RESET(2)-F(1,13) = 0.65 CHOW-F(l 1,12) = 2.80
Real Exchange Rate for Import Competing Sector (Equation IV.4.3)
ARER3 = 3.53 - 0.30 ATOT - 0.17 TOTt_, - 0.09 DTR - 0.09 GEXM -0 .12EXMSm 
(2.93) (2.25) (2.08) (1.79) (2.12)
-0.20 AID M -0.17 NDEV M -0.53RER3M 
(3.20) (2.97) (5.49)
Adjusted R2 = 0.72 F(7,15)= 9.06 JBN-x2(2) = 0.86 LM-x2(6) = 11.0
ARCH-x2(1) = 0.24 RESET(2)-F(1,14) = 1.74 CHOW-F(l 1,12) = 1.91
Notes:
1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
2. The F statistic is against the null that all coefficients = 0. The Durbin Watson for first order serial 
correlation is not reported for these models since it is strictly not valid in these models with lagged 
dependent variables.
3. LM is the Lagrange multiplier general test for residual serial correlation. ARCH is the test for 
Autoregressive Heteroscedasticity, RESET is the Ramsey’s RESET test for functional mis-specification, 
residual normality test for skewness and excess kurtosis is given by Jarque Bera Normality (JBN) test.
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Although the coefficient indicates a positive sign in relation to RER, but it is not 
statistically significant both in the short-run as well as in the long-run at the 
conventional 5 per cent level.
The coefficient of the government expenditure variable (GEX) has the expected 
negative sign with respect to the trade-weighted real exchange rate in equation (IV.4.1) 
but does not have any significant short-run or long-run effect at the conventional 5 per 
cent level.
The net long-term capital inflow significantly affects the trade-weighted real 
exchange rate. The sign of the coefficient is negative as expected in the theoretical 
model. A one per cent increase in capital inflow appreciates the RER by 0.35 per cent 
in the long run. Foreign aid and grant flows have the expected negative sign with 
respect to the RER in equation (IV.4.1) but do not have any significant long-run effect 
at the 5 per cent significance level.
Trade restrictions, as measured by the dummy variable (DTR), had a significant 
negative effect on the trade-weighted real exchange rate. The dummy variable for trade 
restriction indicates that the introduction of restrictive trade policies from the mid-1980s 
appreciated the RER of PNG in the long run. Trade restrictions tends to have 
appreciated the RER of PNG by 0.08 per cent in the long run. Thus, the trade regime 
had an important bearing on the movement of the real exchange rate in PNG.
The role of macro policy, as proxied by the excess growth of money supply over 
the growth rate of real GDP (EXMS), was found to be significant in affecting the real 
exchange rates of PNG in equation (IV.4.1). A one per cent excess money supply over
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the growth of GDP appreciated the RER by 0.05 per cent in the long run. Unsustainable 
macropolicy, in terms of excess money supply, raised the domestic price of nontradables 
and appreciated the RER of PNG, confirming the theoretical analysis of the real 
exchange rate discussed earlier in this chapter.
The coefficient of the nominal exchange rate variable (NDEV) is statistically 
significant with positive sign as expected by the theoretical model. The econometric 
results indicate that there is a close link between the two variables in PNG. A one per 
cent nominal devaluation depreciated the RER by 0.61 per cent in the short run and 0.8 
per cent in the long run.
Equations (1V.4.2) and (IV.4.3) indicate the major factors affecting the RER in 
PNG’s export and import competing sectors. An improvement in TOT significantly 
depreciates the RER for the export sector in the short run as well as in the long run as 
price effect overweights the income effect of increased TOT. A one per cent increase in 
TOT depreciates the real exchange rate for the export sector by 0.66 per cent in the short 
run and 0.61 per cent in the long run. However, the change in TOT has significant 
negative effects on the real exchange rate for the import-substitute sector in the short run 
as well as in the long run which indicates that the income effect is much greater than the 
price effect. A one per cent improvement in TOT appreciates the real exchange rate of 
the import competing sector by 0.3 per cent in the short run and 0.16 per cent in the long 
run. The coefficient of government expenditure has a significant negative impact on the 
real exchange rate for the export and import substitute sectors (RER2 and RER3) in the 
long run.
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TABLE 4.4: Estimates of Long-Run Elasticities of RERs in Papua New Guinea
1970-94
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables
RER1
(IV.4.1)
RER2
(IV.4.2)
RER3
(IV.4.3)
TOT 0.12** 0.61** -0.16**
(1.45) (2.56) (2.77)
NKI -0.35**
(1.76)
GEX -0.01 -0.3 -0.17
(0.12) (1.97) (1.79)
DTR -0.08** -0.23 -0.16**
(2.20) (3.05) (2.77)
EXMS -0.05 -0.14 -0.22
(1.76) (1.96) (2.17)
AID 0.28 -0.41** -0.37**
(0.67) (2.03) (2.75)
NDEV 0.77** 0.18* -0.23*
(2.45) (1.95) (3.17)
Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. ** denotes significant at 5 % , * denotes significant at 10 %. 
Source: Long-run multiplier values are computed from the long-run steady state solutions to the 
estimated models reported in Table 4.3.
The impact of net capital inflow (NKI) is found to be insignificant with respect 
to the real exchange rate for the export and import competing sectors and was dropped 
from the final equations. However, it is found that foreign aid has a significant negative 
impact on the real exchange rate of PNG’s export- and import-competing sectors. A 
one per cent increase in foreign aid flows appreciate the real exchange rate for 
exportable sector by 0.41 per cent and real exchange rate for import competing sector by
in
0.37 per cent in the long run. As expected by the theoretical proposition, that increased 
aid and grant flows are usually spent mostly in the nontradable sector, real exchange 
rate appreciation was generated in the economy.
Trade restrictions measured by the dummy variable, DTR, had significant 
negative impacts on the real exchange rate for the export and import competing sectors’ 
real exchange rates (RER2 and RER3). From the mid-1980s, trade protection for 
selected industries appreciated the real exchange rate for the export sector by 0.15 per 
cent in the short run and 0.23 per cent in the long run. The real exchange rate for 
import-competing industries also appreciated by 0.09 per cent in the short run and 0.16 
in the long run, due to an increase in trade restrictions.
Nominal devaluation improved the competitiveness of the export sector by 0.18 
per cent in the long run. But nominal devaluation seems to have a significant negative 
impact on the import-competing sector’s real exchange rate in the long run, result which 
is not consistent with the theoretical prediction. A one per cent devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate appreciated the real exchange rate of the import competing sector 
by 0.23 per cent in the long run,
4.9 Summary and Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to examine real exchange rate behaviour in PNG 
and evaluate whether the movements in the real exchange rate follow the theoretical 
expectations postulated by the framework of the study in Chapter 2. The theory of real 
exchange rates states that, while the long-run equilibrium value of the real exchange rate 
is determined by real variables, the actual or observed real exchange rate is influenced 
by both real and nominal variables in the short run. Movement of the equilibrium RER
from its original position does not necessarily represent disequilibrium since the long- 
run equilibrium is affected by the real variables. This chapter has examined the extent 
to which real and nominal determinants can explain the behaviour of the real exchange 
rate in PNG.
Resources booms can be brought by change in any of the real variables which 
may change the relative PT to nontradables and shift the equilibrium RER from its 
original position. As discussed in the extended version of the theoretical framework of 
resources booms in Chapter 2, policy-induced real (trade policy) and nominal (fiscal and 
exchange rate policy) variables can rectify misalignment of the exchange rate if 
implemented properly and in time.
The results suggest that a resources boom brought about by an improvement in 
the external TOT seems to have no long run effect on the trade-weighted RER in PNG, 
whereas increased net capital inflow and foreign aid flows appreciated the RER. 
Increased trade restrictions from the early-1980s appear to have adversely affected the 
traded-goods sector through RER appreciation. It was found that the nominal variables 
also significantly affected the real exchange rate of the economy over the study period. 
In particular, expansionary fiscal policy resulted in an increased domestic price of 
nontradables and led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, whereas a nominal 
devaluation helped to re-establish the real exchange rate in the short run, as well as in 
the long run. Nominal devaluation had a significant positive impact on the trade- 
weighted real exchange rate and real exchange rate for export competing sector in the 
long run, indicating that a nominal devaluation can be a powerful device to correct real 
exchange rate misalignment. However, the result is perverse for import competing 
sector.
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CHAPTER 5
DETERMINANTS OF SECTORAL OUTPUT, SAVINGS 
AND INVESTMENT IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Introduction
The previous chapter examined the determinants of the real exchange rate and identified 
the major sources of real exchange rate movements in the PNG economy. The major 
changes in key macroeconomic variables, including changes in the RER and changes in 
aggregate demand and domestic policy variables all greatly influence the structure of an 
economy. This chapter focuses on the impact of the real exchange rate and domestic 
policy decisions on savings and investment behaviour and sectoral output growth in 
PNG, in order to examine the theoretical propositions of the ‘theory of booming sector’ 
discussed in Chapter 2.
A resources boom, can be a mixed blessing for a mineral and primary 
commodity producing developing economy. While the influx of export revenue and 
capital relaxes the foreign exchange constraint on economic growth by improving the 
balance of payments and raising national income, some sectors can be affected 
adversely as output and factor incomes decline. The extended version of this analytical 
model predicts that, with huge unemployed resources and adopting a more open trade 
regime, a small open developing economy might not experience the classical problems 
o f ‘Dutch disease’ associated with booming sector theory.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a model based on the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter 2 to estimate the effects of a resources boom 
and the real exchange rate on sectoral growth; this model is Section 3 presents the 
empirical model and discusses data sources, variable definitions and measurement; 
Section 4 presents and interprets the results of the study; Section 5 contains a discussion 
on savings and investment behaviour and assesses the macroeconomic policy impacts 
on the long term growth of the economy over the study period and Section 6 
summarises findings of the chapter.
5.2 Determinants of Sectoral Output
Sectoral growth of an economy is determined by several real, nominal and policy 
variables. To quantify the impact and extent to which macroeconomic variables affect 
the sectoral output of PNG, the output of each sector has been modelled as a function of 
anticipated profitability for that sector, which is assumed to be a function of the 
following variables:
(1) real exchange rate (RER);
(2) government expenditure (comprising government consumption and government 
investment) (GEX);
(3) domestic absorption net of government expenditure (DA); and
(4) openness (OP) of an economy (proxied by X+M/Y).
Summed up, the determinants of sectoral output can be expressed as follows:
Output = f (RER, GEX, DA, OP) (5.1)
Note that GEX and OP were among the explanatory variables in the RER 
equation developed in Chapter 4. These two variables and DA are included as 
additional explanatory variables because they can impact on output directly, over and 
above the impact operating through RER is discussed below.
The change in the RER, and its impact on general inflation, is one of the major 
factors affecting the composition of sectoral growth in an economy. The theory of 
booming sector postulates that sectoral growth is influenced not only by the relative 
price of tradables to nontradables but also by other direct demand effects. Thus, all 
other variables used in this model are control variables, to capture the impact of the 
macroeconomic environment over and above the impact of the RER on sectoral output 
growth. These variables may be partially correlated with the movements of the real 
exchange rate, since they also affect the changes of the real exchange rate. The effects 
of these policy variables on sectoral growth will be analysed separately.
Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate plays a key role in determining sectoral growth of an economy. 
An expected increase in the domestic price level indicates predicted short run 
profitability and tends to increase the output of nontradables since the income effect of 
resources boom is very high during the boom years. However, an increase in the 
domestic price level lowers the marginal product of labour and capital of the tradables 
sector making the sector less competitive than its trading partners and reducing the 
output of the tradables sector. Therefore, the expected sign1 for the RER in relation to
' A negative sign of real exchange rate in relation to other variable indicates a real appreciation, whereas a positive 
sign for the real exchange rate in relation to other variables means a real depreciation.
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sectoral growth is positive for tradables and negative for nontradables, given that the 
RER is defined as the price ratio of tradables to nontradables.
As discussed in the extension of the theoretical model in Chapter 2 the 
imposition of trade restrictions may completely change the effects of the RER on 
sectoral output. In most developing countries, the manufacturing sector is sheltered by 
various forms of trade restrictions, so that manufacturing output may expand, since this 
sector behaves as a nontradable sector during the boom period. Therefore, given limited 
size of an indigenous capital goods sector and low levels of industrialisation, together 
with high levels of protection towards import substitute industries, a windfall gain and 
subsequent appreciation may increase demand, price and output for the domestic 
manufacturing sector of a developing country like PNG. However, protection of the 
manufacturing sector negatively taxes the agricultural export sector and the output of 
this sector will fall as the price of exportable declines relative to the price of domestic 
nontradables. Further, due to imperfect substitutability between some import competing 
goods and imports in most developing countries, an appreciation tends to increase 
profitability and expand output of the import competing sector during the boom years. 
Thus, in the presence of some form of trade restrictions, an appreciation will expand 
manufacturing output, while a depreciation of the RER will reduce the profitability of 
the nontraded sector by reducing the price and output of nontradable goods and services.
Government Expenditure
Government expenditure, either in the form of consumption, investment or subsidies 
(protection), greatly influences the output of an economy. Increased government 
consumption of nontradable goods and services raises the demand for and prices of
nontradables and leads to an expansion of output of the nontradable sectors. Increased 
spending on government investment and subsidies contributes to the expansion of 
nontradable construction as well as the agricultural traded sector. Thus, the anticipated 
sign for this variable is positive for both the traded and nontraded sectors, depending on 
the relative share of government expenditure spent on a specific sector. Since the 
nontradable component in government spending is generally higher in the nontradable 
sector than that of private spending, increased government spending expands 
nontradable output and adversely affects tradable output.
Domestic Absorption
An increase in domestic absorption (less government spending) tends to increase the 
output of nontradables as well as both import substitutes and agricultural tradable 
products through an increase in private consumption and investment demand. The 
expected sign for domestic absorption is positive for the agriculture and import 
substituting tradable sector as well as for the nontradable sector. However, the 
increased demand for domestically produced goods and services raises competition for 
factors of production amongst the sectors. Increased domestic absorption eventually 
increases the domestic price level compared to tradables and reduces competitiveness of 
tradables in the world market. Thus, the anticipated sign for domestic absorption is 
negative in terms of the exportable sector.
Openness in the Trade Regime
Both developed and developing countries attempt to protect some specific sectors or an 
industry by several quantitative and qualitative trade restrictions (proxied by the degree 
of openness in the trade regime). In a developing country an import competing sector is
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generally protected by trade restrictions. While trade restrictions reduce demand for 
imports, they may improve the current account position and increase demand for and 
output of the importable sector. Increased protection also raises the output of 
nontradables and import substitutes due to imperfect substitution between imports and 
import substitutes during the boom years.
Trade protection for a sector acts as a trade tax for other tradable sectors. The 
cost of production increases in the non-protected tradable sector, as a result of a general 
cost increase caused by salary and wages pulled from the protected sector and the 
nontradable sector. On the other hand, a more outward oriented trade policy reduces 
taxes on the non-protected tradable sectors and reduces the price of essential imported 
inputs used in domestic production. By increasing competition in the domestic market, 
greater openness in the trade regime also introduces new strategies for cost effective 
production and increases the output of exportables and importables. Openness in a 
trade regime reduces the domestic price level and makes the export sector more 
competitive in the world market. Hence the expected sign for more openness in a trade 
regime is positive for the tradable sector. The sign can be either positive or negative for 
the nontradable and import substitute sectors.
5.3 The Empirical Model
The general error correction model to determine sectoral impact can be presented by the 
following equations. This general model of sectoral growth is specified with one lag on 
all of the variables as annual data has been used for model estimation.
AAV A = f  (ARER,, AGEX , AOP, ADA, GEX M O P M, D A M, RER M, AVAM) ... (5.2)
AMY A = f  (ARER, AGEX, AOP, ADA, GEXt_b O P M, D A t_„ R ERt_„ M V A ,,) ... (5.3)
AMIN = f  (ARER, AGEX , AOP, ADA, GEX M, 0 P M, D A M, R ER t. b  M IN m) ... (5.4)
ANT = f  (ARER, AGEX , AOP, ADA, GEXM, 0 P M, D A t.„ R ERM, N T M) ........ (5.5)
ACONS = f  (ARER, AGI , AOP, ADA, GI M, O PM, D A M, RERM CONS t. , ) ........(5.6)
The following notations have been used in these above equations.
Dependent variables:
AVA = agricultural value added 
MVA = manufacturing value added 
MIN = mineral sector value added 
NT = nontradable sector value added 
CONS = construction sector value added
Independent variables
RER = RER for export sector 
GEX = government expenditure
OP = trade restriction substituted by the openness o f an economy (proxied by X+M/Y) 
DA = domestic absorption net of government expenditure
All variables are measured at 1990 prices and are in natural logarithms.
Using annual data, the model is estimated over the sample period 1970-94. The 
economy has been decomposed into major traded sectors of agriculture, manufacturing
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and minerals; and nontraded sectors comprising services, construction and utilities for 
analytical purposes. This division enables separate examination of the effects of the 
RER on the growth of the nontradable construction sector, in order to verify the 
‘construction boom’ theory in the context of the PNG economy. Regarding the most 
important determinants of sectoral growth, the most direct measure of the real exchange 
rate (RER2) from Chapter 4 has been used, since the real exchange rate for the export 
sector most closely indicates competitiveness of an economy . Government investment 
(government expenditure minus government consumption) has used separately to 
examine the effect of government investment on the construction sector. Other 
explanatory and dependent variables have been taken from a variety of sources, 
including The World Bank World Tables, IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank 
of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins and from the National Centre for Development 
Studies International Economic Data Bank.
The estimation procedure was began by testing the order of integration of time 
series data. The order of integration for every variable used in the model has been tested 
by the Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The results are reported in 
Appendix Table A5.1. It was found that a number of the key variables are non­
stationary. Therefore, the general to specific Elendry-type error correction model 
building methodology was employed as in the previous chapter, to guard against 
estimating spurious regression relationship while retaining long-run information.
The above equations have been “tested down” using OLS by dropping 
statistically insignificant differenced and lagged terms. The testing procedure continued
2 The results are, however, robust to the use o f the other two real exchange rate measures (RER1, RER3).
until a parsimonious error correction representation was obtained which retained the a 
priori theoretical model as its long-run solution. The selection of final equations was 
made after careful diagnostic check tests on the OLS error process.
5.4 Results
The parsimonious estimates of the model together with the most common diagnostic 
tests are reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The long-run elasticities, with respect to key 
explanatory variables and their t-ratios are given in Table 5.3. In general, the results are
statistically acceptable. All equations pass the F-test for overall fit. The adjusted R s 
range from 43 per cent to 78 per cent suggests the models have fairly good fit. The 
coefficient of the error correction term in each equation is negative and statistically 
significant and provides powerful support for the existence of lag adjustment. The 
Jarque-Bera test statistics for residual normality for equations are less than the critical 
value for a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, indicating normality of 
residuals of the models. A residual correlogram up to six years indicates no significant 
serial correlation in the error terms. The Lagrange multiplier LM-x test for residual 
serial correlation also indicates the calculated x values are much smaller than the 
tabulated value LM-x =16.81, at a 1 per cent significance level, indicating no serial 
correlation in residuals. ARCH-x test for error variance shows that computed values of 
ARCH-x2(1) are smaller in all models than the tabulated value ARCH-x2(l)=6.63 at a 1 
per cent significance level. Thus, the computed statistics suggest that error variances 
are not correlated in the equations. Ramsey’s RESET test for specification error 
indicates that calculated F values are much smaller than critical value at 1 per cent 
significance level. Hence computed RESET-F values for the equations are not 
significant, indicating the equations are not mis-specified.
Table 5.1: Determinants of Sectoral Output: Traded Sector
Agriculture Sector (Equation 5.7)
AAV = 13.62 + 0.21 ARER - 0.23 GEXM+0.13 OP M + 0.12 RERt_, - 0.60 AVM 
(3.55) (3.80) (2.25) (2.40) (4.28)
Adjusted R2 = 0.60 F(5,16) = 4.59 JBN-x2(2) = 0.13 LM-x2(6) = 4.47
ARCH-x2( 1) = 2.73 RESET(2)-F( 1,13) = 1.86 CHOW-F(9,13) = 0.92
MANUFACTURING SECTOR (Equation 5.8)
AMVA = - 4.66 + 0.67 ADA + 0.54 D A + 0.28 O P + 0.34 R E R - 0.71 MVA 
(3.40) (1.93) (2.01) (3.99) (5.27)
Adjusted R2 = 0.72 F(5,16)=9.77 JBN-x2(2) = 0.08 LM-x2(6) = 5.84
ARCH-x2(l) = 0.01 RESET(2)-F(1,14) = 0.22 CHOW-F(9,13) = 3.06
MINERALS SECTOR (Equation 5.9)
AMIN = 14.10 + 1.11 ARER2 + 0.38RER2,., -0.49 MIN 
(1.97) (3.15) (6.78)
Adjusted R2 = 0.78 F(3,18) = 25.15 JBN-x2(2) = 0.99 LM-x2(6) = 2.96
ARCH-x2(l) = 0.29 RESET(2)-F( 1,17) = 0.60 CHOW-F(9,13) = 1.31
The following notations have been used:
AVA = agricultural value added, MVA = manufacturing value added, MIN = mineral sector vale 
added, RER = RER for export sector, GEX = total government expenditure, OP = openness in trade 
regime, DA = domestic absorption.
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2. The F statistic is against the null that all coefficients 
= 0. The Durbin Watson for first order serial correlation is not reported for these models since it is 
strictly not valid in these models with lagged dependent variables. The lagged error correction terms are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and have the expected negative signs. 3. LM is the 
Lagrange multiplier general test for residual serial correlation. ARCFI is the test for Autoregressive 
Heteroscedasticity, RESET is the Ramsey’s RESET test for functional mis-specification, residual 
normality test for skewness and excess kurtosis is given by Jarque Bera Normality test.
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Table 5.2: Determinants of Sectoral Output: NonTradable Sector
NONTRADABLE SECTOR (Equation 5.10)
ANT =11.71 +0.43 ADA + 0.22 DA t_, -0.13RER,., -0.75 NT M 
(2.60) (1.28) (2.61) (3.63)
Adjusted R2 = 0.43 F(4,17) = 4.41 JBN-x2(2) =1.16 LM-x2(6) = 3.23
ARCH-x2(1) = 0.13 RESET(2)-F(1,16) = 1.30 CHOW-F(6,16) = 2.19
CONSTRUCTION SECTOR (Equation 5.11)
ACONS = 16.49 - 0.87 ARER2 + 0.09 GIM +0.13 DAM 
(3.44) (3.22) (2.05)
-0.14 RER21_, - 0.97 CONS M 
(0.99) (4.98)
Adjusted R2 = 0.74 F(6,15) = 8.42 JBN-x2(2) = 0.08 LM-x2(6) = 6.25
ARCH-x2(1) = 0.01 RESET (2)-F (1,14) = 0.13 CHOW-F(9,13) = 1.75
The following notations have been used:
NT = nontradable sector value added, CONS = construction sector value added, RER = RER for export 
sector, GEX = total government expenditure, OP = openness in trade regime, DA = domestic 
absorption, GI= government investment expenditure.
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 2. The F statistic is against the null that all coefficients 
= 0. The Durbin Watson for first order serial correlation is not reported for these models since it is 
strictly not valid in these models with lagged dependent variables. The lagged error correction terms are 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level and have the expected negative signs. 3. LM is the Lagrange 
multiplier general test for residual serial correlation. ARCH is the test for Autoregressive 
Heteroscedasticity, RESET is the Ramsey’s RESET test for functional mis-specification, residual 
normality test for skewness and excess kurtosis is given by Jarque Bera Normality test.
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TABLE 5.3: Estimates of Long-Run Elasticities of Sectoral Growth
1970-94
Independent Agri Manuf Min NT Const
Variables
GEX -0.38**
(2.25)
OP 0.21** 0.32
(2.82) (1.96) *
GI 1.02**
(5.07)
DA 1.48** 0.29* 0.16**
(2.65) (1.83) (3.42)
RER2 0.20** 0.45** 0.65** -0.18** -0.30
(2.64) (2.19) (2.79) (4.21) (1.32)
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. ** denotes significant at 1% , * denotes significant at 5 %. 
Source: Computed from the long-run steady state solutions to the estimated models reported in Table 5.1 
and 5.2.
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All equations passed the Chow tests for parameter stability as the computed F-values of 
Chow-test are insignificant.
The RER has the anticipated sign in the equations for each of these five major 
(agriculture, manufacture, minerals, nontradables and construction) sectoral groupings. 
The empirical results of sectoral growth for each sector will be discussed separately.
Agricultural Sector
Equation (5.7) suggests that depreciation of the RER has a significant positive impact, 
both in the short and long-run, on the agricultural sector. Over the study period, a one 
per cent depreciation of the RER improved the agricultural output by 0.21 per cent in 
the short run and by 0.20 per cent in the long run.
Increased government expenditure had a significant contractionary impact on the 
agricultural traded sector as it increased demand and price of nontradables relative to 
tradables, as predicted by the theoretical propositions. A one per cent increase in 
government expenditure reduced the output of the agricultural sector by 0.38 per cent in 
the long-run, as an increased share of government expenditure is generally spent on the 
nontradable sector.
Greater openness increases domestic profitability at given world prices induced 
by greater export supply. Increased openness in the external trade regime significantly 
improved the output of the agricultural sector in PNG. It seems to reflect the combined 
favourable impact of reduced costs of imported input and improved international
competitiveness. In the long-run openness in the trade regime increased the output of 
the agricultural sector by about 0.21 per cent.
Manufacturing Sector
A one per cent depreciation of the RER led to a significant expansion of manufacturing 
output by 0.45 per cent in the long-run, as real depreciation made the sector more 
competitive by raising the relative price of tradables to nontradables. Increased 
openness also increased output of the manufacturing sector significantly in the long-run. 
As predicted by the theoretical model, a one per cent increase in openness increases 
manufacturing output by 0.32 per cent in the long-run.
Domestic absorption, net of government expenditure, significantly increased 
manufacturing output in the short run and it also had a significant positive effect on 
long-run output growth of the manufacturing sector, due to an expansion of aggregate 
demand. A one per cent increase in domestic absorption increased manufacturing 
output by 0.67 per cent in the short run and 1.48 per cent in the long-run.
Mineral Sector
The impact of the RER on the mineral sector was positive and significant in the short 
run, as well as in the long run (Table 5.3). Increased export prices relative to the 
domestic price level increased profitability and output of the sector. A one per cent 
depreciation of the RER increased output of the mineral sector by 1.11 per cent in the 
short run and 0.65 per cent in the long run.
Nontradable Sector
The effects of a resources boom on PNG’s nontradable sector supports the theoretical 
proposition that a depreciation of the real exchange rate significantly reduces 
profitability and output of the nontradable sector. A one per cent depreciation of the 
real exchange rate reduced output of the nontradable sector by 0.18 per cent in the long 
run. But an increase in domestic absorption raised demand and prices for domestic 
nontradable goods and services as well as significantly raised output of the sector, in the 
short run by 0.43 per cent and by 0.29 per cent in the long run.
Construction Sector
In an attempt to extend the analysis of the consequences of the RER on the nontradable 
capital market, an ECM was estimated on the nontradable construction sector. The 
econometric results support the prediction of the theoretical model since a depreciation 
of the RER significantly lowered the output of the construction sector by 0.87 per cent 
in the short run. But the impact of the RER becomes insignificant in the long-run. As 
predicted by the ‘construction boom’ theory, over the study period increased domestic 
absorption stimulated the construction sector of PNG significantly as increased demand 
for domestically produced goods raised the level of construction activities. A one per 
cent increase in domestic absorption increased construction output by 0.16 per cent in 
the long run. Finally the results indicate increased government investment significantly 
increased the output of the construction sector in the long run by more than a one to one 
basis. A one per cent increase in government investment increased construction output 
by 1.02 per cent in the long run. This result reflects the occurrences of construction 
booms associated with government investment in the PNG economy over the past two 
and a half decades.
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5.5 Investment and Saving Behaviour in Papua New Guinea
This section examines the determinants of domestic savings behaviour in the PNG 
economy. The possible repercussion of various macroeconomic policies on long-run 
growth reflecting changes in savings behaviour of the PNG economy over the past two 
and a half decades are discussed. The econometric results of the savings functions are 
evaluated in Chapter 6 while discussing the savings and investment performance of the 
economy in response to resources booms in detail.
5.5.1 Determinants of Savings: Theory and Hypothesis
The traditional analysis of the relationship between growth and savings stems from the 
analysis of the impact of domestic savings on investment -  which subsequently 
transforms into higher growth. Although short-run growth is determined by investment 
levels, the effect of investment on long-run growth is controversial. Orthodox 
(neoclassical) economists believe that there is no correlation between investment and 
long-run growth -  but that long-run growth of a country may be influenced by various 
determinants which are totally independent of public policy choices with respect to 
investment. The most important determinants of long-run growth of a nation stated to 
be education, a skilled labour force, research and training, population growth and an 
exogenously given rate of technological progress. Thus, increased public spending on 
health, education and research and development enhances human capital formation 
which can greatly influence a country’s output growth.
There is a growing body of literature based on endogenous growth theory 
(Römer, 1986; Lucas, 1988) which attributes long-run growth to changes in the savings 
rate -  contrasting with the neoclassical model where long-run growth is driven by the
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exogenous rate of technological change and changes in the savings rate have only a 
level effect in the long run. However, attempts have been made to develop theoretical 
foundations and empirical support for the view that higher levels of savings and the 
related quality of investment are also critical determinants of long-run growth.
There is a sizeable body of theoretical and empirical literature on the 
determinants of savings behaviour , Different authors have dealt with specific aspects of 
savings including the effects of interest rates, inflation and financial retardation, on the 
one hand, to the contribution of social security and political stability, on the other. 
Because of the vast theoretical complexity and different policy objectives, no one single 
model has been able to deal with the entire spectrum of the effects of savings behaviour 
on a country (Edwards, 1996).
Private sector savings behaviour is essentially an intertemporal choice, that is, 
current consumption vs future consumption (savings). There is ample theoretical work 
which has captured the intertemporal optimisation of savings function. In the rest of the 
section, some major determining factors and policy issues such as real interest rate, 
growth rate of GDP, changes in TOT, inflation, development in the financial system 
and foreign savings affecting the savings behaviour of PNG for the past two and a half 
decades will be discussed.
Real Interest Rate: The role of interest rates on savings is possibly the most 
controversial and broadly discussed topic on economic policy reforms in both developed 
and developing countries. In Keynesian monetary theory, income is considered to be 
the prime mover of savings. But the substitution and income effects of a given change 
in interest rates may work in opposite directions. The increased interest rate has
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‘secondary and relatively unimportant' effects on consumption postulated by early 
Keynesian theory (Keynes, 1936:94). On the other hand, the Keynesian accelerator 
effect shows a positive impact from changes in income on capital accumulation. In a 
recent discussion on the subject Gylfason (1993) showed that the savings response to 
increased interest rates primarily depends on the strengths of substitution and wealth 
effects. The neoclassical model of investment assumes the cost of capital affects the 
desired capital stock in the same way expected output does, so that an artificially low 
interest rate can generate profit and promote investment. Until the 1970s, interest rate 
policies in developing countries were primarily guided by the neoclassical view that the 
interest rate should be kept low in order to accelerate capital accumulation.
In the early 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) forcefully attacked the 
low interest rate policy in developing countries. They argued that in the absence of a 
developed market in stocks and bonds, a low interest rate policy to stimulate investment 
is not consistent in typical developing countries where self-financing and bank loans are 
the major sources of investible funds. Since portfolio choices are limited in these 
developing economies, savings behaviour tends to be highly money intensive, and a low 
interest rate policy impacts adversely on aggregate savings and investment by increasing 
current consumption. The McKinnon-Shaw proposition indicates that financial 
repression retards economic growth by reducing capital accumulation in the economy 
which is subsequently emphasised by their financial liberalisation hypothesis. A 
number of recent empirical studies on rapidly growing East Asian economies suggest a 
positive impact from financial institutional development and high interest elasticity of
savings (Fry 1980, 1988; Fry and Mason 1981).
The views of McKinnon-Shaw on financial repression on savings have been 
challenged by many. The neo-structuralist development economists (Taylor 1983, 
1988; van Wijnbergen 1982) criticised the McKinnon-Shaw proposition, arguing that 
high interest rates on bank deposits may generate a “financial crowding out” by shifting 
the portfolio away from other assets in the household asset portfolio towards bank 
deposits with higher interest rates which may reduce the net increase in total savings 
(Athukorala, 1998). A large number of empirical studies on both developed and 
developing countries have failed to find any significant positive effect on domestic 
savings due to interest rate changes. Giovannini (1983) cast serious doubt on the view 
that the interest elasticity of savings is significantly positive for developing countries, 
finding that there was no significant positive impact of higher interest rates on domestic 
savings for seven Asian countries. Interestingly, other studies suggest a relaxation in 
borrowing constraints, due to financial reform programmes, reduces savings rates. 
Using cross country data for some developed economies, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) 
found support for this view. Schmidt-Hebbel et al. (1992) also found that household 
savings behaviour is negatively related to the relaxation of borrowing constraints for a 
group of developing countries. McKinnon (1991:22) acknowledges that aggregate 
savings does not respond strongly to a higher interest rate. Thus, the effect of an 
increased interest rate on savings behaviour is still clouded with mists of ambiguity and 
controversy, which prompted both analysts and policy makers to consider alternative 
policy mechanisms for encouraging savings.
Income Growth: The growth rate of GDP positively influences savings behaviour by 
increasing overall income of a country. In a life-cycle setting, Modigliani (1970) argued 
that income growth has a positive impact on private savings. Using detailed household
level data Carroll and Weil (1993) also found support for the positive effect of income 
growth on private savings. Recent higher savings performance by East Asian countries 
provides the evidence of the positive influence of income growth on savings behaviour 
bringing subsequent higher growth in these countries. The expected positive influence 
of GDP growth on savings behaviour also indicates the consumption smoothing 
behaviour. Ogaki et al. (1994) argue that the degree of intertemporal substitution is a 
function of per capita income which is supported to a large extent by their empirical 
results.
Terms of Trade: Change in a country’s TOT can also affect savings behaviour,
through real income losses or gains brought about by changes in the price of foreign 
goods in terms of domestic goods. Theoretically, TOT changes are part of real GDP. 
However, price deflators generally do not capture price structural effects on the level 
and growth of real income due to changes in the TOT. Thus changes in the TOT can be 
expected to have an additional effect to that of changes in GDP on savings (Ady, 1976). 
In general, an improvement in TOT has a positive impact on private savings which 
reflects intertemporal consumption smoothing by the private sector in response to a 
temporary TOT shock. However, the effect of TOT can go either way, depending on 
whether the changes in TOT are perceived to be temporary or permanent. An 
improvement in TOT perceived to be temporary may lead to an increase in savings so as 
to keep real expenditure constant. By the same reasoning, households reduce savings 
when faced with a permanent improvement in TOT.
Inflation: Inflation, as a measure of macroeconomic stability, can also exert an
important influence on the savings behaviour of an economy. Increased inflation,
representing economic instability, tends to have a negative impact on the savings rate. 
Another view of the adverse impact of high inflation finds support in the theoretical 
work of McKinnon and Shaw’s ‘financial repression’. During a period of high inflation, 
where nominal interest ceilings are pegged by government, a large withdrawal of funds 
from the banking sector occurs due to the low interest rates. This reduces household 
savings and increases consumption. Thus, financial repression, and lower interest rates, 
result in an inefficient allocation of funds for productive investment in the absence of 
market price rationing (Giovannini, 1983). However, if consumers attempt to maintain 
a target rate of consumption to wealth, or liquid asset to income, the anticipated 
inflation may increase household savings.
Foreign Savings: The open economy model incorporates two perspectives to savings 
analysis. First, in an open economy, agents can use foreign savings (borrowing) to 
smooth consumption through time. Secondly, domestic and foreign interest rate 
differentials induce capital inflow. Foreign savings, induced either by a higher domestic 
interest rate relative to foreign interest rates or through borrowing, can act as a substitute 
for domestic savings and increases both private and public consumption. Thus, the 
coefficient on the foreign saving variable in the private saving function measures the 
degree of substitutability between foreign savings (or current account deficit) and the 
national private and/or total domestic savings (Edwards, 1996). The estimated 
coefficient of this variable would be negative if foreign savings crowd out private
savings.
5.5.2 The Model
In an attempt to capture the key hypotheses, two savings functions have been estimated 
separately for a total domestic savings function and a private savings function for PNG. 
A separate private savings function was estimated to show the contrast with a total 
savings function where public savings is a significant element in total savings. Edwards 
(1996) showed that the process of determination of public and private savings can be 
significantly different, especially when the political stability of a country is in question.
The behavioural relationships of the savings functions are specified as follows:
APS = f (AGY, AIR, ATOT, AINF, AFS, AFD, DS, GYt_„
IRt-b TOT t.j, INF t.j, FSt_b FDt_b PSt_, ) ............  (5.12)
ATDS = f (AGY, AIR, ATOT, AINF, AFS, AFD, DS, GYM,
IRt-b TOTt., INF M, FSt.b FDt.„ TDSt_,) ............ (5.13)
The following notations have been used in the above equations (with expected signs of 
the regression coefficient in parentheses):
Dependent Variables:
TDS = total gross domestic savings 
PS = domestic private savings
Independent Variables:
GY (+) = growth rate of GDP;
IR (+ or -) = real interest rate on time deposit;
TOT (+ or -) = Terms of trade;
INF (-) = expected rate of inflation proxies by the rate of inflation with one year lag 
used as a measure of macroeconomic stability;
FS (+ or -) = foreign savings in billion kina;
FD (+) = financial institutional development, measured as the ratio of broad money to 
GDP; and
DS = a dummy variable which takes value of 1 for boom years (1972-74, 1976-77, 
1991-94) and 0 for other years. The dummy variable (DS) is included to capture the 
effects of broad policy responses during the boom years of the PNG economy.
The model was estimated over the sample period 1970-94 using annual data. 
Data on total gross domestic savings were taken from The World Bank World Tables 
1994 and deflated by the GDP deflator (1990=100). Private savings were estimated by 
subtracting the government savings from the total domestic savings. Government 
savings is the difference between government revenue and operating expenditure. 
Foreign savings are defined as equivalent to the current account deficit (sign revised) to 
GDP. Due to unavailability of data on depreciation allowances, gross rather that net 
saving is used. All variables are measured at 1990 prices. Except for foreign savings, 
the real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation, all variables are measured in 
natural logarithms.
In line with standard practice in modern time series econometrics, the estimation 
process was begun by testing the time series properties of the data series. The order of 
integration for every variable used in the model has been tested by the Dickey-Fuller 
and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, with results reported in the Appendix Table A5.1. 
Since a number of key variables are non-stationary, the general to specific Hendry-type
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Error Correction Model building methodology was employed as in the previous chapter 
to guard against estimating spurious regression relationship whilst retaining long-run 
information.
The above equations were “tested down” using OLS by dropping statistically 
insignificant differenced and lagged terms. The testing procedure continued until a 
parsimonious error correction representation was obtained which retains the a priori 
theoretical model as its long-run solution. The selection of final equations was made 
after careful diagnostic check tests on the OLS error process.
5.5.3 Results
The estimated savings equations are presented in Table 5.4. The long-run elasticities of 
explanatory variables which are computed from the steady state solutions from 
estimated equations in Table 5.4 are presented in Table 5.5.
The results are generally statistically satisfactory and consistent with the theory. 
Both equations pass the F-test for overall fit at a one per cent significance level. The
adjusted R for each equation suggests the model has a good fit. A residual 
correlogram up to six years indicates no significant serial correlation in the error terms. 
The Lagrange multiplier LM-% test for residual serial correlation also indicated no 
serial correlation in residuals. The ARCH-x2 test for error variance shows that in all 
models the computed values of ARCH-x2(l) are smaller than the tabulated value at a 
one per cent significance level. Thus, the computed statistics suggest error variances 
are not correlated in the equations. Ramsey’s RESET test for specification error 
indicates the equations are not mis-specified. Some of the variables, such as financial
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development and dummy variable for policy measures during the boom years were 
found to be consistently statistically insignificant for both private and total savings in 
the experimental runs and dropped from the final equations.
A common practice in the literature on the determination of savings has been to 
impose an income homogeneity assumption on coefficient estimates. That is, other 
things being equal, savings are proportional to income. In reality, income and savings 
may not always move in the same direction and also may not change by the same 
proportion. Hence, an income homogeneity assumption may distort coefficient 
estimates (Athukorala, 1998). As the coefficient of income in the restricted model of 
savings functions with income homogeneity assumption is not statistically significant 
for PNG, the equations were estimated without imposing any restrictions on the 
parameters.
Growth in real GDP shows a very strong positive effect on savings behaviour, 
both in short as well as in long-run savings behaviour. A one per cent increase in real 
GDP in PNG increased private and total domestic savings more than 1 per cent in short 
run, and increased private savings by 1.7 per cent and total savings by 2.2 per cent in 
the long run.
The coefficient of foreign savings is significantly negative for both private and 
aggregate domestic savings, indicating that both in the short run and in long run, foreign 
savings crowds out PNG’s private as well as total domestic savings. As foreign savings 
fell, indicated by a rise in the current account balance to GDP, private savings increased 
by 0.75 per cent in the short run and 1.34 per cent in the long run.
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Table 5:4: Determinants of Savings in Papua New Guinea 1970-94
Private Savings (Equation 5.12)
APS = -14.4+1.86 AGY-0.75 AFS + 0.94 ATOT + 1.54 GYM -0.11 IRt_, 
(4.27) (3.22) (2.97) (4.70) (4.98)
-1.09 INFM - 0.12 FSt_, - 0.90 PSM 
(2.52) (2.89) (4.36)
Adjusted R* 12 3= 0.86 F(9,13) = 12.1 JBN-x2(2) = 1.59 LM-x2(6) = 1.08
ARCH-x2(l) = 0.001 RESET(2)-F(1,12) = 0.01 CHOW-F(l 1,11) = 0.65
Total Domestic Savings (Equation 5.13)
ATDS = -22.93 + 1.47 AGY - 0.84 AFS + 1.22 ATOT + 1.94 GYM - 0.14 IRM 
(2.30) (2.47) (2.56) (3.62) (3.67)
-1.93 INF M - 0.14 FSm - 0.90 TDS M 
(1.85) (2.38) (3.67)
Adjusted R2 = 0.74 F(9,13) = 8.4 JBN-X2(2) = 2.52 LM-x2(6) = 7.13
ARCH-x2( 1) = 0.03 RESET(2)-F( 1,12) = 0.08 CHO W-F( 11,11) = 1.61
Notes:
1. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
2. The F statistic is against the null that all coefficients = 0. The Durbin Watson for first order serial 
correlation is not reported for these models since it is strictly not valid in these models with lagged 
dependent variables. The lagged error correction terms are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
and have the expected negative signs.
3. LM is the Lagrange multiplier general test for residual serial correlation. ARCH is the test for 
Autoregressive Heteroscedasticity, RESET is the Ramsey’s RESET test for functional mis-specification, 
residual normality test for skewness and excess kurtosis is given by Jarque Bera Normality test.
The following notations have been used in the private and total domestic savings equations:
PS = private savings, TDS = total domestic savings, FS = foreign savings, GY = growth of real GDP, 
IR= real interest rate, INF = expected rate of inflation.
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TABLE 5.5: Estimates of Long-Run Elasticities of Savings Functions
Explanatory Variables
GY INF IR FS
PS 1.72* -1.22* -0.13** -1.34**
(5.17) (2.36) (4.92) (5.57)
TDS 2.16** -2.15** -0.15** -1.54**
(4.73) (2.16) (4.68) (4.27)
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. ** denotes significant at 1% and * denotes significant at 5%
Source: Computed from the long-run steady state solutions to the estimated models reported in Table 5.4.
Increased foreign savings also substituted the total domestic savings of PNG by 0.8 per 
cent in the short run and 1.5 per cent in the long run.
The coefficient of TOT suggests a positive short run impact for improvement in 
TOT on PNG’s savings behaviour. A one per cent increase in TOT induced a 0.9 per 
cent increase in private savings and a 1.22 per cent increase in total domestic savings in 
the short run. However, there is no statistically significant long-run TOT impact on the 
savings behaviour of PNG. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of consumption 
smoothing behaviour.
An increase in the real interest rate significantly lowered both private and total 
savings in PNG. It seems that the negative income effect overweighted the positive 
substitution effect of increased interest rate (Dornbusch and Reynoso, 1989). As 
indicated by Giovannini (1985), in a life cycle hypothesis setting, the ‘consumption 
profile’ of an individual does not change with change in the real interest rate. The 
interest elasticity of savings tends to be negative in the steady state for a developing
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country like PNG. In the long run a one per cent increase in the real interest rate is 
associated with a 0.13 per cent reduction in private savings and 0.15 per cent for total 
savings.
Increased inflation erodes the real value of wealth, and has a negative impact the 
household savings given a constant consumption level. It has been found in many 
studies that inflation induces the withdrawal of deposits from the banking system, 
increasing current consumption and reducing savings, PNG’s private savings were also 
found to have been negatively affected by higher inflation over the study period. The 
inflation rate, used as the measure of macroeconomic stability, was found to have a 
significant negative impact on private and total savings behaviour in PNG in the short 
run. In the long run, a one per cent increase in inflation significantly reduced private 
savings by 1.2 per cent and total savings by about 2.1 per cent.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined both the impact of RER movements on sectoral transformation 
of the PNG economy over the past two and half decades, and the macroeconomic policy 
responses on long run growth, by estimating the total (private and public) and private 
savings function of the economy.
As predicted by theory, a depreciation of the RER was found to be positive for 
tradable sectors and negative for the nontradable sectors. A real depreciation stimulated 
the output of the tradable sector whereas increased government consumption on 
nontradables reduced the output of agricultural sector by increasing the demand and 
price for domestic nontradables. It was also found that government expenditure in the
form of investment increased the output of the nontradable construction sector. The 
econometric results indicate that increased domestic absorption raised the output of 
agriculture, manufacturing and nontradable sectors whereas it adversely affected the 
output of the mineral sector in this study. Increases in domestic absorption and 
government investment demand have expansionary effects on the nontradable 
construction sector whereas a depreciation of the RER reduced the size of the sector.
The econometric results relate into TOT variable support the theoretical 
proposition of intertemporal consumption smoothing behaviour of the country. The 
findings also suggest that while an increase in the interest rate and inflation lowers 
private savings and total domestic savings, foreign savings substitute for both private 
and total savings in the short as well as in the long run.
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CHAPTER 6
IMPACT OF MAJOR RESOURCES BOOMS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Introduction
This chapter examines the nature and impact of major resources booms and internal 
policy responses in relation to growth and the sectoral composition of output, and 
savings behaviour of the PNG economy. Only major positive shocks in the form of 
resources booms and their consequences on the PNG economy will be analysed over the 
study period of 1970-94. The objective of this discussion is to analyse whether the 
available empirical evidence of resources booms in PNG substantiates the theoretical 
predictions of the framework of the study postulated in Chapter 2. This chapter will 
also examine the PNG government’s responses to these resources booms, in the short as 
well as the long run. Sections 2-9 identify the major resources booms in PNG during 
the 1970s and the first half of the 1990s, together with overall policy responses, and 
their sectoral impact on the economic performance of the PNG economy over the past 
two and a half decades; Section 10 discusses the long-run policy impact on savings and 
investment behaviour; and Section 11 provides a summary.
6.2 The Major Resources Booms: 1971-77
PNG experienced three major resources booms in the 1970s. The first was an upsurge 
in investment associated with the construction of the Bougainville copper mine, and can 
be termed as an ‘investment boom’ during the financial years1 1971 and 1972. The 
Bougainville copper mine belongs to Bougainville Copper Ltd. (BCL), a Papua New
1 Until 1977, PNG had a July-June fiscal year. Beginning in 1978, the fiscal year was changed to coincide with the 
calendar year.
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Guinean mining company, which is 53 per cent owned by Rio Tinto, a company dual- 
listed in the United Kingdom and Australia. The second boom was a sharp increase in 
minerals production and exports by the BCL mine which coincided with increasing 
world copper prices and generated a massive foreign revenue income for the economy 
during 1973-74. The third boom originated from increased supply from the agricultural 
and non-mineral exportable sectors induced by higher prices for agricultural 
commodities during 1976-77.
6.2.1 BCL Investment Boom 1971-72
Construction of the Bougainville copper mine brought the first major investment boom 
to the PNG economy. PNG experienced major foreign capital investment flow in the 
early 1970s from the Bougainville Copper Project amounting to approximately A$400 
million. During construction period of the Panguna mine of BCL, a massive capital 
inflow of K223 million in 1971 and K212 million in 1972 was recorded. During these 
two financial year of 1971 and 1972, BCL accounted for nearly 72 per cent of all fixed 
capital formation in the country. Thus, 1971 marked the beginning of the BCL 
investment boom ’ as investment in the construction sector grew at the rate of 62 per cent 
from the previous year’s level.
During the height of BCL construction, the growth rate of gross domestic 
investment was striking, increasing from 35 per cent of GDP in 1970 to about 47 per 
cent of GDP in 1971. Total (private and government) consumption increased from 
K410.0 million in 1968 to K614.5 million in 1972. Export value also increased at a rate 
of above 26 per cent of GDP in 1971. Imports increased substantially from the previous 
years and capital goods constituted the major share of imports.
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Table 6.1: Bougainville Copper Mine’s Impact on Monetised Sector GDP
(1968-74; Millions of kina at 1968 constant prices)
Year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Gross fixed investment 85 91 172 251 204 99 75
BCL n.a 20 90 180 130 20 20
Percentage of total n.a 22 52 72 64 22 27
Export of goods and NFS 77 87 97 111 151 308 363
BCL n.a n.a n.a n.a 20 150 174
Percentage of total n.a n.a n.a n.a 13 49 48
Imports of goods and NFS 165 184 262 328 309 237 226
BCL n.a 10 77 146 85 25 20
Percentage of total n.a 5 29 45 28 11 9
GDP in Monetised sector 309 326 376 431 441 555 568
BCL n.a 5 39 70 90 155 183
Percentage of total n.a 2 10 16 20 28 32
Source: World Bank (1976) Report No. 1150-PNG, Table 2.6 p.24.
Adjustment towards new economic activities in 1972 was influenced by a 
number of internal and external factors. Among them, a sharp increase in the world 
price for major export commodities and a substantial revenue flow from overseas sales 
of mineral ore by BCL, were the major factors altering the sectoral composition of the 
PNG economy during this period.
6.2.2 Mineral Boom: 1973-74
The growth rate of approximately 28 per cent in the monetised sector between 1972 and 
1973 was wholly contributed by the increased production of mineral (copper and gold) 
ore from BCL. The mine came into full production at a time when the world prices for 
copper and gold were rising. The Bougainville mine contributed about 20 per cent of
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the monetised sector’s GDP in 1972, 28 per cent in 1973 and 32 per cent in 1974 (Table 
6.1). The increase in the export price index during 1973 outweighed the increase in the 
import price index and brought an average annual change in the TOT index of 25.6 per 
cent and 30.2 per cent in 1973 and 1974, respectively, and contributed significantly to 
export revenue earnings. Thus, 1973 can be marked as the first ‘mineral boom' in 
PNG.
The share of exports to GDP increased significantly after the mine went into 
production in April 1972. The growth in total export revenue was four-fold over the 
first four financial years of the 1970s, increasing from K101.7 million in 1971 to 
K363.5 million in 1974. The BCL mine alone contributed about 50 per cent of total 
export revenue in 1973. The export value of minerals accounted for 63 per cent of total 
merchandise export receipts in 1973. The import share of consumer goods, fuels and 
petroleum also increased rapidly during 1973.
6.2.3 Commodity Boom: 1976-77
Another major boom in PNG economy that began after the national independence, in 
September 1975 and monetary independence in January 1976, and can be marked as the 
‘agricultural commodity boom’. This boom originated from the increased supply of 
agricultural and other non-mineral exportable sectors which was supported by 
favourable world market prices for PNG’s primary commodities. The nature and impact 
of this boom was substantially different from the other major booms as the effects of 
this boom demonstrate different changes in relative prices, sectoral growth and income 
distribution patterns in PNG.
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The pattern of income distribution between PNG nationals and expatriates 
changed during this boom. Papua New Guineans were the major beneficiaries of this 
boom as they became the direct recipients of an increasing share of income from cash 
crops exports. As the majority of the PNG population was involved with the 
agricultural sector for subsistence, most of cash crops which had been dominated by 
expatriates before independence were now produced under the ownership of local 
people. The amount of GDP directly accruing to PNG nationals grew at about 10 per 
cent per annum, in real terms, between 1973/74 and 1981 (Garnaut and Baxter, 
1984:66).
Excluding copper concentrate, the export price index for all commodities greatly 
increased between late 1976 and early 1978. The TOT improved significantly by 20.6 
per cent in 1976 and 22.2 per cent in 1977, from a negative 54.7 per cent in 1975. From 
the September quarter of 1976 the value of PNG’s exports grew strongly, largely 
attributable to buoyant prices for cash crops, particularly coffee and cocoa. The value of 
PNG’s exports continued to rise, mainly due to higher volume of coffee exports, 
together with increases in the volume of copper ore and concentrates and other 
agricultural export commodities.
Table 6.2: Trade Indices 1972-79
(1977=100)
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Export price index 51.0 64.9 98.0 61.4 75.3 100.0 88.4 119.7
Import price index/a 55.8 56.5 65.4 90.5 92.1 100.0 118.3 135.5
Terms of trade index 91.6 115.0 149.8 67.8 81.8 100.0 74.7 88.3
% change in TOT index 7.5 25.5 30.3 -54.7 20.6 22.2 -25.3 18.2
Source: World Bank (1981) Report No. 3544a-PNG.
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During 1976, the export value of coffee increased dramatically to K132.62 million, 
almost a four fold increase compared to K33.55 million in 1975. The large export 
receipts contributed by coffee exports were influenced by the high world market price 
(the export price index of coffee rose by 189 per cent during 1976) and the higher 
volume (about 35 per cent increase from the 1975 level) of coffee exported during this 
year.
6.3 Policy Response
Since PNG did not achieve national independence until 1975, it could not pursue 
independent policy fully to counteract any revenue and price instability in the economy 
brought about by BCL investment and mineral booms between 1971 and 1974. During 
the first half of the 1970s, PNG relied heavily on budgetary support from Australia to 
cover the major part of government expenditure since it was part of the Australian 
monetary system.
The second half of the 1970s will be remembered as the legacy of prudent and 
successful macroeconomic policy implementation by a PNG government. The 
following measures considerably reduced the impact of fluctuating world prices and 
other uncertainties on producers and the budget.
6.3.1 Fiscal Policy
The fiscal response to the ‘investment’ and ‘mineral’ booms in the early 1970s was 
expansionary. As seen from Table 6.3, government expenditure grew substantially. 
From 1971 to 1975, current expenditure to GDP increased by 30.3 per cent, dominated 
by wages and salaries (45 to 50 per cent of total) and purchase of goods and services (35
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to 40 per cent of total). Capital expenditure shows a declining trend over the same
period.
Total revenue increased from 74.2 million in 1971 to 136.7 in 1974 with a 49 per 
cent increase in tax revenue and 235 per cent increase in non-tax revenue (Appendix 
Table A6.1). The large increase in government revenue over these four years was 
contributed mainly by the big boost in income and profit, dividends, and royalties from 
the operation of the BCL mine. The contribution of personal income tax accounted for 
30 per cent, while import duties accounted for 28 per cent of total revenue collection.
Table 6.3: Central Government Revenues and Expenditures 1971-1977
(percentage share of GDP)
Share o f  G D P  (per cent) 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total revenue 11.9 13.2 11.8 13.1 17.9 2 0 .6 17.9
Tax revenue 9 .9 11.1 9 .4 9.1 13.4 16.7 12.1
Non-tax revenue 2 .0 2.1 2 .4 4 .0 4.5 3 .9 3.0
Total expenditure 3 2 .9 36 .2 3 1 .7 2 9 .5 37 .3 3 8 .8 3 2 .7
Current expenditure 26.1 3 0 .0 27.1 2 6 .6 3 4 .0 3 4 .6 2 9 .0
Capital expenditure 6.8 6 .2 4 .6 2 .9 3.3 4.3 3.7
Source: Constructed from World Bank(1976) Report No. 1150-PNG Table 4.2 and 4.4, and World Bank (1981) 
Report No. 3544a-PNG Table 5.2 and 5.6.
As predicted by the booming sector literature, government spending increased 
sharply during the boom years. The phenomenal increase in government expenditure 
increased the demand and price for nontradables and reduced the price of tradables 
relative to nontradables bringing a real appreciation in PNG’s exchange rate.
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To deal with the downturn in the PNG mineral sector in 1973-74, the
government established the Mineral Resources Stabilisation Fund (MRSF) in 1974 to 
smooth out the impact of large export revenue flows on the budget and the domestic 
price level. Payments into the MRSF come only from large scale mining projects (until 
then, only BCL) revenues, with funds subsequently transferred into consolidated 
revenue to produce a steady flow into each year’s budget.
Between 1975/76 and 1980, the MRSF built up reserves in years of 
exceptionally large mining revenues (1974 and 1980) and ran them down again in years 
of exceptionally low revenues (1976 and 1978). In 1978, when mineral related receipts 
dropped by 60 per cent, the flow of funds out of the MRSF fell by less than half yet still 
contributed 12 per cent of domestic revenue. The MRSF, as a major policy tool of the 
PNG government, worked successfully to reduce the instability of the internal economic 
balance until the late-1980s.
Commodity Price Stabilisation Funds (CPSF) operated by the commodity board 
for three major export crops (copra, coffee and cocoa) also stabilised the prices along a 
moving long-run average price trend. At the end of 1980, these funds held K160 
million and were preparing to pay bounties to producers to compensate for falling 
commodity prices.
During the agricultural boom, PNG pursued pragmatic economic policies. 
During 1976-77, the government implemented reductions in real expenditure. Central 
government expenditure fell 14 per cent as a share of GDP in 1977, from its 1975 level, 
as financial management focussed on the requirements of stability and a deliberate 
reduction in Australian aid and budgetary grants. In 1977, capital expenditures rose
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about 41 per cent from the 1975 level, whereas current expenditures grew only 6 per 
cent between 1975 and 1977 (Appendix Table A6.1).
Over the 1975-77 period, real public consumption expenditure fell by more than 
22 per cent and the total real public expenditure fell by slightly less than 9 per cent. A 
National Public Expenditure Plan (NPEP) was introduced in 1978 to facilitate careful 
allocation of increases in government expenditure in the light of national priorities. A 
target of a 3 per cent increase in real expenditure for goods and services was 
implemented successfully during 1978-79. The NPEP was also successful in raising the 
share of capital expenditure in the budget to about 20 per cent before 1980. The 
Government’s fiscal revenue effort also increased significantly during the second half of 
the 1970s. Since independence, every budget had included new sources of revenues and 
steadily reduced the reliance on Australian budgetary support.
Another noticeable influence on economic stability was the steady reduction of 
Australian aid since 1976. In 1976, the two governments reached an agreement on a 
five-year aid package in which Australia undertook a policy to provide a minimum 
annual grant of A$180 million, with annual supplements to be determined on a year to 
year basis. This arrangement was a great improvement over the previous system which 
had sometimes resulted in serious disparities between expected and actual assistance. 
Between 1975 and 1977 Australian aid fell 17 per cent per annum in US dollar terms 
(Appendix Table A3.7). The 1976 agreement also opened the way for the development 
of the NPEP based on a steady growth of government spending. Since the level of aid 
was specified in Australian dollars, devaluation of the Australian dollar, and several
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revaluations by PNG, further reduced the value of aid to PNG over the period until
1980.
Overall, real government spending up to 1979 reflected macroeconomic 
prudence. The econometric investigation of RER determinants in Chapter 4 confirms 
that a reduction in foreign aid and government expenditure improves the 
competitiveness of an economy. It is clear that, during 1976-77, tight government 
budgets and reduced reliance on foreign aid helped maintain a stable domestic price 
level and prevented RER appreciation.
6.3.2 Monetary Policy
Policy instruments for maintaining a stable monetary system have been strengthened 
since independence, as the monetised sector expanded and the financial system became 
more developed.
Under the influence of a large balance of payments surplus, the money supply 
grew 49 per cent in 1976 and 54 per cent in 1977 from K186 million in 1975 to K428 
million in 1977, contributed by increased income in the stabilisation funds for coffee, 
cocoa and copra growers. This large increase in the money supply in 1976 and 1977 
also indicated the growing reliance in monetary policy.
The CPSF, which were set up to stabilise prices to producers, also helped 
dampen the effects of commodity price cycles on the domestic money supply, since the 
majority of their assets was held in the Central Bank. The CPSF reduced monetary 
instability as they developed substantial reserves between 1976 and 1979 when export 
prices were exceptionally high. About 60 per cent of these reserves were deposited in
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the Central Bank. The remaining 40 per cent deposited in the trading banks was 
available to support increased bank lending and thereby increased the money supply. 
The disbursements from the deposits held with the BPNG had reduced the monetary 
contraction associated with low export prices.
During 1976 to 1979, the stance of monetary policy was more or less passive. 
Domestic interest rates remained steady and were generally below international levels. 
From the early 1980s, there was a shift towards amore active and interventionist 
monetary policy.
6.3.3 Trade Policy
In the early years after Independence, PNG maintained a very open trade policy regime 
with primary reliance on market forces to promote industrialisation. During the 1970s, 
established firms experienced very little government interference in the form of 
quantitative trade restriction. Until the early-1980s, taxes on international transactions 
were low and generally comprised of a low and uniform import tax. No import bans or 
quotas were imposed although some interventions were made on an ad hoc basis to 
protect certain infant industries such as flour, poultry and animal feed (World Bank, 
1981). Capital goods and raw materials were exempted from tariffs. Duties on 
manufacturing goods ranged between 10-18 per cent. A basic levy of 2.5 per cent was 
imposed on most imported goods, except for medicine and basic foods, and a tariff of up 
to 50 per cent was imposed on luxury goods. Given the lack of clear policy objectives, 
the impact of these ad hoc trade policy measures is not clear (World Bank, 1981).
Export taxes on primary products were set at 2.5 per cent. An export incentive 
scheme and tariff draw back system was also available during the 1970s for
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manufactured export industries. As a result of improved agricultural export prices, a 2.5 
per cent export tax for copra, tea and rubber was reintroduced from 1 January 1977. 
PNG also enjoyed duty free access for most of its primary exports to Australia, New 
Zealand and the EEC countries under the Lome Convention.
6.3.4 Exchange Rate Policy
In a period of rapid international inflation, the PNG government followed an exchange 
rate policy designed to help control imported inflation and achieved high level success 
in this regard as PNG’s rate of inflation has been one of the lowest in the world in 1975 
(Goodman et al., 1985). Because of the very high import content of most consumer 
goods and intermediate goods and the general absence of trade restrictions in PNG, the 
relative prices of goods and services within the domestic economy were determined to a 
large extent by the corresponding relative prices set in international markets. Allowing 
these relative prices to determine an efficient allocation of resources, the government 
used the exchange rate to influence the absolute level of domestic prices. As shown in
Table 6.4: The Foreign Exchange Value of Kina 1975-80
(IK = units of foreign currency)
End of period $A $us YEN DM $NZ
1975 1.00 1.26 361 3.29 1.27
1976 1.13 1.23 317 2.90 1.30
1977 1.16 1.32 281 2.77 1.30
1978 1.26 1.45 348 2.65 1.37
1979 1.31 1.45 315 2.50 1.48
1980 1.32 1.55 315 3.50 1.63
Source: Garnaut and Baxter (1984) Table 2.1, p. 13.
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Table 6.4, there have been a number of exchange rate changes since monetary 
independence. The exchange rate of the kina appreciated against most currencies except 
the German Mark and the Japanese Yen. Currency appreciations relative to its major 
trading partners, combined with measures to prevent a real increase in wages, resulted in 
a rate of inflation lower than that experienced by PNG’s major trading partners during 
the second half of the 1970s.
6.4 Effects of Resources Boom: 1972-78
It is difficult to trace the exact effects of each boom over a short period of time as prices 
and product markets react slowly to sudden unanticipated changes. Thus, an analysis of 
the effects of these three different booms, the BCL investment boom (1971-72), the 
mineral boom (1973-74) and the agricultural boom (1976-77) has been taken together. 
This gives us much clearer picture of the consequences of these booms. The impact of 
these booms has been analysed in the light of the theoretical framework postulated in 
Chapter 2, on (1) key macroeconomic variables, (2) relative prices and (3) wages and 
employment.
6.4.1 Effects on Key Macroeconomic Variables
The effects of a resources boom on the key macroeconomic variables are examined by 
analysing the changes on the aggregate demand side of the economy. Both private and 
government consumption increased during 1972-74 but export growth was much larger 
than the growth in consumption. The fall in private consumption by expatriates in 1972 
was compensated by increased consumption by locals, with final private consumption 
remaining at around K357 million over 1971-72 (Table 6.5). Government consumption 
was about 0.9 per cent higher in 1973 than the 1970 level.
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Table 6.5: Gross Domestic Expenditure 1968-74
(at constant 1969 Prices)
(Millions of kina)
K e y  E c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
G D P 4 3 0 .8 4 5 3 .3 5 0 3 .9 5 5 7 .2 5 7 2 .5 6 8 7 .4 6 9 5 .8
Market 3 0 8 .9 326 .1 3 7 5 .6 4 3 0 .7 4 3 9 .7 4 8 8 .3 5 6 8 .4
Non-market 121.8 127.3 128.3 126.5 131 .4 132.3 127.4
C o n s u m p t io n 4 2 5 .9 4 5 3 .9 4 8 8 .4 5 0 8 .4 5 1 9 .9 4 9 4 .9 4 8 3 .5
Government 144.9 150.7 155 .0 151.8 162.3 156.4 155.4
Private 2 8 0 .8 3 0 3 .2 3 3 3 .4 3 5 6 .6 3 5 7 .6 3 38 .5 328 .1
Market 160.2 176.1 2 0 7 .4 2 2 7 .5 2 2 7 .5 2 0 9 .2 2 0 1 .3
Non-market 120.6 127.1 126 .0 130.1 130.1 129.3 126.8
G r o ss  fix e d  c a p ita l fo r m a tio n 86.1 9 1 .4 174 .0 2 5 0 .9 2 0 4 .9 102.1 7 5 .0
Market 84 .9 91 .3 171.6 2 5 0 .8 2 0 3 .6 99.1 7 4 .4
Non-market 1.2 0.1 2.3 0.1 1.3 3.0 0.6
In c r e a se  in s to c k 7.0 6.7 5.4 14.6 8.4 9.6 0.3
E x p o r ts  (g o o d s  a n d  N F S ) 7 7 .4 86 .8 9 6 .6 110.7 149 .9 2 5 2 .8 3 6 3 .5
Im p o r ts  (g o o d s  a n d  N F S ) 164.7 184.2 2 6 1 .6 3 2 8 .0 3 0 9 .3 2 3 7 .3 2 2 6 .5
Statistical discrepancy -0 .9 -1 .2 1.1 0.5 -2 .8 -1 .8 -1 1 .4
Note: Continued on Table 6.6.
Source: World Bank (1976) Report No. 1150-PNG.
Private foreign investment in the construction sector increased from A$96.9 
million (K107 million) to A$414.8 million (K454 million) in 1972 at current prices. 
Investment spending on the BCL mine fell to A$20 million in 1972 from an average of 
A$100 million in the previous years (World Bank, 1976). Other private investment was 
much the same in money terms as in previous years. The large volume of copper 
production and exports by the BCL mine, contributed to a large surplus in PNG’s 
balance of payments (BOP) in 1973.
In 1973, the trade account exhibited a surplus of K15.5 million from a deficit of 
K160 million in 1972. Most of this improvement was offset by the distribution of
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income and dividends payable to overseas shareholders plus the payment of interest and 
debt repayments. Nevertheless, the balance of payments on the current account 
improved from a deficit of K140 million in 1972 to a surplus of K42.5 million in 1973. 
The current and capital account surplus over 1973-74 brought a balance of payments 
surplus of K29.2 million in 1973 and K153.2 million 1974. The non-market primary 
and subsistence sector, which then accounted for 40 per cent of the economy, grew by 
more than 4 per cent with an output of K132 million in 1973 from K 126.5 million in 
1971.
Table 6.6: Gross Domestic Expenditure 1975-1978/a
(at constant 1969 Prices)
(Millions of kina)
K e y  E c o n o m ic  V a r ia b le s 1975 1976 1977 July-D ee
1977
1978
G D P 642.9 570.2 628.0 348.0 701.7
M arke t 553.9 475.3 530.4 295 .5 593.9
N o n -m ark e t 109.0 94 .9 97.6 52.5 107.8
C o n s u m p t io n 543.6 511.8 494.2 277.2 492 .2
G overnm en t 210.1 196.1 171.8 85.2 182.1
P rivate 333.5 315 .7 322.4 186.0 392.1
M arke t 225.6 221 .9 225.9 134.1 285.6
N o n -m ark e t 107.9 93.8 96.5 51.9 106.5
G r o s s  f ix e d  c a p it a l  f o r m a t io n 119.4 87.2 113.0 65.0 136.4
M arke t 118.5 86.2 111.9 64.4 135.1
N o n -m ark e t 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.1
I n c r e a s e  in  s t o c k 22.7 16.0 16.9 7.5 22.3
E x p o r t s  ( g o o d s  a n d  N F S ) 274.1 213.8 270 .0 170.0 294.3
I m p o r t s  (g o o d s  a n d  N F S ) 287.1 251 .4 263.0 161.9 318.7
S tatistical d isc repancy -5 .9 -6 .9 -3.1 -3 .9 -4.3
Note: a/ Beginning in 1978, the fiscal year was changed to coincide with the calendar year. 
Source: World Bank (1981) Report No. 3544a-PNG.
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Data on consumption expenditure show a declining trend in the real growth of 
both private and public consumption spending over the period of 1976-77. Real private 
consumption increased moderately but public consumption fell 22 per cent in 1977. 
Most private consumption expenditures were on food, beverages, cigarettes, beer and 
motor vehicles. During 1976/77, gross fixed capital formation grew by 23 per cent in 
real terms, to K113.0 million in 1977 compared with K87.5 million in 1975, mostly 
contributed by the private sector.
Gross domestic investment increased by 26 per cent in 1977 from its previous 
year’s level and contributed 13 per cent to total GDP. Private investment also showed 
an increasing trend over the same period. Expenditure on plant, equipment and 
buildings increased with a very significant increase indicated for plant and equipment in 
the Highlands in 1976, during the December quarter. Inventory investment for raw 
materials and intermediate inputs and stock of finished goods also showed an increasing 
trend in this quarter.
By industry classification, investment in primary production, building and 
construction, motor vehicle and machinery distribution reported strong growth. Both 
gross domestic savings and investment increased substantially with gross domestic 
investment increased from 15 per cent in 1973 to more than 22 per cent in 1978 which 
indicates that the boom was perceived by households as a temporary one. As a result, 
the agricultural boom in 1976-77 induced a subsequent construction boom, indicated by 
increased production in the construction and building sector, and reduced inflationary 
pressure on the nontradable goods market. Between 1975/76 and in 1980, the public 
sector’s real investment doubled which was very conducive to long-run steady growth. 
This outcome is predicted by the theoretical propositions of a construction boom where
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the private sector correctly perceived the nature of a resources boom and increases 
investment in nontradable capitals due to imperfection in the under-developed capital 
market. This outcome is also verified by the econometric results of Chapter 5.
In 1977, the total value of exports increased relative to the total value of imports 
and brought a large current account surplus. The strong current and capital account 
balance during 1976-77 brought an overall balance of payments surplus of K34.6 
million in 1976 followed by a huge K110.3 million in 1977. This substantially reduced 
PNG’s net foreign indebtedness over the first four years of monetary independence.
6.4.2 Relative Price Effect
The indices of most important price series have been shown in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, 
indicating the relative price movements over 1970-80. The CPI shows a sharp increase 
in 1973. The CPI rose 5.6 per cent in 1971 followed by 3.5 per cent in 1972.
Table 6.7: Changes in Key Price Indices 1970-80
(1970=100)
Year CPI PT NEER RER1 % change  
CPI
% change 
PT
% change 
NEER
% change 
RER1
1 9 7 0 1 0 0 .0 1 00 .0 1 0 0 .0 100 .0
1971 1 0 5 .6 102.1 9 9 .9 9 6 .7 5 .6 0 2 .1 3 -0 .1 2 -3 .2 8
19 7 2 1 0 9 .3 1 04 .7 9 9 .7 95 .8 3 .5 0 2 .4 8 -0 .2 2 -0 .9 9
197 3 1 4 3 .3 1 13 .0 9 6 .3 78 .9 31.11 7 .9 7 -3 .4 0 -1 7 .6 5
197 4 154.1 136 .6 95.1 8 8 .6 7 .5 4 2 0 .8 6 -1 .2 3 1 2 .3 9
1 9 7 5 1 6 7 .3 152 .4 9 8 .6 91.1 8 .5 7 1 1 .5 5 3 .7 2 2 .7 5
1 9 7 6 1 7 3 .6 151 .3 9 1 .7 87.1 3 .7 7 -0 .7 4 -7 .0 4 -4 .34
1 9 7 7 1 7 4 .3 1 59 .4 9 1 .8 9 1 .4 0 .4 0 5 .3 8 0 .1 5 4 .9 6
1978 1 8 4 .0 1 56 .4 8 7 .7 8 5 .0 5 .5 5 -1.91 -4 .4 4 -7 .0 7
1 9 7 9 1 9 3 .6 1 64 .3 8 3 .8 84 .8 5 .2 6 5 .0 9 -4 .4 6 -0 .16
1 9 8 0 2 1 9 .5 1 86 .3 8 2 .9 8 4 .9 1 3 .3 8 1 3 .4 0 -1.11 0 .0 2
Notes: CPI = consumer price index, PT = price o f tradables, NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, 
RER1= trade-weighted real exchange rate.
Source: Table 4.1.
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But the index rose by 31 per cent during 1973, with food components (including 
alcohol, tobacco and betel nuts) dominating the index. Following the sharp increase 
during 1973, the rate of price level increase slackened markedly from the first quarter of 
1974 and the inflation rate stood at 7.5 per cent over the year. Imported inflation 
impacted on PNG’s inflation rate during 1975. Table 6.7 also indicates an increasing 
trend for the prices of tradables. The average trade-weighted nominal exchange rate 
(RJER1) appreciated 1.2 per cent against major trading partners’ currencies over 1971- 
74. The increase in domestic CPI was much higher than the increase in the price of 
tradables, bringing a significant reduction in the relative price of tradables to the 
domestic CPI during 1973. While the trade-weighted real exchange rate (RER1) 
appreciated 18 per cent in 1973 from the previous year’s level, the real exchange rate for
Table 6.8: Changes in Key Price Indices of Export and 
Import Competing Industries 1970-80
(1970=100)
Year % change  
EPI
% change  
IPI
% change  
PNT
RER2 RER3 % change
RER2
% change  
RER3
1 9 7 0 - - - 1 0 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 - -
1971 -6 .7 5 1 0 .5 5 2 .3 9 1 .2 108.1 -8 .8 8.1
1 9 7 2 1 0 .4 6 3 .9 5 2 .8 3 9 7 .9 1 0 9 .2 7 .4 1.1
1 9 7 3 6 3 .3 5 2 5 .9 5 8 .7 5 147 .1 1 2 6 .5 5 0 .2 1 5 .8
1 9 7 4 2 3 .7 7 4 6 .4 8 1 5 .3 1 5 7 .9 1 6 0 .7 7 .4 2 7
1 9 7 5 -8 .5 2 1 .72 1 4 .8 6 1 2 5 .7 1 4 2 .3 -2 0 .4 -1 1 .4
1 9 7 6 1 7 .9 8 -1 .5 2 6 .0 7 1 3 9 .9 1 3 2 .2 1 1 .2 -7 .2
1 9 7 7 2 5 .1 4 5 .8 2 1 .9 9 1 7 1 ,6 137.1 2 2 .7 3 .8
1 9 7 8 -6 .8 4 1 6 .5 7 .8 1 4 8 .3 1 4 8 .2 -1 3 .6 8.1
1 9 7 9 1 5 .9 4 1 9 .5 8 7.61 1 5 9 .8 1 6 4 .7 7 .7 11.1
1 9 8 0 -1 .1 5 1 8 .9 3 1 0 .0 1 4 3 .6 178.1 -10.1 8.1
Note: NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, RER1 = trade-weighted real exchange rate,
CPI = consumer price index, PT = price of tradables. 
Source: Table 4.2.
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exports and the import competing sector depreciated by 50 and 16 per cent, respectively, 
in 1973, due to increases in world price for PNG’s export commodities (Table 6.8).
Table 6.8 indicates that the real exchange rate for export and import competing 
industries depreciated as the export and import price indices rose more rapidly than the 
domestic price of nontradables (weighted average of nontradable components of CPI) 
over the 1972-74 period. It can therefore be concluded from the empirical analysis and 
the econometric investigation that the appreciation of the trade-weighted real exchange 
rate in 1973 might have been overestimated due to a sharp increase in the CPI which 
itself contains a considerable amount of tradable items.
During the commodity boom of 1976-77, the kina value price of tradables 
continued to rise, while domestic inflation began to decline in 1976. Increased tradable 
prices, and an inflation rate of 0.4 per cent in 1977, increased the prices of tradables 
relative to the domestic CPI (Table 6.7). This change in relative prices brought about a 5 
per cent depreciation of the trade-weighted real exchange rate which was a significant 
improvement over a 4 per cent appreciation of the real exchange rate in the previous 
year.
Real exchange rates for the export and import competing sectors also indicate a 
substantial depreciation. In 1977, the export price index increased by 25 per cent and 
the import price index increased about 6 per cent compared with a 2 per cent increase in 
the domestic price of nontradables (Table 6.8). It is interesting to note the real exchange 
rates depreciated significantly in terms of all alternative measures at the height of 
agricultural boom in 1977, which can be attributable to prudent policy choices during 
the 1976-77 period.
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Figure 6.1: Actual and Estimated Real Exchange Rates in PNG 
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Source: Equation 4.1.
Figure 6.1 indicates that the actual real appreciation of the trade-weighted 
exchange rate was greater than estimated real appreciation due to the very high inflation 
induced by the dramatic increase in nominal wages and government spending in the 
nontradable sector during the mineral booms of 1973. But during the 1976-77 
commodity boom, the actual real depreciation was much higher than what is predicted 
by the estimated model. It seems to reflect the impact of income and wage restraint 
policies, as well as reduced aid and grants flow from Australia. The proposition that the 
open trade regime of the 1970s also reduced appreciation of the real exchange rate over 
the period, is supported by the econometric results in Chapter 4.
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6.4.3 Effects on Employment and Wages
This section attempts to analyse the changes in employment and real wages in PNG 
during the resources booms of the 1970s. As discussed in the theoretical framework, a 
resources boom shifts labour from the non-booming traded sector to the nontradable 
sector as the price of traded goods falls relative to nontradables. This shift of labour is 
likely to have enormous ramifications for wages and overall distribution of income.
Available data on employment in monetised activities suggest there was an 
increase in total formal employment during the boom years. Total formal employment 
increased from the 1968 level by about 11 per cent in 1973 with a substantial increase 
in public and mining sector employment, although private non-mining employment 
shows a declining trend (Appendix Table A3.6). This outcome confirms the booming 
sector theoretical proposition that labour shifts from the non-booming private sector to 
the more profitable booming mining and nontradable public sectors. Available limited 
data on wage rates in Table 6.9 indicate that both real and nominal wage increased 
rapidly during the early 1970s, with employment in the non-mining sector failing to 
keep pace with the wage rise.
The declining trend for private non-mining employment growth appears to have 
been closely related to the increase in real wages. The rise in domestic CPI was 13 per 
cent on average whereas the nominal weekly wage rose 56 per cent for urban workers 
and 13 per cent for rural workers over the 1972-75 period.
As a result, rural and urban real wages increased on average by 0.5 per cent and 
30 per cent, respectively (Table 6.9). The higher cost of labour due to this substantial 
increase in money wages and salaries added upward pressure to domestic prices,
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Table 6.9: Changes in Real and Nominal Weekly Wages 1967-85
Year Rural Urban Real Rural Real Urban % change % change % change % change
nominal nominal (1977 prices) (1977 prices) rural nominal urban nominal real rural real urbar
1967-71* 4.7 6.9 8.6 12.7 -- - -- -
1972 5.9 8 9.6 13.0 25.5 15.94 11.6 2.36
1975 8.9 25.8 9.8 28.5 16.9 74.2 0.7 39.7
1978 11.5 28.5 10.8 26.9 9.7 3.5 3.4 -1.9
1979 11.9 30.8 10.7 27.5 3.48 8.07 -0.93 2.23
1980 12.4 33.2 9.9 26.5 4.20 7.79 -7.48 -3.64
1981 13.7 36.8 9.9 26.6 10.48 10.84 0.00 0.38
1982 14.5 38.8 9.8 26.2 5.84 5.43 -1.01 -1.50
1983 15.5 41.5 9.6 25.8 6.90 6.96 -2.04 -1.53
1984 16.3 43.6 9.7 26.0 5.16 5.06 1.04 0.78
1985 17.0 45.5 9.7 26.0 4.30 4.40 0.0 0.0
Note: * period average.
Source: World Bank (1991) Table 4.2, p.75 and AusAID (1995) Table A22.
exacerbated inequality between rural and urban incomes, and adversely affected 
employment. It is evident from the wage and price data that the increase in real wages 
during the high inflationary period was clearly influenced by the deliberate 
implementation of a wage policy which raised the urban nominal wage faster than 
domestic price level changes.
It is noticeable that during the BCL investment and mineral boom in 1971-74, a 
large share of the wages bill went to pay skilled expatriate labourers. As a result, the 
enclave nature of these booms did not have much spill-over effect on the vast non­
mining sector’s employment and spending behaviour. The mobility of labour across 
national boundaries reduced the spending effects of the resources boom which might 
have helped to keep the domestic price level relatively stable, as discussed in the
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extension of ‘Dutch disease’ theory under the openness of the labour market in Chapter
2 .
It has been the policy of the PNG government, since independence, to maintain a 
steady trend in real wages. The wage structure that was determined between 1972 and 
1975 posed a number of problems. The wages study by Garnaut and Baxter (1984:99) 
suggested that employment growth was very slow when urban minimum wages were 
rising 50 per cent during 1972-76, and indicated the high level of wages was one of the 
major factors responsible for depressing the level of employment and the pace of 
employment generation in PNG.
Except for the mining sector, urban wage employment growth was relatively 
strong from 1976 because of the direct spending effects of the agrucultural boom. The 
growth in rural wages shows this effect. The growth in urban wages is also quite 
significant, given that they were already artificially high as a result of the MWB ruling 
in 1972/73. The government’s institution of a temporary wage freeze in 1976, was 
successful as an initiative to reduce the inflationary wage spiral. After that, until 1992 
wages were indexed at, or slightly below, the growth rate of the urban based consumer 
price index. Minimum Wage Boards had accepted the argument that wage 
determination should be restrained to encourage the growth of income earning 
opportunities and to allow the government to increase the share of new development 
spending in the budget. Although rural wages rose slightly, the result was a reduction of 
2 to 6 per cent in the real value of urban minimum wages for unskilled labourers 
between 1976 and 1980.
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Over the period 1977-79, total wage employment increased by 1.7 per cent 
annually, with an increase of 2 per cent in private sector employment, while 
employment in the mining and public sector remained steady (Appendix Table A3.6). 
Rural nominal wages increased on average by 9.7 per cent, but urban wages rose by 
only 3.5 per cent in 1978, from the 1975 level. Costs and prices increased due to 
continued increases in the cost of materials and supplies, but labour costs increased only 
marginally. In 1978, real rural wages rose by 3.4 per cent, but real urban wages fell by 
1.9 per cent as a result of temporary wage freeze in 1976.
6.5 Changes in Sectoral Composition
It is clearly evident that the onset of full operation of the BCL project, and the 
subsequent mineral boom and agricultural commodity boom in the second half of the 
1970s, together with government policy responses, had significant identifiable effects 
on both the relative prices of tradables to nontradables and wages and employment. 
This section examines sectoral composition changes over 1971-78, and investigates the 
overall effects of the resources booms and the policy implications on the sectoral 
composition of the PNG economy over the decade of the 1970s.
Table 6.10 shows the sectoral composition of GDP, from late 1968 to 1977. The 
data indicate a declining trend in agricultural share to GDP between 1971-74, although 
the value of agricultural output increased from K216 million in 1971 to K273 million in 
1974. The share of the agricultural sector to total output in 1971 accounted for 35 per 
cent before declining sharply to 26 per cent of GDP in 1974. By contrast, the sectoral 
share of mining increased dramatically, from a very low 0.2 per cent in 1971 to 25 per 
cent of GDP in 1974.
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The share of mining exports also grew dramatically, from a low of 0.1 per cent in 1971 
to 17 per cent of total GDP in 1973. But the agricultural export share of GDP fell from 
6 per cent in 1972 to 5 per cent of GDP in 1973. In the manufacturing sector, general 
business activities seemed to increase but the share of this sector to GDP shows slow 
growth, from 6 per cent in 1971 to 7 per cent GDP in 1974.
The share of the services sector to GDP declined from 38 per cent of GDP in 
1971 to 32 per cent in 1973 and increased again to 38 per cent in 1974. The building 
and construction sector also slowed, due to declining investment in the BCL project, and 
cut-backs in government capital spending. The contribution of non-market products fell 
from 28 per cent in 1968 to 18 per cent, although more than half the population survived 
on subsistence agriculture in 1974.
Towards the end of 1974 world commodity prices slumped and the prices for 
most of PNG’s major tree crops declined. In 1974, the real value of GDP fell a massive 
18 per cent, indicating an economy wide recession in that year. PNG’s export revenue 
declined by 24 per cent in 1975 from 1974, reflecting both lower world prices for 
PNG’s exports and lower export volumes. On completion of the Bougainville 
construction the share of construction sector to GDP fell from 18 to 14 per cent. This 
sector accounted for only 8 per cent of GDP as the government responded to the 1974’s 
downturn by cutting capital expenditure, with a subsequent contractionary effect on 
building and construction sector.
In 1974, following the large increase in the urban wage, private investment 
became sluggish, while private consumption was buoyant. Copper prices fell sharply
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which reduced the share of the BCL mine in total export value -  although it accounted 
for almost 50 per cent of total exports in 1974. Imports fell from their previous level 
because of the lack of new investment projects. However, overall, the economic 
environment and prospects appeared more stable at the end of 1974.
Benefits from the commodity boom in the second half of the 1970s were more 
evenly distributed in the economy. Because of the nature and origin of this boom, the 
price impact was more moderate than the booms in the early 1970s. In 1977, the real 
growth rate of GDP was 10 per cent, compared with -12.0 per cent in 1976. The share 
of the agricultural sector to GDP improved significantly from 26 per cent in 1974 to 36 
per cent in 1977, and remained stable until 1979. The mining sector contributed an 
average 10 per cent to GDP and its share increased to 15 per cent of GDP in 1979 due to 
the continued escalation of world gold prices together with the maintenance of high 
prices for copper.
The boom had important growth effects on manufacturing output, fixed capital 
formation and a wide range of private sector services. Increased domestic production 
increased the supply of goods and services. The share of the manufacturing sector to 
GDP increased from 8 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 9 per cent in 1977. The contribution 
of the services sector to GDP rose from 33 per cent in 1976 to 38 per cent in 1977. Since 
independence, the building and construction sector has experienced increasing growth. 
In 1977, the construction sector experienced strong growth associated with investment 
in general office buildings and hotel accommodation. The expansion of the construction 
sector associated with the commodity boom in PNG confirms the propositions of the 
construction boom theory.
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During 1978, economic activities slowed down, due to falling world market 
prices for PNG’s agricultural export commodities. The share of agricultural exports fell 
to 15 per cent of total exports in 1978 from 22 per cent in the previous year. The share 
of mining exports grew moderately, private and government consumption was modest, 
with government expenditure only slightly above budget projections and total revenue 
collection for the year close to expectations. Gross domestic investment as a percentage 
of GDP increased moderately by one percentage point in 1978 from 1977. In 1978, 
current account balance was only K4.3 million, with an almost 50 per cent reduction 
compared with 1977, and an overall balance of payments deficit of K1.8 million. The 
TOT fell by 25.3 per cent, as the import price index rose to 118.3 in 1978, compared 
with an export price index of 88.4. The weak balance of payments associated with the 
lower commodity prices in 1978 caused monetary expansion to fall. The growth of real 
GDP fell to 1.8 percent due to decline in mining sector output, the result of decline in 
the ore content of the copper concentrate produced by the BCL mine.
PNG economy experienced an appreciable pick-up in economic activities since 
the mid-1980 following an extended period of slow growth during the first half of the 
decade. Investment in the mining sector peaked at nearly 15 per cent of GDP in the 
early 1980s at the height of investment in the Ok Tedi mine . Real GDP grew by 3.7 
per cent per annum between 1985 and 1988. Gross domestic investment increased from 
22 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 25 per cent in 1990 (Table 3.2). But public investment 
was on a declining trend throughout most of the 1980s, falling steadily from nearly 9 
per cent of GDP in 1981 to around 5 per cent by 1987. Private non-mining sector also
2 As mentioned earlier the discussion of the investment and mineral boom from the early 1980s associated with the 
Ok Tedi mine establishment follows a similar analytical interpretation to that of investment and mineral booms in 
the early 1970 associated with BCL mine.
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exhibited a similar trend, declining from more than 13 per cent of GDP in 1981 to just 
over 8 per cent in 1987 (World Bank, 1991). In the final two years of the decade there 
was an encouraging recovery, but it was mainly confined to the construction sector as a 
result of increased demand for residential and office accommodation.
During the second half of the 1980s, PNG established a sound overall fiscal 
management. Following several years of large fiscal deficits in the early 1980s, the 
government increased its revenue efforts and tightened control over expenditures. As a 
consequence, the overall fiscal deficit fell to 2 per cent of GDP in 1985 and just over 1 
per cent between 1987-891987 (World Bank, 1991). The government placed 
considerably more emphasis on public investment and by 1989 public investment had 
risen to 4.5 per cent of GDP. Another notable aspect of PNG’s fiscal performance in the 
1980s was the extent to which the country increased its self reliance in revenue 
generation and financing. Budgetary grants from Australia which represented almost 
one third of current revenues in 1981, had fallen in relative importance to less than one 
fifth by the end of the decade. After having an extended period of balance of payments 
deficits during 1981-83, PNG’s balance of payments improved significantly from the 
mid-1980s owing primarily to the production Ok Tedi mine and higher world prices for 
copper and gold. Official reserve peaked at the end of 1987 at just over K564 million, 
equivalent to more than 6 months of nonmineral imports. Government also adopted a 
prudent approach to external borrowing from the middle of the 1980s and a 
contractionary monetary policy was followed from 1989. There was a substantial 
decline in total formal sector employment during the first half of the 1980s followed by 
a moderate recovery during the second half of the decade. Domestic price level became
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more stable at around 3.2 per cent per annum between 1985-88 from a double digit 
inflation rate in the early 1980s ( Appendix Table A3.2).
6.6 Resources Boom in the early 1990s
PNG experienced another resources boom in its mineral sector over the 1991-93 period, 
due to the new discovery of petroleum as well as buoyant gold prices in the world 
market. The strength of this boom was determined by the world market prices of gold, 
copper and petroleum, as well as domestic and foreign investment conditions. Real 
GDP grew from a low -3.0 per cent in 1990 to 9.5 per cent in 1991, 11.8 per cent in 
1992 and 16.6 per cent in 1993. This spectacular performance resulted in a significant 
increase in levels of real per capita income, rising from K665 in 1991 to K828 in 1993.
Background
After achieving admirable economic growth in the second half of the 1980s, PNG faced 
enormous setbacks in May 1989. The abrupt cessation of BCL operations brought the 
economy to a sudden halt; unrest in the North Solomons resulted in a sharp downturn in 
tree-crop exports; as virtually all the prices of the country's leading tree crop exports 
fell, in some cases, quite drastically. As a result, real GDP fell by 1.5 per cent in 1989.
The impact of these shocks was severe. Between 1989 and 1991, the adverse 
average annual impact on national income and fiscal revenue was at 10.9 and 3.7 per 
cent respectively. The average annual impact on the balance of payments was at about 
US$375 million, or, about one-quarter of total exports in 1988. Roughly half of these 
losses were attributable to the BCL mine closure and the other half so the fall in TOT
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and loss of non-mineral output from North Solomons province. During 1989 and 1990, 
private consumption and gross domestic investment declined from the 1988 level.
However the government committed itself to implementing widespread reform 
(Elek, 1991). The PNG authorities undertook large cuts in government expenditure and 
significant revenue-raising efforts, which held the fiscal deficit at about 3 per cent of 
GDP in 1990. Since 1989, monetary policy was kept tight, by means of ceilings on 
domestic credit to the private sector. Growth in the broad money supply fell from 10.7 
per cent in 1988 to 6.5 per cent in 1989 and 5 per cent in 1990. Inflation was on a 
declining trend from 1989 to 1992. The burden of the adjustment was reasonable 
broad through out the economy. Output in the agricultural sector declined by 4.9 per 
cent in 1989. In 1990 real GDP fell to -3.0 per cent and the contribution of the services 
sector to GDP dropped tO -12 per cent from the previous year, owing to the impact of 
restraint in government spending, and weakness in both wholesale and retail trade. 
Among the other major sectors, construction and utilities recorded a sharp decline of 8 
per cent in output growth, reflecting a drop-off from the high rates of building activity 
and mine construction in 1989. Output in manufacturing continued to grow at a modest 
rate which was typical of the previous years, except for the big dip in 1990.
6.6.1 Resources Boom: 1992-93
The rapid economic growth in the early years of 1990s came largely from growth in 
minerals and petroleum production along with spin off activities in other non-mining 
sectors. Oil production from the Kutubu oil project accounted for 10 per cent of GDP in 
1992. Oil exports earned K301 million in 1992 increasing up to an estimated K848 
million in 1993. Production of petroleum from the Kutubu project alone provided 37
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per cent of total exports in 1993 from nothing in 1991. The combined share of the 
minerals and petroleum sector in GDP improved from 15 per cent in 1990 to about 30 
per cent in 1993, and provided 30 per cent of government revenue. Non-mining GDP 
also increased by 5 per cent in 1991 but then came down to 1.1 per cent in 1993.
From 1991 to 1994, the value of total exports increased enormously. Mineral 
exports increased from K758 million, or 32 per cent of GDP, in 1990 to K1768, or 53 
per cent of GDP, in 1993. From K205 million in 1990, agricultural exports increased to 
K270 million in 1993 and K375 million in 1994. Revenues from log exports increased 
more than six fold from K80 million in 1990 to K494 million in 1994.
6.7 Policy Response
From independence until 1989, PNG maintained confidence in the financial system by 
exercising successful expenditure restraint policy, and a ‘hard kina’ policy that kept 
domestic inflation at a low level. But from 1990 the country failed to maintain this 
reliable policy package, due to a series of budget deficits caused largely by the closure 
of BCL mine and subsequent fiscal indiscipline.
6.7.1 Fiscal Policy
The PNG government’s undisciplined fiscal policy was a major issue of concern during 
1990-1994. The fiscal deficit widened in 1990 with the closure of the Panguna mine at 
Bougainville. Government internal revenue and grants fell from K1014 million in 1989 
to K998 million in 1990 while total government spending increased from K1049 million 
in 1989 to K1089 million in 1990. In 1991, government revenue recovered to 1989 
levels and grew rapidly over 1992 to 1994, owing to increased revenue flows from the 
boom in the minerals and petroleum sector.
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Table 6.11: Key Economic Indicators 1989-94
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Real Economic Growth (annual %)
Real GDP -1.5 -3.0 9.5 11.8 16.6 3.1
Per capita GDP (kina 1983 prices) 656 622 665 727 828 834
Sectoral Growth
Agriculture, Forestry and fishing -4.9 3.9 -1.8 6.2 25.8 10.6
Mining and Quarrying -40.6 23.1 26.7 4.1 -6.9 11.0
Petroleum n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. 166.7 -19.4
Manufacturing 17.5 -21.4 16.9 10.1 1.3 -1.6
Services 10.2 -11.7 15.1 5.6 0.6 5.3
Construction 24.3 -7.6 35.0 -8.4 -13.2 9.8
Growth in Prices and wages (annual %)
Consumer Price Index (1990=100) 5.2 6.0 5.0 4.0 6.7 4.4
Implicit GDP deflator -2.1 4.0 6.0 2.0 2.3 6.6
Urban real minimum wage (1977 prices) 0.7 -4.0 -0.8 0.4 -63.4 -2.8
GDP by Expenditure Component 
(Million Kina in current prices)
Consumption 2707 2580 2974 3326 3550 4051
Private Consumption 1962 1816 2166 2396 2532 2969
Government consumption 745 764 808 930 1018 1082
Domestic investment 707 752 988 984 943 884
Exports 1238 1250 1524 1870 2516 2456
Minerals and Petroleum 676 758 1005 1372 1768 1783
Agriculture and Marine 278 213 215 233 278 386
Forestry (Log and Other) 96 80 90 148 410 494
Imports 1607 1506 1881 2040 1993 1980
Source: Constructed from various Tables, AusAID (1996).
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In 1991 central government expenditure increased by K99 million with large 
increases on education, defence, transport, public debt servicing and transfers to local 
and provincial governments. The economy absorbed the mineral windfalls through 
current consumption as the boom was perceived as lasting a longer period. This is 
evident from the sharp rise in government expenditure over the years 1991 and 1993, 
which contributed to a fiscal deficit of 5.6 per cent in 1992 and 5.9 per cent in 1993.
The 1994 budget was expansionary at the beginning of the year but later 
changed to a more restrictive policy stance owing to the sharp increase in the fiscal 
deficit. By early-1994, the price support programme announced in 1992 was creating 
significant pressure on government expenditure, and the budget deficit had grown to 11 
per cent of GDP by the middle of the year. The government announced another mini 
budget to reduce the deteriorating fiscal situation largely due to an unexpected by sharp 
decline in oil prices. As prices rose in mid-1994, the subsidy for coffee became 
redundant. By the end of the year, adoption of an expenditure restraint policy had 
reduced total government expenditure to K1570 million and higher than expected 
mining revenues, cuts in crop price support and transport increased total revenue and 
grants of K1446 million and also reducing the budget deficit to 2.3 per cent.
A positive balance in the MRSF over this period gave a misleading conception 
of the government as a net saver. Over this period, continuous fiscal deficits simply 
indicated that the government effectively borrowed from the private sector to augment 
the MRSF. Between 1990 and 1994, public sector debt increased to K2.9 billion, or 48 
per cent of GDP, and the debt servicing requirement increased to K86 million. To
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finance these continuous budget deficits, foreign debt rose to US$4.2 billion with debt 
servicing costs rocketing to over 30 per cent of export earnings (AIDAB, 1995).
6.7.2 Monetary Policy
In mid-1991, the BPNG changed monetary policy from a liquid asset requirement to a 
base money management approach, adopting open market operations as the principal 
policy instrument. This monetary approach was reasonably successful in keeping 
liquidity growth under control. As fiscal deficits grew, and interest rates remained 
above those in Australia the BPNG faced enormous pressure to keep interest rates under 
control. However, at the end of 1992 and in mid-1993, lending rates were lowered, 
narrowing the spread somewhat (Table 3.9).
During 1992 and 1993, private sector credit growth was above 4 per cent but 
liquidity had fallen due to a substantial decline in foreign assets. Total money showed 
an increasing trend over the period. The growth rate of money supply increased from 4.2 
per cent in 1990 to 17.7 per cent in 1991 and then eased back to 12.5 per cent in 1992 
whereas real GDP grew at a slower rate than money supply by 9.5 per cent in 1991 and 
11.8 per cent in 1992.
In 1993, money supply of about 27 per cent was much higher than 16.6 per cent 
growth of real GDP (Table 3.9, Table 6.11 and Table 6.12). The econometric results in 
Chapter 4 indicate an excessive growth rate of money supply (growth of money exceeds 
GDP growth) has adverse impact on the real exchange rate of PNG. The RER 
appreciated by 5 per cent in 1993 (Table 6.15).
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Table 6.12: Major Economic Indicators Before and During the 1991-93 Boom
1989
GDP ( million kina, current prices) 3046
Central Govt. Fiscal Operation 
Central govt. Revenue and grants 1014
Expenditure and net lending 1049
Budget deficit/surplus as % of GDP -1.2
Monetary Conditions (kina million)
Narrow money (M l) 352
Broad Money 1035
Total Money Supply 1038
Sectoral Share of GDP (per cent)
Agriculture, Forestry and fishing 28.1
Mining and Quarrying 11.6
Petroleum 0.0
Manufacturing 11.1
Services 43.9
Construction 5.3
Balance of Payments (kina million)
Trade Balance -20
Balance on current account -312
Balance on capital account 211
Overall Balance -52
Terms of Trade & Exchange Rates
Terms of Trade (1990=100) 114.9
Nominal effective exchange rate 88.4
Real effective exchange rate (trade- 90.5
weighted)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
3076 3606 4140 5016 5411
998 1026 1126 1309 1446
1089 1188 1358 1605 1570
-3.0 -4.5 -5.6 -5.9 -2.3
353 458 509 528 571
1080 1271 1431 1811 1854
1082 1273 1432 1813 1854
29.0 26.0 24.7 26.6 28.6
14.7 17.0 15.8 12.7 13.6
0.0 0.0 6.5 14.9 11.6
9.0 9.6 9.4 8.2 7.8
52.3 40.8 38.6 33.8 34.2
5.0 6.6 5.1 3.8 4.2
86 75 607 1437 1346
-88 -144 94 632 576
207 60 -146 -701 -605
9 -81 -68 -96 -26
100.0 102.6 100.9 103.3 105.4
100.0 101.1 99.1 100.2 134.3
100.0 97.4 92.2 87.3 112.1
Source: Constructed from various Tables, AusAID (1996). Real and nominal effective exchange rate 
indices series are constructed by the author
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Although the growth rate of money supply fall dramatically to 2.3 per cent in 1994, the 
burden on the banking system of financing the entire budget deficit domestically, 
resulted in tighter credit conditions in the private sector and foreign assets, putting 
further upward pressure on interest rates.
The introduction of a floating exchange rate system in October 1994 impacted 
substantially on how monetary policy was conducted. Since the BPNG has no 
obligation under the floating system to sell or buy foreign currencies at a particular 
exchange rate, it could set the level of the money supply independently, and the 
weighted average of commercial bank lending rates increased substantially from 10 per 
cent in December 1994 to 15.4 per cent by December 1995. Private sector demand for 
credit was affected by adverse fiscal and monetary conditions in 1994, the subsequent 
high interest rates in 1995 and the uncertain investment climate.
6.7.3 Trade Policy
Until the early 1980s, PNG’s followed an open trade regime, with taxes on imports and 
exports quite low and relatively uniform. From the mid-1980s, an increasing number of 
trade interventions were introduced to achieve an assortment of revenue, protection and 
distributional objectives. Tariff policy has been seen as an instrument of industry policy 
to promote the interest of a particular sector or industry. The protective policy 
introduced in PNG produced widely differing rates of effective protection and served 
the interest of producers focussed on the domestic market. Import bans and very high 
duties on selected products created an incentive structure with high levels of effective 
protection for a limited range of activities and a strong bias against exports and the 
agricultural sector. Table 6.13 shows that currently 68 per cent of 5366 total tariff items
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are taxed at rates of 11 per cent or below. The remaining 31 per cent items are protected 
at rates of 40 per cent or higher. In the early 1980s, the tariff rate for a smaller number 
of import competing industries was 10 per cent which was increased to 17.5 per cent in 
the mid-1980s, and sharply increased in the early 1990s to 30 per cent for all goods 
where there was domestic production (Fallon et al., 1995). The rise in import protection 
has been accompanied by bans on certain food items, import quotas, and special 
privileges given to cement, canned meat and sugar industries.
Table 6.13: Tariff Regime in Papua New Guinea as in mid-1990s
Existing tariff regime Tariff rate Number of tariff items
Free 0% 127 (2%)
Input rate 5% 1178 (22%)
Basic rate 11% 2377 (44%)
Protective rate 40% 1051 (20%)
Restrictive/luxury rate 55% 504 (9%)
Prohibitive rate Specific rates or ad valorem 129 (2%)
Total
(75% - 175%)
5366 (99%)
Source: Internal Revenue Commission of Papua New Guinea (1997), Table 2.
As shown in Table 6.13, currently 2 per cent of imports are duty-free. Basic 
food items such as rice as well as medical supply and equipment, books and kerosene 
are exempted from duty, while a 5 per cent tariff is imposed on 22 per cent of tariff 
items classified as basic inputs to production.
The basic tariff rate of 11 per cent is imposed on the largest category which 
includes many foodstuff items, textiles, production inputs and raw materials. The 
current rate of 40 per cent is on the category of goods that are produced or potentially
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can be produced in PNG. A 55 per cent restrictive tariff is imposed on 504 tariff items, 
including fish, some toiletries, photographic flim, wood boards, carpets, pearls and 
precious stones, steel netting and fencing, double cab vehicles and motor cycles, arms 
and ammunition and furniture. Another 2 per cent of importable items are subject to a 
prohibitive tariff rate of 75 to 175 per cent. The specific import duty rates are imposed 
K3.50 per kg of poultry and K0.05 per box of matches. When these special rates are 
converted into ad valorem form, they provide very high levels of protection. The ad 
valorem rates include many vegetables and fruits (75%), vehicles (75%), sugar (85%), 
tinned mackerel (99%), beer (125%), cigarette and cigars (125%), veneer and plywood 
(100%), and door frames (100%).
Table 6.14 indicates currently in PNG the average nominal tariff rate is 21.9 per 
cent and the trade-weighted tariff rate is 14.3. At a broader industry classification level, 
the highest level of nominal protection is given to fisheries (53.9%), agriculture (46.3%) 
and food processing (46.1%). Both the nominal and trade-weighted tariff is on 
manufactured articles imposed at about 30 per cent.
Although PNG’s nominal rate of tariff is not exceptionally high, some of the 
tariff barriers, especially on fish and fish products, food processing, leather, rubber and 
footwear and other manufactured articles have been imposing significant costs on the 
most efficient import competing and export oriented sectors as well as on consumers.
The limitations of this trade policy have been recognised by successive 
governments, and unsuccessful several attempts have been made in recent years to 
reform the system.
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Table 6.14: Average Sectoral Tariff Rates in Papua New Guinea 
as in mid-1990s
Category of goods Nominal tariff 
rate (average)
Trade-weighted 
tariff rate (average)
All goods 21.9 14.3
Agriculture (excluding fish) 46.3 10.9
Fish and fish products 53.9 48.9
Food processing 46.1 39.4
Wood, pulp, paper and furniture 35.7 19.3
Textiles and clothing 23.3 25.9
Leather, rubber and footwear 27.8 37.2
Metals 12.9 11.4
Chemical and photographic supplies 10.8 13.8
Plastics 20.4 15.7
Transport equipment 19.6 16.7
Non-electric machinery 6.6 5.9
Electric machinery 12.7 13.4
Mineral products, precious stones and metals 21.0 7.5
Other manufactured articles 29.6 30.4
Note: The average trade-weighted tariff rate is the nominal tariff rate weighted against trade data. Tariff 
schedule as of January 1997.
Source: Internal Revenue Commission of Papua New Guinea (1997), Table 3.
In the 1990s, promotion of export oriented manufacturing was regarded as a longer term 
goal. Under this programme the PNG government decided to remove all import bans 
and introduce tariffs where protection was required to continue. The result was high 
tariffs on several items, such as poultry, but a decision to remove the remaining bans 
was postponed (AIDAB, 1993:19). In 1992, the PNG government took further 
initiatives to reform trade policy by replacing quantitative restrictions with more 
uniform and simple import duties (at around 10 per cent). This reform was also directed
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at removing export taxes, except for logs and unprocessed shells (AusAID, 1995:142). 
Tariffs on a number of commercial inputs, including fuels, spare parts and transport 
equipment were subsequently reduced in the 1993 budget, but the general import levy 
was also increased, from 8 per cent to 10 per cent, and again to 11 per cent in 1994 with 
its coverage extended to a range of goods including some agricultural and 
manufacturing inputs that had previously been exempted.
The 1993 budget also proposed highly restrictive tariff protection on some 
chosen goods and individual manufacturers and projects and continued a ban on sugar 
imports which was overtly inconsistent with underlying trade reform principles. This 
budget increased further restrictive protection for the Lea Mackerel Cannery and the 
Halla Cement Factory. From September 1993, a nominal monopoly was given to the 
sole domestic producer of cement, where users could import cement only with a special 
licence. As a result, the prices of cement increased more than 50 per cent. The 1994 
budget again imposed a protective rate of duty of another 11 per cent on basic consumer 
goods used by the low income consumer while reducing duties on luxury items. The 
Supply Bill of November 1994 raised the protective rate of duty to 40 per cent.
6.7.4 Exchange Rate Policy
Since monetary independence, under the influence of the ‘hard kina’ policy, PNG 
maintained a convertible currency and until 1980 was successful in maintaining low 
inflation, relative to world inflation. Domestic inflation increased sharply in 1981-82 
and remained relatively high up until 1984 (Appendix Table A3.2). From June 1978 to 
October 1994 the kina was pegged to a basket of currencies of its major trading partners. 
The kina was devalued by 10 per cent in early 1990 and in 1993 appreciated by 1.7 per
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cent against the Australian dollar, 0.9 per cent against the US dollar, and 10.3 per cent 
against the German Deutsche mark but depreciated by 9.4 per cent against the Japanese 
yen. On 12 September 1994, the kina was devalued by 12 per cent against the US dollar. 
The PNG government decided to float the kina in the face of a worsening foreign 
exchange crisis on 4 October 1994. By mid-1995 the kina had declined by more than 40 
per cent in nominal terms from the level 12 months earlier.
6.8 Effects of Resources Boom: 1991-94
In this section the effects of the resources boom of 1991-93 on the key macroeconomic 
variables are analysed by examining the expenditure side of the national income 
accounts.
6.8.1 Effects on Key Macroeconomic Variables
During 1991-93, both private and public consumption growth were moderate. The share 
of private consumption to GDP fell from 60 per cent in 1991 to 51 per cent in 1993. 
Overall government demand remained at about 28 per cent of total GDP with a public 
consumption demand of 20 per cent of total GDP in 1993 compared with 22 per cent in 
1991. Total private demand (consumption and investment) declined significantly from 
around 88 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to around 68 per cent of GDP in 1993 
(AIDAB, 1994). This relative decline in private spending reflected diminished 
optimism in private consumption and private investment. The construction of the 
Porgera and Kutubu projects contributed to a sharp increase in private fixed investment 
which accounted for more than 23 per cent of GDP in 1991. Gross domestic investment 
increased to 27.4 per cent of GDP in 1991 and then declined to 20.3 per cent of GDP in 
1993.
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The value of merchandise imports grew by 26.5 per cent from 1990 to 1991 due 
to K250 million in capital imports associated with the construction of the Kutubu oil 
project. General imports also increased by 25 per cent indicating a general recovery in 
the economy. However, a continuous rise in export revenue and a substantial reduction 
in capital imports more than offset the increased imports of consumer goods between 
1992 and 1994. The value of merchandise imports declined by 4.6 per cent in 1992 as a 
result of reductions in mining, petroleum and general imports. A further decline of 14.9 
per cent in merchandise imports in 1993 was due to a lower level of imports by the 
mining and petroleum sectors. As a result, the trade surplus grew rapidly to K1437 
million in 1993 from K75 million in 1991. The balance on the current account changed 
from a deficit of K144 million in 1991 to a surplus of K632 million in 1993 despite a 
large increase in services payments and net transfers associated with the mining sector.
Despite a large current account surplus, and a 10 per cent devaluation of the kina 
in 1990, the overall balance of payments continued to weaken over the period 1991-93 
with an overall deficit of K68 million in 1992 and K96 million in 1993. This large 
deficit in 1993 was mainly brought about by the large capital account deficit of K701 
million. The capital account deficit was mainly attributed to substantial increases in the 
private capital outflow, reflecting deterioration in private sectors’ confidence in a 
volatile investment climate. The outflows were also facilitated by the liberalisation of 
foreign exchange controls in 1992. As a consequence, international reserves fell to 
K112 million in 1993 from K309 million in 1991. In 1994, the value of merchandise 
imports increased by 16.9 per cent due to increased capital imports by the Porgera mine. 
However, the surplus in the trade account increased to K1346 million and the deficit in 
the capital account was K605 million. The overall balance of payments situation
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improved substantially in this year. The lower balance of payments deficit of K26 
million was the result of higher merchandise exports, lower service payments and lower 
outflows of private capital.
6.8.2 Relative Price Effect
The inflation rate was 6 per cent in 1990 and 5 per cent in 1991 easing back to 4 per 
cent in 1992. This relative decline in the price level was mainly influenced by lower 
inflation in Australia -  PNG’s major source of imports as well as the appreciation of 
the kina against the Australian dollar. The CPI index rose to 7.2 per cent in 1993 but 
slowed down to a lower rate of 4.6 per cent during 1994. The kina value of tradables 
increased more than 17 per cent in 1990 which brought a 10.5 per cent depreciation of 
the trade-weighted real exchange rate.
Table 6.15: Changes in Relative Price Indices 1988-94
(1990=100)
Y ear NEER RER1 PT CPI % c h a n g e  
NEER
% c h a n g e  
PT
% c h a n g e  
CPI
% c h a n g e  
RER1
1 9 8 8 9 1 . 0 3 9 4 . 2 3 8 4 . 1 5 8 9 . 3 0 - 0 . 0 6 4 . 3 6 9 . 0 8 - 4 .3 3
1 9 8 9 8 8 . 3 7 9 0 .5 1 8 5 . 0 9 9 4 . 0 2 - 2 . 9 2 1 .1 3 5 . 2 8 - 3 .9 4
1 9 9 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 . 0 0 1 3 . 4 7 1 7 . 0 3 6 . 3 6 1 0 . 4 8
1 9 9 1 1 0 1 . 0 7 9 7 . 3 6 1 0 2 . 6 4 1 0 5 . 4 2 0 . 7 9 2 . 0 8 5 . 4 2 - 2 .6 4
1 9 9 2 9 9 . 0 9 9 2 . 1 6 1 0 1 . 2 9 1 0 9 .9 1 - 1 . 9 6 - 1 .3 1 4 . 2 6 - 5 .3 5
1 9 9 3 1 0 0 . 2 2 8 7 . 2 8 1 0 2 . 8 3 1 1 7 . 8 2 1 .1 4 1 .5 2 7 . 2 0 - 5 .2 9
1 9 9 4 1 3 4 . 2 7 1 1 2 .0 1 1 3 8 . 0 0 1 2 3 . 2 0 3 3 . 9 8 3 4 . 2 0 4 . 5 7 2 8 . 3 4
Note: NEER = nominal effective exchange rate, RER1= trade-weighted real exchange rate, 
CPI = consumer price index, PT = price of tradables.
Source: Computed from Table 4.1.
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Over 1991-93 period, price of tradables increased less than one per cent (0.76 
per cent) on average whereas domestic CPI rose by 5.6 per cent. The increase in the 
domestic price level relative to PNG’s major trading partners resulted from increased 
government spending, which appreciated the trade-weighted real exchange rate by 4.4 
per cent. As the price of tradables increased substantially with a fall in the domestic 
price level to 4.5 per cent and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate by 34 per 
cent, the trade-weighted real exchange rate depreciated more than 28 per cent in 1994 
(Table 6.15).
Until 1992, the growth in the export price index was slower than the domestic 
price of nontradables but the index increased sharply during 1993-94 due to improved 
world market prices for PNG’s mineral and agricultural products. Real exchange rate 
for export sector depreciated by 8.5 per cent in 1993 and 15.4 per cent in 1994. In both 
years this was the outcome of greater increase in export prices compared to increase in 
domestic price of nontradables.
Table 6.16: Changes in Relative Price Indices of Export and 
Import Competing Industries 1990-94
(1990=100)
Year % change 
EPI
% change 
IPI
% change 
PNT
% change 
RER2
% change 
RER3
1990 4.5 6.4 6.3 -1.68 0.09
1991 -0.9 -1.0 5.4 -6.0 -6.4
1992 1.8 2.7 3.8 -1.9 -1.1
1993 11.8 -3.4 3.3 8.5 -6.7
1994 16.6 1.8 1.2 15.4 0.6
Note: EPI= export price index, IPI=import price index, PNT= price of nontradable, RER2= real 
exchange rate for export industry, RER3= real exchange rate for import industry.
Source: Computed from Table 4.2.
187
The real exchange rate for import competing industries appreciated over 1991-93 before 
depreciating slightly at about 0.6 per cent in 1994 (Table 6.16). The movement of real 
exchange rates suggests that the relative price of tradables to nontradables declined over 
the 1991-93 period.
Appreciation of the real exchange rate was driven by a rapid fall in the inflation 
rates of PNG’s major trading partners. Increased domestic inflation was also aggravated 
by persistent expansionary fiscal policy and an increasingly restrictive trade regime. 
From the late 1980s until 1993, the increase in the domestic price level was higher than 
the price of tradables, which greatly reduced competitiveness of the economy and 
appreciated the real exchange rate substantially. This outcome is supported by the 
econometric results in Chapter 4, which showed increased government spending 
significantly appreciates the real exchange rate, at least on a year to year basis. From 
1994, PNG began to regain some competitiveness for its export commodities.
6.8.3 Effects on Employment and Wages
In 1990-91 employment in the private non-mining sector declined by about 4 per cent 
on average. Mining sector employment was also in a declining trend because of this 
sector’s capital intensive nature. The employment situation recovered in 1992 due to 
increased spin off activities in the non-mining sector, especially in agriculture. 
Employment in the formal sector declined by 3 per cent in 1993. The BPNG’s 1994 
employment survey recorded a 10 per cent decline in private formal sector employment. 
Both rural and urban nominal wages rose about 11 per cent in 1992 from 1990 levels 
whereas real wage remained constant at about K25 weekly for urban and K9.4 weekly 
for rural workers over the 1990-92 period at 1977 prices (Table 6.17).
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Table 6.17: Real and Nominal Weekly Wages 1988-93
Y e a r R ura l
n o m in a l
U rb a n
n o m in a l
R e a l R u ra l 
(1 9 7 7  p r ic e s )
R e a l U rb a n  
(1 9 7 7  p r ic e s )
%  c h a n g e  
ru ra l n o m in a l
%  c h a n g e  
u rb a n  n o m in a l
%  c h a n g e  
rea l ru ra l
%  c h a n g e  
rea l u rban
1988 19.1 51.3 9.7 26 .0 2.7 3.0 - 2.0 - 2.3
1989 20.1 54.0 9.8 26 .2 5.4 5.3 1.0 0.8
1990 20.8 55.7 9.4 25.2 3.3 3.2 - 4.1 - 3.8
1991 22.0 59.1 9.3 25 .0 5.8 6.1 - 1.1 - 0.8
1992 23.0 61.8 9.4 25.1 4.6 4.6 1.1 0.4
1993 23.8 23.8 9.2 9.2 3.5 - 61.5 - 2.1 - 63.4
Source: Constructed from AusAID (1995) Table A22.
Introducing a land mark wage policy in 1992, the Minimum Wages Board 
Determination (MWBD) lowered urban minimum wages for new entrants and abolished 
wage indexation. Since 1992, private sector wages have been determined by market 
forces, subject to a national minimum wage set by the MWBD. The MWBD decision 
changed the focus of wage negotiation from an income based approach to a productivity 
based approach. It unified the dual system of urban and rural minimum wages at the 
much lower rural wage level and introduced a new national youth wage set at 75 per 
cent of the new national minimum. This policy opened the way for achieving a 
reduction in the real exchange rate through a nominal exchange rate devaluation. A 
decline of 61 per cent in the nominal urban wage in 1993 brought a 63 per cent 
reduction in real urban wages compared with the 1992 level. A 3.5 per cent growth in 
the nominal wage in 1994 resulted in a less than expected 2.1 per cent decline in the 
minimum real wages3.
3 The figures reported here need to be taken cautiously because they referred to minimum wages and the lowered 
minimum wages generally applied only to new entrants.
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6.9 Changes in Sectoral Composition
Between 1991 and 1993, the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP remained 
stable at around 26 per cent. Within the agricultural sector, logging showed the greatest 
expansion and provided more than half of the sector’s exports. The agricultural sector 
grew at the rate of 11 per cent in real terms and the share of agricultural output to GDP 
expanded to 29 per cent in 1994. Improvement in world prices for PNG’s agricultural 
cash crops in 1993 and devaluation of the kina improved the competitiveness of this 
sector. In the second half of 1994, export prices for coffee, copra and palm oil all 
moved above their respective support prices and contributed about 14 per cent of total 
export revenue.
The share of the manufacturing sector declined from 10 per cent of GDP in 1991 
to 8 per cent in 1993, due to a substantial reduction in both private and public 
consumption growth. This outcome is consistent with the econometric results in 
Chapter 5 suggesting a positive relationship between domestic absorption and output of 
this sector.
The services sector also indicated a declining trend over the period, from a share 
of 40 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 34 per cent of GDP in 1993. Benefit from the opening 
of major new projects, the construction sector had real growth of 35 per cent in 1991. 
The growth of this sector declined to 13 per cent in 1993, attributed to a lack of new 
investment and the completion of a number of large construction projects. After the 
sharp decline in 1993, this sector’s growth rate picked up in 1994 and was at around 10 
per cent in real terms as a result of major building projects such as the Lamana Hotel 
and the Royal Papua Yacht Club Marina. The econometric results of sectoral growth in
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Chapter 5 indicate that appreciation of the real exchange rate, an increase in domestic 
absorption, and increased government investment, expand the output of the construction 
sector.
The real growth rate in the mining and quarrying sector was 11 per cent, but the 
growth in petroleum sector declined to 19.4 per cent in 1994 from 167 per cent in 1993, 
as petroleum output fell substantially from the Kutubu oil field. This sector’s 
contribution to export revenue fell to 26 per cent in 1994 and is expected to continue to 
decline as reserves are depleted.
As major projects were completed, a slowdown in mining activities, low prices 
for PNG’s petroleum and a tightening in government expenditure, led to a slowdown of 
the growth rate to 3.1 per cent during 1994. A decline in mineral revenues, employment 
bottlenecks, slowdown in construction activity and loss of investor confidence are also 
responsible for this fall in economic growth.
From the above discussion on sectoral transformation in response to resources 
boom and policy management, it is clear the share of the mining sector to GDP rose 
unambiguously, whereas the contribution of the agricultural traded sector remained 
constant due to improved world prices for PNG’s export commodities. The cumulative 
effects of an increasing domestic price level adversely affected output of the 
manufacturing traded sector. Large fiscal deficits and an inward-looking trade regime 
over 1991-93 kept the domestic price level relatively higher than PNG’s major trading 
partners. The real exchange rate of PNG would have depreciated to a great extent with a 
more open trade regime and more disciplined fiscal policy. This impact on sectoral
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growth is also verified by the analytical framework and econometric results in Chapter 
5.
6.10 Investment and Savings
This section discusses the effects of broad policy incentives laid out by the government 
in response to the resources booms on the long-run savings behaviour of PNG. The 
main policy focus for the mining and petroleum sectors in recent years was to promote 
foreign investment and a fair distribution of resource rents among the stakeholders. By 
clearly stating the rights of resource owners, making a fair return on investment and also 
taking into account the rights of state, landowners and local communities to share in the 
resulting benefit, the PNG government has been attempting to attract foreign as well as 
domestic investment to this sector. Another feature of this policy is that the government 
is taking out its equity share in all new mining projects and selling-off existing equity to 
nationals as investment matures. This, in turn, would transfer significant equity 
holdings to the national private sector (AusAID, 1995).
Over the first half of 1990s, the government showed strong support and 
encouragement for investment in the non-mining sectors. Establishment of industry 
corporations allowed the transfer of research and development to non-mining sectors. 
Other supporting policies include a progressive reduction in the existing tariff rate (set 
at around 40 per cent) and replacing import bans and quotas with tariffs. Exemption of 
import duty for selected inputs used by the non-mining exporters, the replacement of 
quantitative restrictions with tariffs for selected agricultural products, such as fruits, 
vegetables, beef, sugar and some small goods, had a positive impact on investment in 
the manufacturing sector. The next section discusses PNG’s public and private sector 
savings and investment performance over the last two and a half decades.
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6.10.1 Contribution of Savings and Investment
Given the constraints on the mobilisation of foreign direct investment and other kinds of 
foreign resources, a sustainable rate of investment can only be achieved by a raising 
domestic savings rate. Investment, is therefore crucially dependent on the overall 
economic condition that is conducive to mobilising both private and public savings and 
the ability to attract foreign savings and direct foreign investment.
Table 6.18: Investment and Savings 1970-1994
(Percentage Share of GDP)
1970-72 1973-76 1977-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-94
Gross Domestic Investment 40 18 23 27 23 22
Resource Balance/3 - 2 1 10 4 -13 0 5
Gross National Savings/b 5 19 20 13 17 32
Gross Domestic Savings^ 19 28 27 14 23 27
Foreign Savings/4* 14 9 7 1 6 -5
/ a Calculated as gross domestic savings less domestic investment 
/ b Calculated as gross domestic savings less foreign savings 
/ c Calculated as gross national savings plus foreign savings
/ d Calculated as equivalent to the balance of payments deficit on the current account
Source: World Bank (1981, 1991) and AusAlD (1996), Constructed from various Tables from Report No. 3544a-PNG (1981), 
Report No. 9396-PNG (1991) and AusAID 1996 Report.
From the late 1960s, investment policies of the PNG government have addressed 
these two key issues, as well as providing incentives to influence investment in specific 
key sectors. Private sector contribution to gross domestic savings and investment 
played a crucial role in the development of the economy as it had a positive and direct 
influence on the long-run growth of PNG. During the 1970s, PNG’s investment and 
savings performances were high enough to build a foundation for long-run growth. 
Between 1970 to 1972, the contribution of gross domestic investment to GDP was 40
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per cent, funded mainly by foreign savings and direct foreign investment. During 1973- 
76, the contribution of gross domestic investment to GDP declined sharply with the 
completion of the BCL mine and the lack of new foreign investment projects.
The share of gross domestic savings to GDP began to rise from 1972 and 
accounted for 28 per cent of GDP on average over 1973-1976. Gross national savings 
also rose to 19 per cent of GDP on average over this period and resulted in a positive 
resources gap which accounted for 10 per cent of GDP (Table 6.18).
Table 6.19: Gross Domestic Investment and Gross National Savings
1991 -94 (percentage of GDP)
1991 1992 1993 1994
G r o s s  D o m e s t i c  I n v e s tm e n t 28.0 23.8 18.8 16.3
P r iv a t e  I n v e s tm e n t 23.3 18.6 12.5 13.2
Mining 15.9 11.1 4.6 5.0
Non-mining 7.4 7.5 7.9 8.2
P u b l ic  I n v e s tm e n t 4.7 5.2 6.3 3.1
G r o s s  N a t io n a l  S a v in g s 23.4 26.0 31.4 27.0
Source: AusAID (1996), constructed from various Tables.
Between 1977-80, the share of investment to GDP increased compared with the 
previous period and both national and domestic savings remained at comfortably high 
levels. These figures indicate the PNG government was wise to utilise its windfall gain 
from the first two major resources booms of the 1970s and to save a large portion of its 
windfall, facilitating economic development in later years.
194
During the 1980s, PNG’s share of investment to GDP was comparable with 
other lower middle income countries of the world. Between 1981-85, gross domestic 
investment averaged around 27 per cent of GDP and a large share of this was in the 
form of direct foreign investment. Over the first half of the 1980s, both domestic and 
national savings declined due to unfavourable economic conditions but regained a 
satisfactory level during the second half of 1980s.
In 1991, gross domestic investment reached a peak of 28 per cent of GDP and 
declined over the next three years due to a reduction in mining investment. Among 
other factors, instability in government policy relating to resource development was the 
major factor in explaining this declining trend of gross domestic investment over the 
period.
During 1991-94, private sector investment averaged about 17 per cent of GDP, 
but public sector investment fell to about 5 per cent over the period (Table 6.19). Until 
1992, domestic investment was funded mainly by private and foreign savings. From 
1992, major investment projects were solely funded by domestic private savings as 
foreign and public savings continued to decline. The share of private savings to GDP 
declined substantially in 1993, as the private sector was called on to finance large 
budget deficits and to make up the shortfall in foreign financing of government 
transactions. Despite the large capital flight during 1992-93, and significant public and 
foreign dis-saving since 1992 as a result of large debt repayments by the government 
and diminished confidence by investors in the mining sector, private saving’s 
contribution averaged 30 per cent of GDP over 1991-93. Thus, private sector savings
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have played an important role in building up the necessary capital stock conducive to 
the long-run growth of the country.
Private sector savings behaviour clearly indicates the consumption smoothing 
behaviour which supports the central theme of the theory of ‘construction boom’ by the 
private sector. The econometric results in Chapter 5 confirmed that there is a significant 
positive effect of real GDP growth (contributed mainly by the increased windfall 
income) on the private and total savings of the nation. These empirical and econometric 
findings indicate the farsightedness of private sector savings decisions.
6.11 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has examined the policy responses by the government to resources booms 
during the 1970s (the BCL investment boom in 1971-72, the copper boom in 1973-74 
and the agricultural boom in 1976-77) and the 1990s (the mineral boom during 1992-93) 
and their effect on the long-run growth of the country. These booms have impacted 
significantly upon the sectoral composition of output. The overall policy response to 
these shocks were admirably positive in insulating the economy during the 1970s, as 
indicated by the average depreciation of real exchange rate and a more even distribution 
of income. The share of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to GDP increased 
significantly during the second half of the 1970s, indicating that, although the economy 
was moderately affected by the ‘Dutch disease’ type of phenomenon in the early 1970s, 
prudent macroeconomic policies in the second half of the 1970s moderated these 
adverse resources boom effects.
On the other hand, an undisciplined fiscal stance in the early 1990s brought 
about considerable economic problems for PNG, as the real exchange rate appreciated
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significantly and reduced external competitiveness in the 1991-93 period. Following an 
improvement in world market prices for PNG agricultural commodities, the 
implementation of radical wage reform in 1992, and flotation of the kina in 1994, PNG 
has managed to regain its external competitiveness to a great extent.
Long-run policy effects indicate that, despite some adverse economic events and 
large public sector dis-saving in the early years of the 1990s, the contribution of 
domestic private savings to gross domestic investment was encouraging. The increased 
savings during the boom years also indicated consumption smoothing behaviour by the 
private sector, confirming the theoretical propositions of construction booms in PNG.
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CHAPTER 7
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RESOURCES BOOMS 
IN PNG, INDONESIA AND NIGERIA
Introduction
From time to time, during the early 1970s to the early 1980s, high price levels prevailed 
for several minerals and primary commodities bringing price instability and sectoral 
transformation to the economies of some primary commodity-exporting countries. Like 
PNG, many other agricultural-based small open economies experienced large 
fluctuations in their external trade as well as in their internal economic environment. 
Indonesia and Nigeria are two other agricultural-based, primary commodity-exporting 
countries which experienced a large transfers of wealth, brought about by two major oil 
booms during 1972-82 (1973-74 and 1979-81). PNG experienced major booms in the 
same period (construction and mineral boom in 1971-74, and an agricultural commodity 
boom in 1976-77 which continued in another mineral boom during the 1978-79 period).
This chapter examines whether the divergent economic performance of these 
countries was the result of unequal magnitude of the resources booms, or the different 
policy measures adopted and implemented by the respective governments.
In terms of size, population, and stages of development although these countries 
are quite heterogeneous, they possess many similar economic characteristics, 
resembling each other in their agricultural base and abundance of mineral resources. 
They are also comparable in terms of significant agricultural and primary sectors,
198
which, in each case, provide the chief source of non-mineral exports. The main 
differences over the study period lie in their macroeconomic policies and the impact of 
these policies on real exchange rates, sectoral transformation and long-run savings and 
investment behaviour.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses the 
nature and magnitude of the oil booms in Indonesia and Nigeria during 1972-82. 
Section 3 provides a description of policy responses by the Indonesian and Nigerian 
governments. Section 4 presents a comparative study of the oil booms in Indonesia and 
Nigeria with that of the resources booms in PNG, and attempts to compare the 
magnitude of the booms and the different policy measures adopted in response. This 
section also analyses the effects of these booms on domestic inflation, real exchange 
rates and employment and wages movements and provides a brief discussion on the 
sectoral transformation of these economies over the boom years. Section 6 summarises 
the findings of the comparative study and draws conclusions.
7.2 Oil Booms in Indonesia and Nigeria: 1972-82
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria all experienced several short-lived booms over the period 
1970-82, of which two major booms are particularly notable in terms of their enormous 
impact on sectoral changes within these economies. During the period, 1973-74, the 
dramatic rise in the world price of oil and minerals brought the first resources boom in 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria. The first oil boom was experienced by Indonesia and 
Nigeria in early 1974 after the world real oil price began to rise in 1973. The world real 
oil price quadrupled in 1974 from its 1971/72 level and remained relatively constant 
over the next five years.
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Nigeria experienced a large quantitative rise in the production of oil from 1970. Gelb 
(1988) estimated the windfall (counting both quantity and prices as windfall) at about 23 
per cent of non-mining GDP for Nigeria and 16 per cent for Indonesia in 1974 and 
1978.
As has been discussed in Chapter 6, PNG also experienced a major mineral 
boom during 1973-74. In 1974 the export unit value index of copper concentrates 
increased by 89 per cent from its 1972 level and the export value of copper concentrates 
accounted for 68 per cent of PNG total merchandise export receipts. PNG’s mineral 
export earning rose from 3 per cent of GDP in the financial year 1972/73 to 30 per cent 
in 1974. It is worth noting that the share of mineral production rose dramatically in 
PNG, compared with Indonesia and Nigeria.
A second boom resulted when the real price of oil increased by a further 50 per 
cent in 1979 with another 50 per cent increase in 1980, before peaking in 1981 at more 
than six hundred per cent higher than the 1971/72 level1 2. The volume of Nigeria’s oil 
exports increased by 50 per cent and the value of oil exports accounted for 97 per cent 
of total export value in 1981 . Indonesian oil production increased 10 per cent between 
1979 and 1981 in volume terms and the export value of oil accounted for 65 per cent of 
total exports in 1981. Indonesian petroleum output rose by 490 per cent in US dollar 
terms and the unit value of petroleum rose by 350 per cent in real terms over the period 
1972-82. The importance of oil in Indonesia and Nigeria and minerals (copper, silver 
and gold) in PNG is shown in Table 7.1.
1 In nominal terms, the price of a barrel of crude oil (OPEC basket) increased from US$1.7 in 1971 to US$34.3 in 
1981. By 1986, this price had fallen to US$13.6 per barrel.
2 Nigerian total exports increased from US$2.1 billion in 1972 to US$26 million in 1980. Of these total value of
export, oil export revenue accounted for US$25 billion in nominal terms.
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During 1976-77, PNG also experienced an agricultural boom as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. PNG’s export of non-fuel primary commodities contributed 90 per 
cent of export earnings in 1977 due to an increase in export volumes of agricultural cash 
crops (coffee, cocoa, copra, tea, etc) brought about by favourable world market prices. 
PNG’s export unit value indices for coffee, cocoa and copra increased by 320, 160, and 
62 per cent from 1975 to 1977.
Table 7.2: Terms of Trade and Export Price Indices 
Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and Nigeria
(1978=100)
Indonesia Nigeria PNG
Year T O T E P I T O T E P I T O T E P I
1971 51.2 22.2 34.3 15.5 84.4 35.6
1972 43.2 20.8 32.6 16.0 90.1 39.3
1973 49.4 30.6 38.5 22.8 98.1 64.2
1974 103.2 85.1 112.3 84.4 88.3 79.5
1975 92.2 78.6 100.0 81.2 105.8 72.7
1976 105.5 88.1 109.0 87.9 105.8 85.8
1977 113.9 99.0 111.3 97.9 125.2 107.3
1978 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1979 123.8 143.1 123.3 139.9 97.0 115.9
1980 149.5 207.1 172.5 146.0 80.7 114.6
1981 158.1 220.3 189.1 244.9 69.8 101.0
1982 152.3 201.7 174.9 221.5 74.3 100.3
1983 144.1 184.0 169.4 204.3 77.6 100.9
1984 145.6 181.6 171.2 201.2 84.1 105.9
Source: Constructed from World Bank (1993).
All these three countries experienced a positive terms of trade shock over the 
decade. The TOT increased by 139 per cent for Indonesia and 245 per cent for Nigeria 
between 1972 and 1974. Export price indices also rose, by 309 per cent and 429 per 
cent for Indonesia and Nigeria respectively over the period. This sharp increase in the
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export price index and terms of trade brought about impressive increases in national 
income for both countries. Gross domestic product was 70 per cent higher in Indonesia 
and 55 per cent higher in Nigeria in 1974 than it was in 1970. Indonesia’s TOT 
increased a further 58 per cent in 1981 over its 1978 level with a 121 per cent increase 
in the export price index over the period and Nigeria’s TOT increased by 89 per cent 
and the export price index by 145 per cent. PNG’s TOT increased by 16 per cent and 
its export price index by 80 per cent between 1971 and 1973. During PNG’s 
agricultural boom in 1977, TOT increased by 18 per cent with a 48 per cent increase in 
the export price index compared with the 1975 levels.
PNG experienced another boom in the petroleum and mineral sector over 1992 
and 1993 which attributed for the largest contribution by this sector to the country’s 
export revenue and GDP growth. In 1993, the petroleum and mineral sector accounted 
for 30 per cent of GDP and contributed 70 per cent to total exports. A detailed 
discussion of this boom appears in Chapter 6.
7.3 Policy Responses
In this section various macroeconomic policy measures adopted by the governments of 
Indonesia and Nigeria, are analysed, such as fiscal, exchange rate and trade policies, 
together with their crucial role in determining structural change within these two 
economies.
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7.3.1 Indonesia 
Fiscal Policy
The composition and timing of government spending are very important as windfall 
revenue from a resources boom accrues to the government through direct sales, royalties 
and taxes. As a result of the oil boom, government revenue in Indonesia increased from 
11 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 32 per cent in 1974. Government revenue accounted for 
24.4 per cent of GDP in 1981 and then fell to 21 per cent of GDP in 1982. Oil and gas 
was responsible for nearly 33 per cent of total government revenue in 1973/74, over 50 
per cent in 1979/80 and 62 per cent at its peak in 1981/82. Government expenditure 
increased by 29 per cent in 1974 from its 1973 level and by a further 63 per cent in 1981 
from its 1978 level. The budget deficit increased 10 times between 1970 and 1982 in 
absolute terms, but the budget deficit to GDP declined from 2.0 per cent in 1972 to 1.9 
per cent in 1982.
Development Expenditure
During the boom years the share of development expenditure (capital expenditure spent 
mostly on investment to support the private sector) to total expenditure increased from 
48 per cent in 1973/74 to around 50 per cent in 1981-82 (Table 7.3). Though the share 
of development expenditure in the agricultural sector declined moderately in 1982 from 
its 1972 level, absolute government spending on agriculture increased from 16 per cent 
in 1972 to 22 per cent of total expenditure in 1982. After it was forced to import a large 
quantity of rice in 1973 at a time of high world prices the Indonesian government was 
committed to rapid development of the rice sector and the achievement of rice self- 
sufficiency. Through rapid increases in rice yield, rice production grew by 4.2 per cent 
per year from 1968 to 1978, and by 6.7 per cent from 1978 to 1984.
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Table 7.3: Real Government Revenue and Expenditure of Indonesia
(at constant 1980 prices, billion Rupiah)
Government Revenue Government Expenditure
Year Development1 Routine^ Total Oil and gas Development Routine Total
1973/74 632.91 3003.75 3636.66 1186.35 1422.57 2214.09 3636.66
1974/75 535.99 4051.56 4587.54 2211.41 2240.06 2451.45 4691.51
1975/76 949.34 4329.38 5278.72 2410.04 2705.31 2573.41 5278.72
1976/77 1298.18 4813.10 6111.28 2708.49 3411.90 2699.38 6111.28
1977/78 1160.72 5305.93 6466.66 2924.61 3241.58 3225.07 6466.66
1978/79 1459.26 6011.91 7471.16 3253.48 3604.66 3866.50 7471.16
1979/80 1520.53 7372.90 8893.44 4689.64 4421.56 4471.88 8893.44
1980/81 1406.36 9627.70 11034.05 6608.25 5573.84 5460.12 11033.96
1981/82 1488.68 10638.15 12126.83 7515.33 6048.78 6078.05 12126.83
1982/83 1540.91 9863.38 11404.29 6489.59 5847.50 5557.03 11404.53
1983/84 2753.48 10235.96 12989.43 6752.91 7023.62 5965.82 12989.43
Notes:
1. Government Foreign Borrowing and Loans to support the private sector.
2. Domestic revenue including oil and gas.
3. Mostly spent on investment to support private sector.
4. Mostly for consumption expenditure.
Source: Nota Keuangan Dan Rancangan Anggaran Pendapatan Negara Republik Indonesia (Income 
Statement), various issues.
The commodity board, BULOG, adopted a pricing policy for agriculture to 
stabilise the price of rice and ensure the prices for agricultural exports moved in line 
with international price trends. The main policy emphasis of BULOG was to increase 
rice production together with increased investment in irrigation, research and extension, 
credit programme and subsidisation of major inputs and fertiliser (Pinto, 1987). As a 
result, the agricultural sector gained self-sufficiency in rice and was also able to increase 
its production of cash crops, like rubber, coffee, tea and spices, over the oil boom 
period. Even though the effective rate of manufacturing protection penalised the
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agricultural export sector by 11 per cent, the production of agricultural output increased 
substantially in absolute terms, and the agricultural price level was moving slightly 
higher than the general price level over the 1970s (Scherr, 1989).
In an attempt to strengthen the infrastructure of the economy and diversify 
exports from oil to non-oil commodities, the Indonesian government substantially 
increased development expenditure on education and training, roads and construction 
and health and family planning -  from 63 per cent of total expenditure in 1969/70 to 74 
per cent in 1982/83.
7.3.2 Trade Policy
During the early 1960s, there were extensive barriers to international trade in Indonesia. 
Apart from establishing a unified exchange rate, Soeharto’s ‘New Order’ regime moved 
decisively towards more open trade policies between 1967 and 1971. From then until 
the mid-1980s, Indonesia’s trade regime again became increasingly inward-oriented as 
the government taxed or banned some traditional exports, pursued its goal of self- 
sufficiency in rice and invested a large share of oil revenue to set up import-substituting 
manufacturing industries. The primary instrument of trade protection was a high and 
disparate tariff structure. Import tariffs became the major form of protection from the 
early 1970s and over the 1976-78 period the average tariff rate on manufactured 
imported items was about 66 per cent. The import competing manufacturing sector also 
received substantial trade protection in the form of import quotas and direct input 
subsidies. Import bans reappeared from the early 1970s, especially in the automobile 
and textiles industries.
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Table 7.4: Estimates of Effective Rates of Protection of Indonesia
(per cent)
Pitt World Bank Parker
1971 1975 1984
All tradables 33 30 133
Exportables -11 -2 -4
Importables: 66 58 224
import competing n.a. 61 n.a
non-import competing 15 9 n.a.
Sub-sectors:
cigarettes 556 4 n.a.
sugar refining 154 -9 141
weaving NVA 192 589
motor vehicles 526 718 2948
Note: These series are generally not directly comparable except where the same author or methodology 
is involved. NVA indicates negative value added at international prices, n.a. indicates there ware no 
estimates presented for this category.
Source: Hill (1996), Table 6.8, p. 112.
In 1970, export taxes and import duties constituted about 37 per cent of non-oil 
domestic revenue (Hill, 1996). Table 7.4 summarises protection estimates by several 
authors. It is apparent that the effective rate of protection for importables increased over 
1971-84 whereas all studies found negative protection for exportables over the period. 
The trade regime became more restrictive during 1982-85. After the second oil boom, 
as a result of steady decline in Indonesia’s commodity exports and the adverse effects of 
the world recession on the Indonesian economy.
Tariff protection was supplemented by a proliferation of non-tariff barrier 
(NTBs) in the form of restrictive licences. In addition, export restrictions in the form of 
bans, taxes and quotas were implemented for unprocessed agricultural commodities.
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During 1980, bans on log exports were introduced in stages and all log exports were 
banned after 1985. Little et al. (1993) found that during the tight trade regime of 1983- 
84 Indonesian imports fell by 11 per cent and trade tax revenue by 7 per cent.
7.3.3 Exchange Rate Policy
The aim of the exchange rate policy was to maintain the Indonesia’s external 
competitiveness, and this was achieved by a series of nominal devaluations in a 
situation of rising domestic inflation. The most noticeable macroeconomic policy 
undertaken by the Indonesian government was two massive currency devaluations in 
1978 and 1983.
Over 1971-78, Indonesia’s nominal exchange rate was pegged to the American 
dollar. As the government spent most of its windfall revenue domestically, the money 
supply increased by 30 per cent in 1974. This led to high domestic inflation and a 
subsequent appreciation of the real exchange rate. In November 1978, to reverse the 
erosion of competitiveness in its non-oil sector Indonesia devalued its currency by 50 
per cent and changed the exchange rate system from a fixed to a flexible regime.
As a result, the real exchange rate depreciated significantly. As pointed out by 
Warr (1986), following the devaluation, the index of tradables to nontradables price 
ratio reached a peak (real depreciation) after 3 to 5 months, indicating a substantial rise 
in the tradable sector’s competitiveness. There was a sharp increase in non-oil exports 
in 1977. But the second oil shock during 1979-81 led to monetary expansion, and 
increased inflation. Thus, the effects of the devaluation were eroded by domestic 
inflation and then wiped out by late 1982 (Arndt and Sundrum, 1984). In March 1983,
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Indonesia devalued its currency again by 38 per cent in an attempt to stimulate non­
mining exports, and combat high inflation and low TOT.
7.3.4 Nigeria
Fiscal Policy
During the two oil booms, government revenue in Nigeria increased substantially from 
only 11 per cent of non-mining GDP in 1970, to 41 per cent in 1974 and 37 per cent in 
1981. Both current and capital expenditure also showed an increasing trend over the 
period 1974-82. Capital expenditure accelerated rapidly from only 3.6 per cent of non­
mining GDP in 1970 to 18 per cent in 1974 and 43 per cent by 1982. Current 
expenditure accounted for 11.6 per cent of non-mining GDP in 1974 and 21.1 per cent 
in 1981 (Table 7.5). As a result Nigeria’s budget surplus of 6 per cent of GDP in 1974 
turned into a budget deficit of 8 per cent in 1982.
Development Expenditure
Spending on agriculture and rural development rose from 3-5 per cent of GDP in 1970 
to 9-10 per cent in 1982 (World Bank, 1985). Import subsidies for agriculture were 
quite generous, at around 50 per cent for tractors and 85 per cent for fertilisers. But the 
share of government real expenditure for tree crop production, processing and marketing 
declined markedly. Most of the capital intensive and large scale projects that dominated 
the agricultural development programme turned out to be inefficient, drawing resources 
away from small holders. Some benefited from the fertiliser subsidies, but there were 
no definite subsidy programmes for the dominant food crop sector provided by 
smallholders (Scherr, 1989).
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Nigeria’s public capital spending was geared towards the nontradable sector and 
the transport and communications sector received a large rise in public funding 
allocation. Other public spending on infrastructure was also directed to the urban 
population. Capital spending on education increased sharply, from 3.9 per cent of total 
spending in 1973/74 to 18.2 per cent in 1975/76. Increased investment in buildings, and 
roads, as well as schools, led to another boom in the construction sector.
Table 7.5: Federal Budget of Nigeria
(Percentage of non-mining GDP)
Y ear T otal R even u e N o n -O il
R evenue
O il-R ev en u e Current
E xpenditure
C apital E xpenditure
1970 10.7 7.9 2.8 8.5 3.6
1971 16.0 8.2 7.8 8.6 4.9
1972 16.2 7.7 8.5 9.6 5.7
1973 24.0 7.5 16.5 10.9 7.5
1974 40.6 7.7 32.9 11.6 17.8
1975 34.3 7.2 27.1 15.9 27.5
1976 33.9 7.5 26.4 13.2 29.5
1977 33.0 8.6 24.4 14.7 28.0
1978 24.9 8.1 16.8 13.3 20.3
1979 42.2 7.7 34.5 18.1 26.7
1980 47.2 8.7 38.5 21.1 26.5
1981 37.2 8.7 28.5 21.1 29.6
1982 29.7 7.0 22.7 42.7 42.7
Source: C onstructed  from  G elb  (1 9 8 8 ) , T able 13-2 , p .2 4 0 .
The services and construction sectors value added increased from the 1974 level by 
about 30 per cent in 1976 and 48 per cent in 1982. Public investment spending on
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heavy manufacturing increased rapidly after the decision to build a steel industry in the 
late-1970s.
7.3.5 Trade Policy
Trade policy in Nigeria has traditionally protected local manufacturing industries by 
imposing relatively high tariffs and import duties. Domestic manufacturing received 
high levels of protection and artificially expanded production assisted by prohibitive 
tariffs and other quantitative import restrictions, price controls and subsidies which 
acted as incentives to the sector. Overall, these policies made the manufacturing sector 
behave as a nontradable sector at the margin. At the end of the first oil boom, 
particularly when oil exports tended to fall, Nigerian authorities decided to tighten 
import restrictions via increasing tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports.
Table 7.6: Effective Rates of Protection for Selected Agricultural Crops in Nigeria
(per cent)
Commodity 1970-76 1979 1980 1981 1982
Maize 13 61 95 189 247
Rice 35 1 -4 13 59
sorghum 13 86 67 190 197
Millet 13 8 9 5 3
Yams n.a. 1 1 1 0
Cassava n.a. 1 1 0 1
Cowpeas n.a. 4 4 2 2
Groundnuts -53 -1 -11 18 n.a.
Palm oil -29 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cocoa -42 -31 22 138 114
Rubber n.a. -1 -23 34 n.a.
Cotton -43 -21 -16 18 20
Note: n.a. means not available. Effective rates of protection are computed taking into account purchased 
inputs subject to import duties and sales taxes.
Source: Oyejide (1986), Table 7, p. 31.
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Gelb (1988) shows the net effective rate of protection for consumer goods rose 
from 55.8 to 124.9 per cent between 1977 and 1980. The share of manufacturing in 
GDP increased by more than 9 per cent in 1981-83. But after the collapse of the oil 
price, together with reductions in tariffs and dismantling of quantitative restrictions in 
1986, the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP fell substantially.
Trade protection for agriculture has been highly erratic and inconsistent, and 
mainly in response to foreign exchange availability, rather than a systematic policy of 
protection. The government tried to increase agricultural production by giving 
producers higher price incentives. Between 1974-81, producers’ prices doubled for 
many agricultural commodities but agricultural production did not increase as was 
expected. In spite of an increase in agricultural protection in the early 1980s, 
agricultural crops generally received less protection than the manufacturing sector, and, 
within the agricultural sector, export crops received less protection than food crops 
(Table 7.6). As a result, the agricultural sector as a whole contracted sharply.
The more pervasive effects of protection impacted upon the real exchange rate. 
Given industrial protection, the real exchange that maintains external balance was lower 
than the equilibrium real rate that would have prevailed otherwise. In the absence of 
import restrictions, food grains are considered to be potentially tradable. Collier (1988) 
pointed out the production of food grains declined during the oil boom but food prices 
rose relative to the price of nontradables. He termed this phenomenon the ‘Nigerian 
disease’, since the standard theory of “Dutch disease’ could not explain the decline of 
the food grain sector at a time of high prices for them. The spending effects of the oil 
boom raised the demand for food grains, but the production of food grains declined
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relative to the labour force. This paradoxical outcome is explained by Collier (1988) as 
the result of a massive rural labour migration to the cities induced by higher public 
sector demand for labour which contracted food production and increased its relative 
price.
7.3.6 Exchange Rate Policy
Nigeria’s exchange rate policy appears to have focused on maintaining a relatively 
stable nominal exchange rate over the period from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. In 
1973, an ad hoc devaluation of the Naira brought a small adjustment to the exchange 
rate. However, during 1974-78, the Central Bank of Nigeria adopted a strategy of 
gradual nominal appreciation of the Naira against the US dollar and British pound 
sterling, primarily with the aim of maintaining the country’s balance of payments 
situation. Nigeria also discounted the important contribution of the agricultural sector. 
Nigeria did not devalue its currency until the mid-1980s, on the premise that cheap 
imports were essential to political stability and that the expected economic benefits of 
higher agricultural exports were insignificant (Oyejide, 1985).
7.4 Comparative Study
For the purpose of a comparative study the key economic indicators for Indonesia, 
Nigeria and PNG are summarised in Table 7.7.
7.4.1 The Magnitude of Booms
To begin with the mineral sectors’ contribution to GDP -  PNG’s mineral sector’s share 
to GDP increased dramatically, from only 0.8 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1974 
(Table 7.7), whereas the contribution of the Indonesian mineral and petroleum sector 
increased from 12.3 in 1973 to 22.2 per cent to GDP in 1974.
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The contribution of Nigeria’s oil production also increased to 32 per cent of 
GDP in 1974 compared with 17 per cent in 1973. The swing in PNG’s current account 
balance was also dramatic in 1974. PNG’s current account surplus accounted for more 
than 20 per cent of GDP in 1974 compared to 17 per cent for Nigeria and 2.3 per cent 
for Indonesia. In 1982, while the mineral export share accounted for 75 per cent for 
Indonesia and 99 per cent for Nigeria, PNG’s mineral sector to GDP and share of 
mineral export to total export declined substantially.
Indonesian real GDP grew at 8 per cent in 1974 and 8.3 per cent in 1981. The 
annual average growth rate of per capita GDP was 7.7 per cent between 1970 and 1982. 
The average annual real GDP growth rate for Nigeria was more than 7 per cent during 
1970-80 compared with 4 per cent during the 1950s and 1960s. Nigeria’s real per capita 
income increased by almost 60 per cent between 1972 and 1974, and by more than 200 
per cent between 1972-80. The growth rate of PNG’s real GDP was at around 7 per 
cent in 1973 and 10 per cent in 1977. PNG achieved reasonably high average annual 
per capita GDP growth of 5.7 per cent over 1970-80 and 5.5 per cent over 1991-94.
These figures show the order of magnitudes of the resources booms in the three 
economies, indicating that the magnitude was similar in terms of their impact on exports 
and overall output of the economy. The next section discusses the different policy 
measures adopted by the respective governments in response to these booms.
7.4.2 Policy Measures
Since the early 1970s, PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria, have all gone through a wide range 
of policy experiments in the wake of resources booms. This section attempts to 
compare the various macroeconomic policies adopted by the respective governments
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and their crucial role in determining structural change and seeks to identify relevant 
factors that can explain the divergent performances of these three economies.
7.4.2.1 Fiscal Policy
This section compares and contrasts the PNG government’s fiscal policy and domestic 
demand responses over the boom years with those of Indonesia and Nigeria during the 
1970s and early 1980s. As discussed in chapter 6, after national independence, the main 
aim of the PNG government was to increase government revenue whilst holding real 
government spending at a low level to reduce reliance on Australian aid. These policy 
objectives succeeded to a remarkable degree over the second half of the 1970s.
Government consumption and domestic absorption increased sharply over the 
decade of the 1970s, both in Indonesia and Nigeria, while PNG maintained relatively 
more stable levels as indicated by Figure 7.1. Over the period 1970-82, the average 
annual real growth rate of Indonesian public consumption (11.9 per cent) and public 
investment (13.7 per cent) were much higher than in PNG and Nigeria. Government 
consumption increased three fold in PNG, compared with almost 26 times in Indonesia 
and 10 times in Nigeria (Table Appendix A7.1).
General consumption by the PNG government increased by 73 per cent in 1974 
compared to the 1970 level, whereas the Nigerian government increased consumption 
by 117 per cent, and Indonesia by 187 per cent. The PNG government was successful in 
reducing consumption levels during the second half of the 1970s by implementing 
income and wage restraint and by reducing dependency on Australian budgetary 
support.
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Figure 7.1: Index of Real Domestic Absorption 1970-82 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria
(1970=100)
2500 T
Indonesia 
- a— Nigeria
1000
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Year
Source: Table Appendix A7.1.
Between 1977 and 1982 government consumption increased by 39 per cent in PNG. By 
contrast, government consumption rose by 262 per cent in Indonesia and 75 per cent in 
Nigeria from 1977 to 1982.
Real domestic absorption increased significantly higher in Indonesia and 
Nigeria over the period (Figure 7.1). From the 1970 level, the index of domestic 
absorption increased by 22, 80, and 188 per cent in PNG, Nigeria and Indonesia, 
respectively, in 1974. In 1977, PNG’s domestic absorption increased by only 38 per 
cent whereas Indonesia increased domestic absorption by 85 per cent and Nigeria by
3 Private consumption, and general government consumption, plus gross domestic investment.
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106 per cent from the 1974 level. By 1982, domestic absorption had increased a further 
226 per cent in Indonesia, and 81 per cent in Nigeria, compared with 65 per cent in 
PNG.
PNG’s public debt as a ratio of GNP was moderate compared to Indonesia in 
1973, but increased sharply in 1982. This increase, caused by a down grading of ore 
grades at the major copper mines, pushed PNG to borrow in order to cover its current 
account deficit. PNG’s foreign debt increased by 67 per cent from early 1977 to 1982, 
while exports revenue increased by only 58 per cent in US dollar terms (Harvey, 1987). 
While Indonesia’s public debt to GNP fell substantially in 1982 from its 1973 level, the 
ratio for Nigeria increased moderately over the period, as seen in Table 7.7. In 1982, 
debt service ratios to total exports were also lower for Indonesia and Nigeria compared 
with PNG.
However, the PNG government failed to maintain fiscal discipline during the 
1990s, and increased agricultural price support schemes and increased defence 
expenditure for the Bougainville rebellion caused fiscal deficits to explode during the 
first few years of the 1990s. PNG’s fiscal deficit increased significantly from 1 per cent 
in 1988 to 5.9 per cent in 1993, with government consumption at K1018 million in 
1993. None of the stabilisation funds (MRSF and CPSF) actively restrained 
government spending. Domestic absorption also increased from K2568 million in 1990 
to K4493 million in 1993. Since the budget deficits were financed domestically, the 
demand for goods and services was satisfied by rising imports, eroding the international 
reserves of the Central Bank, until a foreign currency crisis emerged in September 1994 
when international reserves were almost exhausted (AusAID, 1996). Contractionary
218
policy measures were then successfully implemented by the PNG government which 
reduced the budget deficit to 2.3 per cent of GDP in 1994. Radical labour market 
reform undertaken in 1992 also helped regain price stability and competitiveness to a 
large extent by the end of 1994.
7.4.2.2 Exchange Rate and Trade Policy
After monetary independence in 1976, the PNG government undertook a series of 
revaluations of the nominal exchange rate during the second half of 1970s as discussed 
in Chapter 6. PNG revalued its exchange rate by 6.5 per cent in 1978, Indonesia and 
Nigeria devalued their nominal exchange rates in 1973. In 1978 while Indonesia 
undertook a large devaluation to restore export competitiveness eroded by the increased 
domestic inflation induced by the first oil boom, Nigeria also devalued its currency by 
10 per cent (Table 7.8).
Between 1970 and the mid-1980s, there were virtually no trade restriction in 
PNG and PNG was literally a ‘free-trade country’ which helped to keep the domestic 
price level lower than its major trading partners and prevented erosion of the 
competitiveness of the export sector. By contrast, both Indonesia and Nigeria followed 
increasingly restrictive trade policies. Indonesia adopted more protectionist trade 
policies from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s and increased protection rates even 
further after the second oil boom in 1983-84. Nigeria, pursued relatively open trade 
strategies during the 1973-74 period but after the second oil boom reverted towards a 
more restrictive trade regime during 1980-85.
As a result of the oil price decline in 1982-83, Nigeria faced a large balance of 
payments crisis as did Indonesia. In 1983, in the face of this crisis, Indonesia devalued
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its currency but increased trade restrictions. Nigeria held on to its fixed exchange rate 
policy and did not devalue its currency until the mid-1980s, when it also severely 
tightened import restriction by a series of quantitative trade restrictions (Little et al., 
1993). As a result, resources were diverted from the tradable to nontradable and import- 
competing sectors, put upward pressure on the domestic price level and rapidly 
appreciated the real exchange rates of these two countries.
From the mid-1980s, the trade regime of PNG also became more restrictive 
driven primarily by revenue collection motives. The rise in trade protection was 
accompanied by higher levels of tariffs, bans on certain food items, import quotas and 
special privileges for certain industries. This impacted severely on the cost structure of 
the rest of the economy and had a negative impact on domestic price level and 
competitiveness of the economy in the world market. This outcome is confirmed by the 
econometric results in Chapter 4, it indicating that the introduction of a restrictive trade 
regime from the mid-1980s appreciated the real exchange rate of PNG and significantly 
reduced the competitiveness of both export and import-competing sectors.
The nature of trade policy regimes plays a very important role in determining the 
outcome of a resources boom and the overall economic performance of a country. The 
difference in exchange rate and trade policies in these three countries had severe 
economic ramifications in later years. The next section attempts to analyse the impact 
of policy measures on the domestic price level and the relative price of tradables to 
nontradables for these economies.
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7.4.3 Comparison of the Effects of Booms
This section compares how external shocks and government policy measures in these 
three economies impacted upon domestic price levels, real exchange rates, employment 
and wages.
7.4.3.1 Domestic Price Level
Compared with Indonesia and Nigeria, the impact of the booms on the domestic price 
level was relatively moderate in PNG. Throughout the period 1970-82, Indonesia’s 
domestic price level remained higher than its major trading partners, with an average 
annual rate of inflation at about 16 per cent between 1975-82. In 1978, the GDP 
deflator had doubled from its 1971 level. The performance of the Nigerian economy 
was even worse in terms of inflation. The oil booms increased the inflation rate sharply 
in the mid-1970s as public spending rose dramatically, and the average annual rate of 
inflation was around 18 per cent between 1975-82 (Table 7.7). The high levels of 
industrial protection for domestic manufacturing were a major contributor to this rate. 
PNG’s incomes and wage restraint policies, coupled with a ‘hard kina’ exchange rate 
policy and a very open trade regime contributed to low inflation over the same period.
A 10 per cent devaluation of the kina in 1983, coupled with a more inward­
looking trade regime were major factors in causing higher domestic inflation from the 
mid-1980s. Another devaluation in 1990, large fiscal deficits during the first few years 
of the 1990s, and higher levels of trade protection for selected industries and goods, 
were mostly responsible for PNG having a higher inflation rate than its trading partners 
in the first half of 1990s.
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7.4.3.2 Real Exchange Rate
The movement of the real exchange rate gives some indication of the competitiveness of 
the tradable sector and the overall competitiveness of an economy compared with its 
major trading partners. This section attempts to trace how the various policy responses 
to the resources booms of the 1970s and early 1980s influenced real exchange rates in 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria.
Table 7.8 compares the import weighted real exchange rate, nominal exchange 
rate and domestic price level for these three economies. There is very little difference 
between import-weighted and trade-weighted real exchange rate indices that were used 
for the discussion in Chapter 4. Therefore, import-weighted real exchange rate has 
been used for this comparative study as it excludes the major booming commodities 
(e.g., oil, copper or other primary booming commodities) from the computation and 
focuses on the non-booming sectors.
The largest real exchange rate erosion was experienced by Nigeria whose real 
exchange rate doubled by the end of the second oil boom. The real exchange rate for 
Indonesia also started to appreciate in the wake of the first oil boom. Indonesia’s real 
exchange rate appreciated by more than 17 per cent in 1974. A large devaluation of the 
nominal exchange rate in 1978 temporarily helped restore competitiveness of the export 
sector for the next few years. The real exchange rate again started to appreciate with the 
second oil boom during 1980-81 and continued to appreciate until another devaluation 
was undertaken in 1983.
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Table 7.8: Import-Weighted Real Exchange Rates: 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria
(1980=100)
Inflation (per cent) Nominal Exchange Rate Real Exchange Rate
Year PNG Indonesia Nigeria PNG Indonesia Nigeria PNG Indonesia Nigeria
1970 3.0 12.4 13.6 127.2 43.4 99.8 114.6 91.8 156.0
1971 5.6 4.4 16.1 127.0 47.2 102.0 111.3 100.5 146.1
1972 3.5 6.4 2.8 126.4 54.1 100.6 110.5 113.2 148.5
1973 31.1 31.0 5.5 123.0 59.5 108,6 91.6 105.8 164.6
1974 7.5 40.6 12.5 122.0 58.1 100.5 102.7 87.6 154.5
1975 8.6 19.1 33.8 124.9 57.8 100.0 106.3 82.6 131.0
1976 3.8 19.8 24.2 113.5 56.7 92.8 100.3 74.2 108.7
1977 0.4 11.0 19.5 112.2 59.1 97.6 105.3 75.1 112.8
1978 5.6 8.1 18.6 104.9 70.1 107.9 97.4 86.2 109.0
1979 5.3 20.6 11.1 100.4 101.0 108.0 99.0 109.1 106.1
1980 13.4 18.5 11.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1981 11.9 12.2 20.9 101.0 98.7 96.8 96.7 94.3 87.8
1982 3.4 9.5 7.7 98.3 96.0 94.2 96.6 87.5 85.4
1983 14.1 11.8 18.9 107.2 128.9 93.7 96.0 107.9 72.4
1984 9.3 10.5 39.6 107.8 145.2 90.1 90.5 112.8 52.2
Note: Inflation = changes in domestic CPI; Nominal exchange rate = trade-weighted nominal effective 
exchange rate and Real exchange rate = import-weighted real exchange rate.
Source: Pinto (1987), Table 3, p.427. PNG’s exchange rate indices are constructed by the author.
PNG provides an interesting contrast to these two oil exporting countries. On 
average PNG’s real exchange rate showed a mild appreciation over the period of 1970- 
82. The real exchange rate started to appreciate in 1971, reflecting the impact of large 
foreign capital inflow and subsequent construction boom, due to establishment of the
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BCL mine (Table 7.8). High TOT over this period seem to have had a significant 
income effect on PNG’s real exchange rate behaviour. The real exchange appreciation 
in 1973 might also have been partially influenced by the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon 
associated with the resources boom in mineral and construction sector with high levels 
of government consumption. When domestic inflation peaked at around 31 per cent in 
1973, the import-weighted real exchange rate appreciated by almost 17 per cent.
Figure 7.2: Import-Weighted Real Exchange Rates: 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria
(1980-100)
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Source: Table 7.10.
Compared with Indonesia and Nigeria PNG’s real exchange rate was relatively 
stable on average up until the end of the decade (Figure 7.2). After 1973, a very slight 
appreciation of the real exchange rate is noticeable in 1976 and 1978. It should be
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pointed out that PNG’s real exchange rate depreciated substantially (about 5 per cent) in 
1977 when the economy was at the height of an agricultural commodity boom. PNG’s 
income and expenditure restraint policy, coupled with a sensible exchange rate policy 
and an open trade regime, at that time, can claim the full credit for this exceptional 
improvement of competitiveness of the tradable sector and domestic price stability. In 
1981, the real exchange rate appreciated 3 per cent and remained stable until 1984 when 
it appreciated another 6 per cent, due to higher domestic inflation than PNG’s major 
trading partners.
Indonesia’s real exchange rate depreciated during 1971-72, mainly because 
domestic inflation was lower than in its major trading partners. Indonesia’s real 
exchange rate started to appreciate in 1973 with the oil price hike and had appreciated 
18 per cent in 1974. A substantial real appreciation between 1973-77 reflects ‘Dutch 
disease’ effects associated with the high level of government consumption on the 
domestic nontradable sector which increased the price of nontradables compared to 
tradables and reduced non-oil export competitiveness. A 50 per cent depreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate in 1978 was mainly responsible for the real exchange rate 
depreciation between 1978-79. With the surge of second oil boom, Indonesia’s real 
exchange rate again started to appreciate in 1980, and continue to erode the 
competitiveness of non-oil tradable sector up until a second nominal devaluation 
undertaken in 1983 (Figure 7.2).
Nigeria’s real exchange rate remained overvalued even before the resources 
boom in the early 1970s. However, compared with PNG and Indonesia, Nigeria’s 
inflation rate was low, which ensured the depreciation of Nigeria’s real exchange rate in
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1973. As Nigeria started to have a large influx of export earnings associated with the oil 
boom in 1974, the real exchange rate began to appreciate, and by 1984 had appreciated 
more than 150 per cent whereas the nominal rate appreciated by only 12 per cent (Table 
7.10 and Figure 7.2). This reflects the loss of competitiveness of Nigeria’s tradable and 
exportable sector with a double digit inflation rate start continued over the rest of the 
decade. The over valued real exchange rate substantially reduced productive incentives 
for Nigeria’s non-oil tradable sector, particularly agriculture. Agricultural export 
revenue declined from over a billion dollars to less than a hundred million during the 
years of the oil boom (Taylor et ai, 1986).
During the resources boom of the early 1990s, PNG’s fiscal expansion, and a 
more closed trade regime, impacted adversely on the price of tradables. As the relative 
price of nontradables to tradables increased substantially during the 1991-93 period, 
PNG suffered from real exchange appreciation. However, the tradable sector was able 
to restore competitiveness to a large extent, due to an improvement in world market 
prices for PNG’s agricultural exports and the government adoption of stricter measures 
to implement more comprehensive income and wage restraint policies.
7.4.3.3 Employment and Wages
Nigeria’s population is overwhelmingly rural and concentrated in the South. Over 90 
per cent of food and export crop production is highly labour intensive and provided by 
small holders. From the early 1970s, the major constraint on agricultural production 
appears to have been a labour shortage, as the rural market was distorted by high 
opportunities for employment in nearby petroleum activities and other public works, 
construction and services provided by the state, all offering higher wages.
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Table 7.9: Sectoral Shifts of Employment in Nigeria
Sector Sectoral Shift 
Effect
Economic Growth 
Effect
Total
Change
Percentage
change
Agriculture -5.440 5.570 0.130 1.7
Oil and mining 0.068 0.018 0.086 1.2
Manufacturing 0.918 1.110 2.028 27.3
Services 4.454 0.732 5.186 69.8
Source: Oyejide (1986) Table 13, p.40.
Oyejide (1986) decomposed the effect of the oil boom on employment into a 
structural shift and economic growth effect. Table 7.9 indicates that total change in 
employment in the agricultural sector recorded a small increase. Thus, agriculture had a 
relative, but not absolute, fall in employment.
Table 7.10 indicates that nominal rural wage increased about five times over the 
1970-75 period. As the domestic CPI increased at a much slower rate than the nominal 
rural wage, the real rural wage rose rapidly over the period, and may have contributed to 
the decline in relative employment in the rural agricultural sector.
The major overall beneficiary from the oil boom in employment terms was the 
services sector, which accounted for a 70 per cent rise in employment compared with 
little more than a 27 per cent increase in the manufacturing sector. This empirical 
evidence supports the theoretical proposition of the booming sector that a resources 
boom shifts employment from the agricultural tradable sectors to the nontradable 
services sector. The increased employment in manufacturing can be explained as 
quantitative trade import restrictions increased the demand for import competing
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Table 7.10: Minimum Wage and Rural Wage Rate Indices 1970-82
(Naira/day, 1970=100)
Y e a r R u ra l W ag e  
N a ira /d a y
N a tio n a l M in im u m  C P I R ea l R u ra l W ag e
W ag e  
N a ira /d a y
R ea l N a tio n a l 
M in im u m  W ag e
1970 100 100 100 100 100
1971 177 100 116 153 86
1972 253 100 119 21 3 84
1973 3 3 0 100 127 2 6 0 79
1974 4 0 7 33 7 144 2 83 2 3 4
1975 48 3 33 7 161 3 0 0 2 0 9
1976 56 0 561 198 283 2 83
1977 6 3 7 561 231 2 7 6 243
1978 713 561 2 6 9 26 5 2 0 9
1979 867 64 5 3 0 0 2 8 9 21 5
1980 9 0 0 645 331 271 195
1981 9 3 4 7 02 4 0 0 233 176
1982 1000 70 2 431 2 3 2 163
S o u rce : O y e jid e  (1 9 8 6 )  T a b le  l , p . 17.
manufacturing sector which behaved like nontradables at the margin due to high 
protection.
Since the national minimum wage remained constant, with rising inflation, 
Nigeria’s national real minimum wage declined significantly over 1970-73 which might 
have created more opportunities for urban employment. From the mid-1970s, both the 
national real minimum wage increased rapidly, though the rate of change in wage rates 
became slower from 1980.
The Indonesian situation was very different. A strong regional labour market 
and surplus rural labour supply minimised the adverse affects of labour migration out of
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Table 7.11: Indonesian Sectoral Allocation of Employment (millions) 1971-1981
Sector Employment Annual Growth Estimated Employment
1971 1980 (%) 1973 1981
Agricultural 24.911 28.834 1.64 15.84 29.21
Mining .080 .387 19.14 .11 .46
M a n u fa c tu r in g 2.571 4.680 6.88 2.95 4.99
Utilities 0.034 .066 7.65 .04 .07
Construction 0.638 1.657 11.19 .79 1.83
Trade 4.073 6.679 5.65 4.56 7.04
Transport 0.900 1.468 5.59 1.01 1.54
Finance 0.087 .302 14.83 .12 .35
P u b lic  A d m in is tr a t io n 1.379a 2.223a 5.45 1.54 2.33
Other Services 2.916a 3.485 2.00a 3.05 3.54
Total 37.589 49.781 3.17 40.01 51.36
Note: a = adjusted.
Source: Sundrum (1986) Table: 15, p.59.
agriculture. Even at the height of oil boom, an abundant rural labour supply helped 
overcome the labour shortage in rice production.
There was no substantial increase in regional wage rates to attract labour from 
other regional rural production. Technological improvements in agriculture offset the 
high cost of labour in the labour shortage areas with employment rising by about 2 per 
cent per annum in the agricultural sector between 1971-81 (Scherr, 1989; Sundrum, 
1986). Among other non-mining sectors, the manufacturing and finance sectors 
accounted for the largest increase in employment both in absolute and relative terms 
between 1971 and 1981 (Table 7.11). Real wages also followed an increasing trend 
over the period except for a drop in real wages for 2-3 years following the 1978
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devaluation (Warr, 1986). Real wages in manufacturing increased about 56 per cent 
between 1970-82. The rise in the rural real wage ranged between 3 to 39 per cent over 
the period (Warr, 1986).
The growth in PNG’s formal employment in the agricultural sector was stagnant 
between 1970-80 although employment in agriculture increased in absolute terms over 
the period 1977-79. Since PNG’s labour supply is quite elastic, the booming mining 
sector did not compete with other traded sectors for labour resources. It was also found 
that on several occasions, supply of labour to the non-mining sector was complementary 
rather than competitive with the mining sector’s labour demand (Parson and Vincent, 
1991).
7.4.4 Sectoral Output Composition
Resources booms over the early 1970s to the early 1980s had an enormous impact on 
the key macroeconomic variables of these three economies. As discussed in the 
theoretical framework for this study, a resources boom affects the overall economy 
through a chain network of interaction among different macroeconomic variables. 
Increased revenue from a resources boom not only affects the allocation of factors of 
production, it affects demand and supply conditions in the product market. The flow of 
windfall revenue affects relative factor prices as well as relative product prices and the 
real exchange rate. Over time, a resources boom changes the sectoral composition of an 
economy, through changes in domestic inflation and the relative prices of traded to 
nontradable goods, that create changes in the competitiveness of a sector.
This section compares changes in sectoral composition for these three economies 
that were affected by the resources booms and government policy responses during the
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boom years from 1970-82, when the production structure of all three economies 
underwent a noticeable transformation. The share of the agricultural sector to GDP 
declined in all three countries to varying degrees. The share of the agricultural sector to 
GDP declined by 18 per cent in PNG, 45 per cent in Indonesia and 55 per cent in 
Nigeria from 1970 to 1982.
A tight management structure for macroeconomic policy was quickly established 
in PNG right after national and monetary independence in 1975. These sound 
macroeconomic policies made it possible for PNG to reduce the price instability brought 
about by a large influx of windfall revenue. The share of agriculture improved 
significantly, from 26 per cent in 1974 to 35 per cent in 1977, before declining to 32 per 
cent of GDP in 1982, due to depressed world market prices for PNG’s agricultural 
exports.
Over the period 1970-82, Indonesia was also successful in minimising the 
adverse effects of oil booms on the agricultural and manufacturing traded sectors. 
Increased government spending in the agricultural sector maintained steady growth in 
this sector, especially for food crops, with an average annual growth rate of 3.8 per cent, 
and a per capita growth rate of 1.5 per cent (Scherr, 1989). The output of rice grew an 
average of 3.7 per cent in 1977-82 (Gelb and Associates, 1988).
By 1982-83, Indonesia’s food output per capita reached 133 per cent higher 
compared to 106 per cent for world per capita food output from its 1968-72 level.
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Table 7.12: Sectoral Composition of GDP in PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria
1970 and 1982
1 9 7 0 1 9 8 2
(%  o f  G D P ) P N G In d o n e s ia N ig e r ia P N G In d o n e s ia N ig e r ia
A g r ic u ltu r e 4 0 4 7 4 9 33 2 6 2 2
M in in g  an d  O il 2 5  * 12* 17* 8 14 3 0
M a n u fa c tu r in g 0 .9 10 7 10 16 6
S e r v ic e s 41 3 6 3 4 4 0 3 0 4 7
N o te :  * f ig u r e s  re fer  to  1 9 7 3 .  
S o u rc e : W o r ld  B a n k  ( 1 9 9 3 )
Though the contribution of agricultural output to GDP declined from 47 per cent in 
1970 to 26 per cent in 1982, Indonesia managed to raise the supply of domestic food 
and agricultural products in absolute terms. The value of agricultural exports rose 
compared to food imports, with a ratio of 1 to 0.68 during 1973-81, and total 
agricultural income also increased substantially (Scherr, 1989).
Most Indonesian manufacturing output was imperfect substitutes (partially 
traded) for imported goods and behaved as nontradables under quantitative trade 
restrictions. As a result, despite a large increase in nontradable goods and services 
during the boom years, Indonesia’s manufacturing sector expanded, due to imperfect 
substitutability with imported goods. There was also buoyant small scale sector linking 
into agricultural income growth and supported by the spread of rural infrastructure (Hill, 
1996). Sundrum (1986) explained the rapid growth in manufacturing as a result of 
rising investment in this sector, together with a sharp rise in demand for these products. 
Higher levels of consumption spending also helped stimulate the growth of the 
manufacturing sector.
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In contrast, Nigeria’s agricultural performance was dismal over the 1970-82 
period. Nigeria’s once diversified commodity export sector declined sharply in the 
presence of the oil boom. Nigeria’s inward-looking trade regime created several 
adverse effects for the agricultural traded sector. High import tariffs taxed agricultural 
exports, by increasing the price of imported agricultural inputs such as machinery, 
fertiliser and other chemical inputs. Hence, high levels of protection for industry were 
responsible for reducing the domestic price of agricultural tradables relative to domestic 
prices of industrial tradables and prices of nontradables. This change in relative prices 
also had an incentive effect on the labour market, with labour, and other inputs, moving 
out of agriculture to manufacturing and the nontradable sector over the period. This 
declining flow of rural labour exerted upward pressure on the rural wage rate, which 
tripled during 1970-75, thereby increasing the production cost for agricultural exports. 
A fall in relative output prices and higher relative labour input and other agricultural 
input prices were also responsible for the fall in profitability of agricultural tradables. 
Annual production declined by 65 per cent for cotton, 25 per cent for rubber, and 43 per 
cent for cocoa which brought an average annual 30 per cent decline for export cash crop 
output over the period (Scherr, 1989). Only the production of palm kernel and palm oil 
rose, by 30 and 23 per cent, respectively, as this sector was highly protected by the 
agricultural pricing policy.
Imports of food grains displaced domestic production, depressing Nigeria’s 
agricultural share in GDP from 49 per cent in 1970 to 22 per cent in 1982. Per capita 
food production was stagnant and throughout the period total agricultural production 
declined slowly. The share of the agricultural labour force also declined by 21 per cent 
over the period (from 75 per cent to 59 per cent of total employment). Agricultural
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export production declined at an average annual rate of 5.7 per cent between 1968 and 
1978 and 7.1 per cent between 1978 and 1984. After 1975, agricultural imports grew 
significantly, which worsened the balance of payments situation in 1975-76. From 
being a net exporter of agricultural goods, Nigeria became a net importer.
The mining and oil sectors of all three economies increased substantially. 
PNG’s mining sector share to GDP increased from 0.8 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 
1974 and then declined to 8 per cent in 1982. In the same years, Indonesia’s oil sector 
share occupied 14 per cent and Nigeria’s 30 per cent which was much higher than the 
1970 level.
From 1970 to 1982, the share of the manufacturing sector to GDP rose from 5 to 
10 per cent in PNG and from 10 to 16 per cent in Indonesia. But the share of Nigeria’s 
manufacturing sector to GDP declined from 7 per cent in 1970 to 6 per cent in 1982 
(Table 7.12). The contribution of the services sector declined in both PNG and 
Indonesia in 1982 from the 1970 level but Nigeria’s services sector grew by 38 per cent 
over the same period, as predicted by the theory of the "Dutch disease’ discussed in 
Chapter 2.
7.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter provides a comparative study of the movements of key macroeconomic 
variables, relative prices, employment and wages and sectoral transformation of PNG, 
Indonesia and Nigeria in response to resources booms over 1970-82 and also the early 
1990s in PNG.
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It is found that, although the timing and magnitude of the booms were similar, 
the outcome was significantly different, due, in the main, to differences in 
macroeconomic policy responses, particularly, those in relation to trade regimes by the 
respective governments.
Although Indonesia managed the oil booms reasonably well, it performed worse, 
in terms of government spending and controlling the inflation rate, which was reflected 
in appreciation of the real exchange rate during the 1972-82 period. Increased spending 
on domestically produced goods and services, coupled with import restrictions in the 
form of high tariffs and subsidies, fuelled domestic inflation and exacerbated the real 
exchange rate appreciation. However, adopting a prudent external borrowing strategy, 
Indonesia was able to reduce its total debt and debt service ratio below 13 per cent by 
the end of 1970s. Indonesia’s development expenditures were more evenly distributed 
across rural and urban infrastructure, industry, education and social services than in 
PNG and Nigeria.
Along with the oil shocks, Nigeria also faced several policy induced shocks. 
Several micro and macroeconomic policies contributed to a dismal performance for the 
agricultural sector at a time of high overall GDP growth. Nigeria underwent dramatic 
sectoral transformation over the period. Supported by high government spending and 
various forms of trade restrictions, the country’s production structure shifted in favour 
of the nontradable sector. The agricultural sector was particularly hard hit as this sector 
received less attention despite its important role in the economy. High levels of 
inflation compared with major trading partners reduced the competitiveness of the 
Nigerian tradable sector sharply which was reflected in perpetual real exchange 
appreciation from 1974.
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Compared with Indonesia and Nigeria, PNG managed to maintain stability by 
the application of conservative macroeconomic policies in the context of an open trade 
regime. Given the lack of an indigenous capital goods sector, a low level of 
industrialisation and an insignificant manufacturing sector, resources booms in the 
1970s did not adversely affect PNG’s export oriented tradable sector. An appreciating 
nominal exchange rate reduced the cost of imported capital and intermediate goods over 
the 1970s. Overheating of the economy was avoided by sensible application of 
expenditure management and wage restraint policies. One of the major reasons PNG 
was able to maintain a stable price level during and after the boom years in the second- 
half of 1970s, compared with Indonesia and Nigeria that the trade regime was virtually 
open, which helped reduce pressure on the domestic price level and prevented 
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
It can be concluded that these three economies were all affected by ‘Dutch 
disease’ to a varying extent. Nigeria was greatly affected, and showed all the symptoms 
of the damaging consequences of the ‘disease’ over the years of the oil boom. Indonesia 
was also affected by ‘Dutch disease’, as it was not able to restrain government spending 
and the inflation rate at a desirable level over 1970-82. PNG’s prudent macroeconomic 
policies, including a reduced flow of Australian aid and budgetary grants and an open 
trade regime, substantially offset the adverse ‘spending effects’ of a resources boom 
over these years and prevented the economy from falling prey to ‘Dutch disease’.
However, PNG failed to maintain fiscal discipline during the mineral boom in 
the early 1990s. As well, an increasingly restrictive trade regime was introduced from 
the mid-1980s, and a continuous fiscal deficit from 1990 added extra pressure on the
236
domestic price level. Domestic political instability in the late-1980s has also 
contributed to lower production and overall stability of the economy. As a result the 
real exchange rate appreciated significantly during the 1991-93 period and the economy 
lost international competitiveness. A radical wages policy reform, undertaken in 1992, 
together with stricter fiscal and monetary policies, reduced reliance on foreign aid and 
grants, and the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime improved competitiveness of 
the country from the end of 1994.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Introduction
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of resources booms in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) during the period 1970-94 and the effect of the government’s policy 
response to these booms on the process of economic adjustment. The major emphasis is 
on how the real exchange rate responds both to the shocks and to the different policy 
measures undertaken by the government. The thesis continues to investigate the impact 
of resources booms on the sectoral composition of output, and savings and investment 
behaviour. Finally, a comparative study of policy responses to resources booms in 
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria between 1973 and 1982 is undertaken to investigate the 
different outcomes of these booms and reasons underlying such differences.
The analytical framework of the study is based on the theory of booming sector 
economics, beginning with the core ‘Dutch disease’ model, where a resources boom is 
assumed to be of a permanent nature, and considers the consequences of a resources 
boom in a short-run comparative static framework. The core model is based on a 
number of restrictive assumptions and on the experiences of a developed country. It has 
been extended to make it applicable to the economy of PNG by incorporating the effects 
of openness in the labour market, capital market and trade regime in the context of a 
small open economy. Most resources booms are temporary with implications for the 
long-run growth of an economy through intertemporal choices between consumption
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and savings. The long-run dynamic analysis of resources booms using the theory of 
‘construction boom’ has also been incorporated in to the study.
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the outline of the 
thesis; Chapter 2 reviews the booming sector’s literature and discusses the analytical 
framework of the thesis. The core ‘Dutch disease’ model is extended to take into 
account the different types of openness in the labour market, capital market and 
international trade regimes in developing countries. The theory of ‘construction boom’ 
is also discussed in this chapter in an attempt to capture the long-run dynamic impact of 
a resources boom. Chapter 3 surveys the structure and recent development of the PNG 
economy to set the stage for the ensuing analysis.
Chapters 4 and 5 measure the key economic relations to provide the empirical 
base for the analysis. The ideal methodology is a comprehensive macroeconometric 
model which captures the key relationships suggested by the theory, but given the 
nature of data availability this approach was not feasible in the context of the PNG 
economy. Therefore, the methodology chosen is a case study approach bringing 
together single equation estimates of behavioural relations involving key 
macroeconomic variables and other relevant information, both quantitative and 
qualitative, in order to shed light on the key theoretical propositions. Chapter 4 provides 
an econometric analysis of the determinants of the real exchange rate in PNG using the 
General to Specific Modelling procedure. The Error Correction Modelling procedure 
was employed to guard against estimating spurious regression relationships while 
retaining long-run information. The sectoral impact of real exchange rate movements
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and the long-run growth of the PNG economy is also empirically evaluated in Chapter 5 
by estimating private and total savings functions.
Chapter 6 identifies the major resources booms experienced by PNG, and the 
changes in key macroeconomic variables and their impact on the structure of the 
economy during 1970-94 period. The analysis of this chapter attempts to test the 
theoretical propositions from Chapter 2 and draws upon the results of the econometric 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 7, PNG’s policy responses to booms are 
compared with those of two other resource-rich countries -  Indonesia and Nigeria in 
order to place policy implication of the findings in perspective.
8.2 Summary of Findings
In a resources boom, the real exchange rate of a country changes. Since this indicates 
changes in the competitiveness of a country in the world market, the investigation began 
by constructing three different versions of real exchange rate indices for PNG. The 
results suggest that the major factors behind the real exchange rate movements in PNG 
included changes in government expenditure, growth of money supply over the growth 
of GDP, long-run capital inflow, foreign aid flow and changes in the nominal exchange 
rate. The findings are consistent with the theoretical propositions of the extended model 
of a resources boom. This empirical result also points out appreciation of the trade- 
weighted real exchange rate was amplified due to a sharp increase in CPI in 1973 which 
contains both tradable and nontradable items. A substantial price increase in tradable 
commodities exaggerated the rise in CPI in 1973. However, a substantial depreciation 
of the real exchange was achieved, through income and wage restraint policies and 
maintaining an open trade regime during the height of the agricultural boom in 1976-77.
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During 1991-93, a real appreciation of kina was induced by the mineral boom and was 
aggravated by continuous budget deficits.
There is also evidence in the econometric results on sectoral growth that 
depreciation of the real exchange rate leads to expansion of the output of the tradable 
sector, whereas appreciation of the real exchange rate enhances growth of the 
nontradable sector. Depreciation of the real exchange rate had a positive effect on the 
output of the agriculture, manufacturing and mineral sector, while the output of the 
nontradable sector as a whole, as well as the construction sector, declined. This result is 
consistent with the theoretical propositions of booming sector economics. There is also 
evidence that PNG households perceived the temporary nature of resources booms 
correctly and behaved rationally while dealing with the windfall gain. This is reflected 
in the higher savings during the boom years. PNG’s less developed capital market 
prompted the private sector of the economy to invest in the nontradable activities, 
primarily in construction, during the boom years. This behaviour is consistent with the 
propositions of the ‘construction boom’ theory.
The study then discusses major resources booms and macroeconomic policy 
management. Since PNG did not have independent monetary system (it came under the 
Australian system) during the boom years of the early 1970s, it could not pursue an 
independent monetary and exchange rate policy, PNG mainly followed an expansionary 
fiscal policy which contained a large increase in wages and salaries and government 
consumption. After independence, PNG maintained a prudent macroeconomic policy 
stance during the agricultural boom in 1976-77. Domestic absorption was not permitted 
to adjust automatically to the availability of income by the setting up of various
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Stabilisation funds (example, MRSF and CPSF). Balances were maintained in the 
external accounts by appropriate stabilisation measures. This sound income and wage 
restraint policy coupled with reduced dependence on Australian aid contributed to 
domestic price stability and prevented real exchange rate appreciation at the height of 
the agricultural boom of 1977-78. Furthermore, during the 1970s a very open trade 
regime contributed to a more stable real exchange rate in PNG to a great extent.
However, PNG failed to maintain fiscal discipline during the mineral boom of 
the early 1990s. An increasingly restrictive trade regime was introduced from the mid- 
1980s, and a continuous fiscal deficit from 1990 added extra pressure on the domestic 
price level. Domestic political instability in the late-1980s also contributed to lower 
production and overall stability of the economy. As a result, during 1991-93 the real 
exchange rate appreciated significantly and the economy lost international 
competitiveness. The situation improved significantly by the end of 1994 and PNG 
regained its competitiveness to a large extent as a result of a radical labour market 
reform, flotation of its currency, improved world market prices for PNG’s agricultural 
exports and a stricter fiscal policy.
Finally, the consequences of PNG’s booms and adjustment episodes are 
compared with those of Indonesia and Nigeria. The purpose of the comparative study 
was to determine the underlying causes for the variant performance of these economies 
in the face of resources booms. It has been found that, although the magnitudes of the 
booms during 1970-82 were similar, the impact on the domestic economies of PNG, 
Indonesia and Nigeria was distinctively different. Different policy measures were found 
to be the main contributors to the different outcomes for these three economies.
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Compared with Indonesia and Nigeria, PNG managed to maintain stability by the 
application of conservative macroeconomic policies in the context of an open trade 
regime. PNG kept a tight control over government spending, especially when revenues 
were rising very fast, holding down real wages and making an early response to a 
worsening balance of payments, rather than financing the deficit in the expectation of 
recovery. Over the second half of the 1970s, PNG also reduced its reliance on 
Australian budgetary grants and maintained a high levels of reserves and unused foreign 
borrowing capacity and was therefore able to avoid the adverse consequences of 
resources booms.
One of the major reasons why PNG was able to maintain price stability during, 
and after, the boom years in the second-half of 1970s when compared with Indonesia 
and Nigeria, was a virtually open trade regime. An open trade regime helped 
maintaining the domestic price level largely at par with that in its major trading partners. 
Whereas, after the oil booms, Indonesia and Nigeria adopted increasingly more 
restrictive trade policies to encourage domestic production, which diverted resources 
from the tradable to nontradable and import-competing sectors and put upward pressure 
on the domestic price level, rapidly appreciating the real exchange rates.
A real devaluation was restored temporarily in Indonesia, through a substantial 
nominal devaluation in 1978, although this devaluation exacerbated the inflation to a 
double digit figure over the next few years which quickly took the real exchange rate 
back to its old levels. As the Nigerian authorities lacked farsightedness in 
macroeconomic policy Nigeria fell prey to the classical ‘Dutch disease’ syndrome. The 
oil booms, coupled with high government spending and various forms of trade
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restrictions, shifted the production structure of the country in favour of nontradables. 
Nigeria’s once diversified commodity export sector declined, due to lack of appropriate 
policy management in the face of the resources booms. The country shifted from being 
a net exporter of foods grains to being a net importer.
Why was PNG unable to maintain economic stability in the early 1990s after 
performing relatively better in managing its resources booms during the 1970s? The 
findings of this study suggest three main reasons. First, PNG lost fiscal discipline in the 
early 1990s, and the country was experiencing continuous budget deficits which reached 
6 per cent of GDP in 1993. Expansionary fiscal pressures eroded the international 
reserves of the Central Bank, creating a currency crisis which forced a change to PNG’s 
fixed exchange rate regime in October 1994. Second, a shift to an inward-looking trade 
regime and the centralised wage fixation policies added to the pressure on the domestic 
price level, eroding the international competitiveness of domestic production. By 
contrast, the radical wages reform policy undertaken in 1992, stricter fiscal and 
monetary policies, reduced reliance on foreign aid and the adoption of a floating 
exchange rate regime improved the competitiveness of the country from the end of 
1994.
8.3 Lessons from the PNG Experience
From this detailed discussion of resources booms and macroeconomic adjustment in 
PNG, there are some important possible lessons for other developing countries.
It has been found that appropriate policy management has the most important 
bearing on the outcome of a resources boom. A conservative approach is required to
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maintain a stable domestic price level. Well disciplined fiscal and monetary policy, as 
well as maintaining a more open trade regime, can ensure an efficient economic 
performance. One good example was the activity of the Mineral Resources Stabilisation 
Funds (MRSF) in PNG during the mid-1970s to the early 1980s when it built up the 
resource capacity to deal with slump periods and helped maintain stability in the 
domestic price level.
An economy needs to be flexible in the internal factor market. By reducing 
pressure on the domestic price level, flexibility in labour markets can also reduce the 
production cost of tradable during the boom years and maintain the competitiveness of 
the tradable sector by reducing the price ratio of tradables to nontradables. This will 
generate employment and encourage the expansion of the tradable sector which will 
reap the maximum benefit from a positive trade shock.
An outward-oriented trade policy in the boom years can help develop a strong 
export base. By maintaining domestic prices of tradables in line with world prices, an 
open trade regime can also prevent rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
improve competitiveness of exports in the world market. A nominal devaluation can 
help in this respect. Reduced foreign aid during the boom years can reduce the upward 
pressure on the domestic price level by reducing the spending effect on the nontradable 
sector.
Increased savings and investment on foreign assets can prevent the pressure on 
the domestic price level that arises from a resources boom. Investing in foreign assets 
would be optimal as this protects the real value of windfall gains by holding foreign
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assets during the boom period and repatriating them when the nontradable capital price 
drops after the end of the boom. Thus, the investment boom can be spread out over a 
longer period and the relative price of ‘construction’ can be moderated by building up 
foreign financial assets during the boom years. Repatriated foreign assets can also be 
used in the post-boom period to finance a higher level of consumption.
8.4 Qualifications and Suggestions for Further Research
This study is the first attempt to systematically undertake the theoretical and empirical 
analysis of a resources boom for the economy of PNG. It is therefore pertinent to 
comment briefly on some limitations of the analysis which should receive due 
consideration in assessing the policy relevance of the results. The behavioural 
relationship estimated in these models seem to be statistically satisfactory, both in terms 
of the overall explanatory power and the significance and sign of the coefficients of 
explanatory variables. The performance of these model as a whole is also satisfactory in 
terms of replicating the actual performance of the economy over the sample period. 
However, apart from these favourable statistical properties, first, as in any statistical 
analysis, the results of the study may be accepted with reservations as to the quality of 
the data. All the data series were taken from standard (secondary) sources with due 
consideration to consistency and comparability. Second, the results are essentially 
specific to the sample period and, therefore, care should be taken if extensions beyond 
the period are required. For instance, the economy was under a fixed exchange rate and 
central wage fixation system until 1992. Consequently, various forms of trade 
restrictions were introduced from mid-1980 to reconcile with the fall in export revenue 
in the early 1980s.
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Further research is needed to provide helpful insights for policy makers to 
design and implement specific policy measures (for example trade policy) to utilise a 
windfall gain appropriately. Two important aspects call for future research. First, the 
findings suggest the importance of maintaining an open trade regime to gain higher 
welfare from a resources boom. Since trade liberalisation can improve the output of the 
tradable sector and improve the competitiveness of the economy by preventing a rise in 
the domestic price level, further research on trade liberalisation in resource-rich 
economies could be a useful area for future research. The conclusion on the importance 
of a more open trade regime is based on limited (readily available) data and a priori 
reasoning. Unavailability of required data on trade restrictions prevented the 
undertaking of an extensive investigation into the outcomes of the openness of the trade 
regime in PNG.
Second, a study of economy-wide effects of booms using a computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model could also be a very useful area of future research. This 
approach provides for examining the impact of a resources boom while appropriately 
controlling the impact of other relevant factors such as trade liberalisation, labour 
market conditions, the likely decline of aid and budget grants, and changes in fiscal 
operation. The general case study approach used in this study was largely dictated by 
the nature of readily available data, and the time and financial constraints on 
undertaking a major data generation effort.
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Statistical Appendix:
Supplementary Statistical Tables, Notes and Basic Data
Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A3.1: Social Development Indicators
S o c ia l D e v e lo p m e n t In d ic a to r Papua New Guinea 
1970-75* 1992
Lower middle income 
countries 1992
Low income 
countries 1992
Total population (’000) 2730 4055 941000 3191300
Urban population (% of total 12 16 54 39
population)
Average annual growth rate of 
population* 1 (%)
2.4 2.3 1.7 2.0
Life expectancy at birth (years)3 47 56.5 67 62
Infant mortality b 134 67 45 73
Total fertility rate 6.0 5.0 3.1 3.4
F o o d , H ea lth  a n d  N u tr it io n
Daily per capita 
calorie supply (cal)d
2090 2403 2768 2406
Daily per capita 
protein supply (cal)d
41 49 72 n.a.
Index of food production 
per capita (1979/8 l = 100)e
104 97 101 119
Population per physician
(number)
11733 12874 2850 6760
Access to safe water (% of urban 30 93 78 n.a
population)
E d u c a tio n
Primary school enrolment (%) 56 73 100 105
Secondary school enrolment (%) 12 13 56 41
Adult literacy rate (%) 32 52 74 60
A n n u a l e n e r g y  c o n su m p tio n 206 231 1102 376
per head (kg oil equivalent8)
Source: AusAID (1996), (1995).
Notes: * The reference period refers to 1971
1. The population growth rate in 1992 is for 1980-93
a. Latest year in 1993.
b. Number per thousand live births.
c. Number of children per woman.
d. The most recent estimate refers to 1990.
e. For low income countries, the most recent estimate refers to 1990.
f. This ratio could exceed 100 per cent because of the possibility of enrolment 
by persons outside the age group designated as primary or secondary 
school-age population.
g. Relatively high energy consumption levels are largely due to the requirements of mining 
projects.
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Table A3.2: Growth Rate of Real GDP and Inflation
in Papua New Guinea 1970-94
1990=100
Y ear <Growth rate of real GDP 
(1990=100)
CPI G D P-deflator Inflation-CPi Inflation-
GDPdeflator
1970 10.4 24.97 27.19 4.50 5.32
1971 6.30 26.37 28.12 5.60 3.41
1972 5.64 27.29 30.12 3.50 7.13
1973 6.53 35.78 36.07 31.11 17.74
1974 2.61 38.47 39.28 7.54 8.92
1975 -0.88 41.77 40.18 8.57 2.27
1976 -3.39 43.34 48.10 3.77 19.74
1977 0.83 43.52 51.68 0.40 7.44
1978 8.55 45.93 50.63 5.55 -2.03
1979 1.83 48.35 58.78 5.26 16.10
1980 -2.30 54.82 62.94 13.38 7.09
1981 0.18 61.33 61.85 11.88 -1.75
1982 0.32 63.42 64.14 3.41 3.71
1983 3.02 72.36 76.26 14.10 18.89
1984 -0 56 79.07 82.10 9.27 7 6 6
1985 4.34 77.55 83.16 -1.92 1.29
1986 4.92 78.35 84.10 1.03 1.14
1987 2.60 81.87 90.96 4.49 8.15
1988 2.99 89.30 98.09 9.08 7.84
1989 -1.86 94.02 96.02 5.28 -2.11
1990 -3.01 100.00 100.00 6.37 4.14
1991 10.17 105.42 106.39 5.42 6.39
1992 12.46 109.91 108.62 4.26 2.10
1993 17.54 117.82 111.14 7.20 2.32
1994 3.10 123.20 119.05 4.57 7.11
Source: Constructed from various issues, World Bank, World Tables and Bank of Papua New Guinea, 
Quarterly Economic Bulletins.
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Table A3.3: Government Revenues and Expenditures 1971-1994
(Million of kina in current prices)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994
G D P 531.0 1004.0 1708.1 2423 .9 3076.0 5016.0 5411.0
T o ta l  rev e n u e  a n d  g ra n ts 162.8 317.1 519.1 739.2 998.0 1309.0 1446.0
Tax revenue 46.6 100.1 239.6 404.3 592.0 718.0 852.0
Non-tax revenue 16.2 44.7 47.5 102.2 161.0 133.0 148.0
MRSF . . . 34.7 56.6 17.2 6.0 276.0 283.0
Foreign grants 100.0 137.6 175.4 215.5 239 .0 182.0 163.0
T o ta l  e x p e n d itu re 222.1 373.9 597.3 787.3 1089.0 1605.0 1570.0
Current expenditure 109.0 330.5 474.1 729.2 937.0 1392.0 1443
Capital expenditure 113.1 43 .4 123.2 58.1 152.0 213.0 127.0
O v e ra l l  d e fic it 140.7 56.8 78.2 48.1 91 296 .0 125.0
Source: Constructed from World Bank, Table 5.1, Report No. 3544a-PNG,(1981), Table 5.1 and Table 
5.2, Report No. 9396-PNG, (1991), and AusAID (1996), Table A13, Table A15, Table A17 and Table 
A18.
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Table A3.4: Minerals and Agricultural Exports of PNG 1971-94
(current prices, US dollar million)
Y ear Mining
Exports
Agricultural
Exports
Non-mining
Exports
Total Exports
1971 0.62 53.24 67.50 89.67
1972 19.40 43.09 58.72 106.85
1973 88.62 37.66 51.73 160.72
1974 216.32 68.66 100.53 333.75
1975 182.48 99.71 123.50 321.86
1976 159.11 82.32 101.91 287.32
1977 147.26 227.52 267.89 438.37
1978 164.65 148.18 189.36 400.16
1979 254.96 196.32 243.39 538.75
1980 216.01 154.30 214.00 471.81
1981 201.40 110.62 164.89 379.49
1982 224.29 121.58 180.12 422.84
1983 309.67 192.15 245,10 570.54
1984 290.85 338.73 420.35 731.58
1985 489.90 330.20 409.60 926.20
1986 544.36 321.94 402.07 970.78
1987 650.56 244.70 355.63 1022.11
1988 749.51 222.02 313.37 1092.72
1989 601.73 240.39 333.22 989.32
1990 727.20 196.42 280.70 1077.50
1991 955.04 194.37 289.94 1320.98
1992 1330.36 369.57 475.79 1806.72
1993 1732.44 674.24 744.02 2476.46
1994 1693.85 836.00 854.05 2547.90
Note: * Some total export entries are not equal to the sum o f mining exports and non-mining exports 
because o f omission of other minor exports items and re-exports.
Source: Constructed from Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), 
AusAID (1996).
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Table A3.5: Minerals and Agricultural Exports of PNG 1971-94
(current prices, Kina million)
Year GDP Mining Agriculture Non-mining
Exports3
Total
Exports
1971 645.4 0.7 60.5 69.9 127.2
1972 788.8 23.1 51.3 69.9 127.2
1973 1040.6 126.6 53.8 73.9 229.6
1974 1004.0 313.5 99.5 145.7 483.7
1975 1068.4 240.1 131.2 162.5 402.6
1976 1251.3 201.4 104.2 129.0 363.7
1977 1298.5 186.4 288.0 339.1 554.9
1978 1413.3 231.9 208.7 266.7 563.6
1979 1632.5 359.1 276.5 342.8 758.8
1980 1708.1 322.4 230.3 319.4 704.2
1981 1696.9 300.6 165.1 246.1 566.4
1982 1764.7 303.1 164.3 243.4 571.4
1983 2145.4 373.1 231.5 295.3 687.4
1984 2282.2 326.8 380.6 472.3 822.0
1985 2402.2 489.9 330.2 436.3 926.2
1986 2572.4 561.2 331.9 414.5 1000.8
1987 2854.5 714.9 268.9 390.8 1123.2
1988 3169.9 861.5 255.2 360.2 1256.0
1989 3045.7 676.1 270.1 374.4 1111.6
1990 3076.1 758.0 205.0 365.0 1123.0
1991 3605.5 1005.4 204.6 384.6 1390.0
1992 4139.6 1371.5 224.0 491.5 1862.6
1993 5016.0 1767.8 270.0 759.2 2527.0
1994 5411.0 1783.0 375.0 899.0 2682.0
Note: a. Non-mining exports include the export value of agriculture, forestry, marine and other re­
exports, * Some total export entries are not equal to the sum of mining exports and non-mining exports 
because of omission of other minor exports items and re-exports.
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), AusAID (1996), 
(1997).
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Table A3.6: Total Labour Force and Wage Employment in PNG
1968-93 (persons)
Y ear Total
Labour Force
Formal W age 
employment*
Public
Service
Elcom plus 
PTC
Private
em ploym ent
Mining
1968 1060704 161540 (15.2) 28093 918 130878 1651
1969 1079456 174648 (16.2) 32796 1411 138245 2229
1970 1098540 182642 (16.6) 33804 1556 144589 2693
1971 1126413 183633 ((16.3) 36335 1588 142245 3465
1972 1154993 178594 (15.5) 37452 1716 134263 5163
1973 1184299 176734 (14.9) 40516 1612 130138 4468
1974 1214348 176008 (14.5) 43389 1599 125838 5182
1975 1245160 175429 (14.1) 46465 1760 122081 5153
1976 1262390 174825 (13.9) 49759 1833 118710 4523
1977 1279859 185160 (14.5) 49700 1913 128893 4654
1978 1297570 186943 (14.4) 49742 2288 130053 4860
1979 1315525 194129 (14.8) 50936 2189 136111 4893
1980 1333730 213000 (16.0) 52862 2744 152351 5043
1981 1357762 206816 (15.2) 54728 2659 143328 6101
1982 1382227 196505 (14.2) 52858 4724 130181 8742
1983 1407133 196494 (14.0) 49493 4746 132759 9496
1984 1432488 200871 (14.0) 51460 5001 138023 6387
1985 1458300 204772 (14.1) 51682 4672 142551 5867
1986 1479964 208111 (14.1) 49926 5072 146073 7040
1987 1501951 212908 (14.2) 50099 5363 149427 8019
1988 1524264 218107 (14.3) 49076 5288 154496 9247
1989 1546908 228590 (14.8) 49274 5199 166033 8084
1990 1569890 218957 (14.0) 50309 5143 158174 5331
1991 1587462 213217 (13.4) 50823 4879 152232 5283
1992 1605231 - - - - - 156071 5653
1993 1623198 — — — 151090 5600
Note: * Formal wage employment as percentage of total labour force is given in bracket. 
— : not available
Source: World Bank (1995), AIDAB (1993) Table 3.1 and AusAID (1997) Table Al l .
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Appendix to Chapter 4
TABLE A4.1: Nominal and Real Exchange Rate Indices
( 1990= 100)
Y ear NEER-import NEER-export N EER-trade RER1-import RER1-export R ER 1-trade
1970 110.10 77.18 93.29 119.1 117.1 122.3
1971 109.95 77.16 93.19 115.6 113.0 118.2
1972 109.44 77.68 92,98 114.8 112.3 117.1
1973 106.47 75.11 89.82 95.2 92.6 96.4
1974 105.61 73.78 88.71 106.7 104.2 108.4
1975 108.13 77.24 92.01 110.3 106.6 111.3
1976 98.27 73.32 85.53 104.3 103.5 106.5
1977 97.14 75.03 85 65 109.5 109.9 111.8
1978 90.82 73.82 81.85 101.2 103.5 103.9
1979 86.90 70.15 78.21 102.8 101.5 103.7
1980 86.59 69.07 77.33 103.9 100.8 103.7
1981 87.06 67.58 76.94 99.4 92.5 97.5
1982 85.15 66.83 75.94 99.4 92.5 97 7
1983 92.81 72.69 82.92 98.8 89.5 95.9
1984 93.33 71.91 83.03 94.0 82.8 90.3
1985 90.35 79.05 85.50 96.0 94.7 97.2
1986 87.86 84.00 86.64 92.8 96.6 96.0
1987 89.71 91.78 91.09 94.3 101.3 98.5
1988 93.31 88.76 91.03 95.3 92.5 94.2
1989 90.23 86.04 88.37 91 6 88 4 90 5
1990 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991 100.18 101.40 101.07 96.2 97.5 97.4
1992 97.23 99.94 99.09 90.3 92.6 92.2
1993 97.66 101.85 100.22 85.5 87.8 87.3
1994 131.21 137.16 134.27 110.3 112.9 112.0
Note: NEER = nominal effective exchange rate and RER1 = trade-weighted real exchange rate. Three 
different nominal and real exchange rate indices are constructed by using import share, export share and 
trade share as weights.
Source: Author’s computation using data from World Bank World Tables, IMF International Financial 
Statistics, Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins, various issues.
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TABLE A4.2 : Test for Unit Roots
Variables Data series DF/ADF Statistics 
Ho: 1(1) versus 
Ha: 1(0)
R eal incom e (real G D P ) Y - 2 .2 5  ( 1 )
T rade-w eighted  real exchan ge rate RER1 - 4 .2 5  ( 0 )*
R eal exchan ge rate defined  as EPI/C PI RER2 -3 .3 1  ( 0 )*
R eal exchan ge rate defined  as IP1/CPI RER3 - 2 .2 7  ( 0 )
N om ina l effective exchan ge rate NEER - 1 . 3 7 ( 0 )
E xternal term s o f  trade TOT - 3 .4 1  (0 )*
O p en ness o f  trad e regim e OP - 1 .6 5  ( 0 )
M oney supply MS - 2 .0 9  ( 0 )
G overn m en t exp en d itu re to G D P GEX 1 .0 0  ( 0 )
G ross investm ent to G D P GIY - 4 .4 5  ( 0 )*
L ag net long term  cap ita l inflow NKI - 2 .6 4  ( 0 )
F oreign  aid flow AID - 1 4 .4 9  (0 )*
N om inal d evaluation NDEV - 9 6 .3 6  ( 0 )*
Note: The critical value of null hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 10 per cent level is -3.13 with total 
number of observation n = 23
The null hypothesis of rejecting there is no serial correlation lies outside 1.54<d<2.46
The null hypothesis of rejecting there is no 1st order autocorrelation lies out side -1.96<h<l .96
A * indicates the rejection of null hypothesis. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of lags on the 
differenced variable used in the auxiliary regression to achieve residual whiteness.
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Appendix 4A
ECONOMETRIC NOTES ON METHODOLOGY
This appendix discusses the methodological issues related to econometric modeling 
with time series data. The topics include, alternative methods of testing the stationarity 
of time series variables and the order of integration of time series, the error correction 
estimation procedure that is used, the related issues of dynamic model building 
methodology and the relative merits of alternative estimation procedures.
Unit Roots and Order of Integration
The standard (classical) approach to time series estimation is based on the assumption 
that the mean and variances of the variables are well defined constants and independent 
of time, i.e., the data series are stationary. There is substantial evidence in recent 
literature to suggest that these assumptions of conventional time series analysis are not 
satisfied by a large number of macroeconomic time series and may possess unit roots, 
that is , they are integrated processes. This concern has led to the development of an 
expanding literature on the implications of non-stationarity.
The variables whose means and variables change over time are known as non­
stationary or variables possessing unit root variables. A stochastic process of Y(t) will 
be stationary if it satisfies the three criteria as follows:
Equation (1) implies that given the value of X, the mean or the expected value of 
the random disturbance term jlxj is zero. Equation (2) states that the given the value of 
X, the variance of p; is the same for all observations. That is, the conditional variances 
of pj are identical. Equation (3) requires that given any two X values, Xj and Xj (i * j ), 
Pi and pj (i ^ j ) is zero.
(1) E(pj/ Xj) = 0
(2) Var((ij / Xt) = E { ( Hi - E(m / Xs)}2 = a2
(3) Cov ( H i, |_ij / X;, Xj) = 0
( 1)
(2)
(3)
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In the presence of cointegrated series the analysis by ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method produces spurious regression or misleading inferences. As the sample 
size increases the means and the variances of unit root variables change overtime, so the 
statistics in a regression model which use these means and variances also become time 
dependent and fail to converge their true values (Rao, 1994). Also the biasedness 
towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no relationship between the dependent and 
independent variable increases greatly (Type II error). That is, the possibility of 
accepting the relationship as significant increases when in fact, dependent and 
independent variables are uncorrelated.
Tests for Unit Roots
It is important to start with a formal illustration of the properties of unit roots. Formal 
tests of unit roots can help determine whether or not a system contains a trend and 
whether the trend is stochastic or deterministic. The three major types of unit root 
testing are: (a) informal examination of correlograms; (b) Durbin Watson statistic test; 
and (c) regression based t-tests.
The test of stationarity starts with the procedure to test the variable stationarity at 
‘level’ form. If the hypothesis of stationarity in level form is accepted then Yt is 
stationary and the series is integrated of order zero, 1(0). The series includes a ‘white 
noise’ and first order autoregressive {AR (1)}. If the hypothesis of ‘level’ stationarity 
is rejected, then the first difference of AYt, i.e., AYt is tested for stationarity. If the 
hypothesis of AYt is stationary is not rejected, that implies that first difference of the 
original series is stationary and 1(0) and the original series Yt is 1(1) which contains a 
‘random walk' process.
The first method of informal stationarity testing involves estimating 
autocorrelation of the series. The correlation between Yt and Yt.j is given as:
p „ r={X(Yt- Y, ) ( Y „ -  Y t  .r)} / V {(£( Yt - Y, )2S(Y,.r - Y,.r )2} (4)
The series is likely to be stationary if the autocorrelations decline rapidly as lag 
length increases and remain close to zero (Holden and Thompson, 1992). If the
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autocorrelations remain high at relatively high level of lags, then the series is not 
stationary at ‘level’ form and a test of autocorrelation of the first difference is required.
A stationary first difference autocorrelation implies that the original series is 
integrated in order one or 1(1). Therefore, it can be shown that a stationary series is less 
smooth with more fluctuation around a constant long run mean than a non-stationary 
series. A non-stationary series rarely returns to any particular value. A stationary series 
has a finite variance that is time invariant and has a theoretical correlogram that 
diminishes as lag length increases. However, this test of correlogram is rather 
subjective and informal.
The first formal test for unit root was developed by Sargan and Bhargava (1983). 
They proposed to regress the variable of concern (say, Yt) on a constant and then 
examining the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic of the estimated equation which is
S (m -H t.,)2/ S( M.,)2 (5)
where pt is the observed residual.
If the sum squared of the changes in the estimated pt is smaller than the sum 
squared of pt then pt is 1(1) and DW value remains very low or close to zero. Yt is also 
1(1) if DW is very small. Thus if the critical value of DW statistics exceeds the 
computed DW value, then the Yt is 1(1) but if computed DW value exceeds critical 
value Yt is stationary or 1(0). Special tables of relevant critical values for DW statistics 
are provided by Sargan and Bhargava (1983).
Finally, there are many alternative tests for estimating regression equations 
based on t and F test. These tests are categorised as ‘Dickey-Fuller’ statistics in the 
literature (Holden and Thompson, 1992). As the distribution of the statistics of the non- 
stationary variables in these tests are non-standard, they require a special ‘f  and ‘F’ 
tables. However, these tests are not very powerful to distinguish between unit roots and 
unit roots near 1.
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Three distinct types of data generating processes of a univariate series Y are 
carried out by these tests as:
The differences between these three series are that in equation (6) the mean of 
the series is zero, but the mean of the series is non-zero in equation (7) and equation (8) 
contains both a non-zero mean and a time trend T. Thus, if the value of a  is equal to 1, 
then the error term in equation (6) has a constant variance and the variance of Y tends to 
infinity as t increases. In this case the assumptions of standard t-tests for OLS 
regression are not valid (Holden and Thompson, 1992). Thus the test for stationarity 
shows whether the value of a  is equal to 1 or less than 1. If the value of a  is equal to 1, 
Yt is non-stationary and if the value of a  is less than 1, Yt is stationary.
To check whether Yt is 1(1) or stationary in the first difference, we can rewrite 
equation (6) in first difference form as follows:
where ß = (a - 1)
To test the level of integration of individual variables, we may use the modified 
‘f  statistics given by Fuller (1976). If the test statistics is larger negative value than the 
critical value, we reject the null hypothesis of cointegration of order 1 or 1(1). That is, if 
ß is negative i.e., a  is less than 1 and then Yt is stationary or 1(0). But if the test 
statistics is smaller than the critical value, then the null hypothesis of Yt is 1(1) is not 
rejected which means if we do not reject ß is zero, then AYt is stationary and Yt is 1(1).
Turning to the reparameterised version of equation (7) which can be written as:
Y, = ctY,.| + n,
Y,= a 0 + a, Y,.i + n,
Yt = a 0 + a iY t.| +Y T + H,
(6)
(7)
(8)
Y.-Y,., = ( a - l ) Y t., + m
and then reparameterising equation (9), we get
AYt = ß Yt_, + pt
(9)
( 10)
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AYt = a 0 + ß Yt_i + p t ( ID
and the test of stationarity can be carried out in the same fashion as for equation (10). 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected if the calculated t value is a larger 
negative value than the critical value of the Fuller modified t-table. The presence of 
drift, a 0, in equation (7 and 11) can easily be checked by regressing AYt on a constant 
and performing a standard t-test for the estimated coefficient.
Equation (8) can also be reparameterised as
AYt = a 0 + ßYM + Y T + pt (12)
and is examined for stationarity. Again the null hypothesis of Yt is 1(1) would be 
rejected if the calculated t-value is larger negative value than critical value in the Fuller 
Table. This test also requires Y to be zero and can be tested by using standard ‘F’ test. 
If both ß and Y are zero, that implies that Yt is random walk with drift.
Until now, it has been implicitly assumed that the estimated residuals are not 
serially correlated and have constant variances. But in real world pts in most of the 
series are not white noise. Though Phillips (1987) has shown that heteroskedasticity 
does not affect a unit root test statistics, a problem occurs if the estimated residuals are 
serially correlated and invalidate the test. Two methods of correcting this problem are 
popular among researchers. The first approach of the ‘Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF)’ test involves augmenting the regression by adding sufficient lagged values of 
dependent variable into the original equation. Thus ADF for regression equation (8) 
with drift and a time trend can be written as:
AYt = a 0 + ßYM + Y T + 5, AYM + b2 AYt_2 + — + 8n AYt_n + pt (13)
The number of lags on the dependent variable is determined by the minimum 
number of residuals free from autocorrelation (Holden and Thompson, 1992). This test 
can be carried out by standard Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. Alternatively, a fixed
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number of lags can be assumed as in ADF test in REG-X package which automatically 
assume four lags.
The hypothesis testing of this test is similar as before, i.e., Yt is 1(1). If ß is 
smaller than critical value, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is not rejected. But Yt 
would be stationary if the computed value of test statistic is larger negative value than 
critical value.
ADF test for nonstationarity is a widely used method while the series includes a 
drift and a time trend. However, the addition of lagged dependent variable in the right 
hand side of the equation loses degrees of freedom. As a result the ADF test becomes 
less powerful.
An alternative non-parametric procedure was introduced by Phillips (1987) and 
Phillips and Perron (1988) which contain the full details of necessary adjustment of the 
system. The Phillips-Perron test uses residuals to correct the t-statistics. This correction 
requires estimating one additional parameter -  the value of the spectral density of pt at 
the origin. The Newey-West estimator is the most popular and widely used for this 
purpose as it takes a weighted average of the autocorrelations of pt (Engle and Granger, 
1991). However, using Monte Carlo evidence, Schwert (1989) suggested that the 
parametric approach produces more accurate test size than non-parametric method even 
in the case when the true autoregression is infinite.
Test For Cointegration
The above discussion, states the alternative methods of testing whether or not a series is 
individually integrated and its order of integration. Now test whether the two series are 
cointegrated or not.
These tests include an intercept and a time trend in the regression equation and 
test whether or not the residuals of cointegration regression are stationary. Containing a 
constant, A,0, and a time trend T, can write a cointegration regression equation as:
Yt = A,0 + A,Xt+ T T + pt (14)
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and the estimated error from the cointegrated regression is thus,
m = Y t -X0- XX{- T T  (15)
Cointegrating Regression Durbin Watson (CRDW) test, Dickey-Fuller (DF) type 
tests or informal autocorrelation tests can be conducted to check the whiteness of the 
error terms of the model. The standard DW tests can easily detect the stationarity of the 
estimated error term for a univariate independent variable system as discussed earlier. 
When there are more than one independent variables, Engle-Granger test for 
cointegration can be used to check the cointegration of the regression equation.
The Engle-Granger test for cointegration can be formed by running the 
regression as
Apt = ßPt-i + et (16)
DF, ADF, DW and CRDW tests can be used for cointegrating errors. The null 
hypothesis of ß = 0 implies that Apt is 1(0) but pt is 1(1) and Y and X are not 
cointegrated. It the test statistics t is a larger negative value than tabulated critical value, 
the null hypothesis of non-stationary errors is rejected and is can be concluded that Y 
and X are cointegrated.
An ADF test can also be run on the residuals including an intercept. The t-ratio 
of this test does not have a Dickey-Fuller distribution. The distribution of this test was 
first tabulated by Engle and Granger and published in Engle and Yoo (1991) and later 
more precise values were provided by MacKinnon (1991). Mackinnon’s (1991) Tables 
of critical value cover cointegrating regression both with trend and without trend and 
test on estimated pt with a constant term. However, Engle-Granger (E-G) procedure of 
parameter estimation is criticised for a number of drawbacks.
Model Estimation
There are various alternative methods for estimating the long run relationship. The 
most widely used approach is the Engle-Granger (1987) two step procedure. This
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procedure involves estimating the long run relationship in the level form of a 
cointegrating regression in the first step and the second step is testing the residual 
whiteness of the cointegrating equation to determine the stationarity of the variables. 
As this approach reduces the number of coefficients to be estimated, is also reduces the 
problem of multicollinearity. Stock (1987) has shown that OLS estimation of the first 
step is ‘super consistent’ as the OLS estimators converges on the true value at a faster 
rate in non-stationary than in the stationary case (Holden and Thompson, 1992). The 
major criticism against the E-G two step method is that the estimate of cointegrating 
regression equation has rather a poor finite sample characteristic. Banerjee et al. (1986) 
investigated the possibility of small sample biasedness of E-G two step procedure and
expressed serious doubts about the small sample properties of the E-G procedure. They
2
showed that the bias might be quite large, particularly in the case where the value of R 
is substantially less than 1. Stock (1987) also showed that even though the asymptotic 
parameter estimates from cointegrating regression are super consistent -  the bias in 
finite-samples will be in the order of 1/T, where T is the sample size. In an attempt to 
reduce the bias, Engle and Yoo (1987) suggested a three step procedure which is 
asymptotically equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation. If there are more than one 
cointegrating vector which link the variables together, then the estimates from E-G 
procedure may simply represent complex linear combinations of all contegrating 
vectors. In such a case, these estimates will be economically meaningless (Menon, 
1992). Finally the E-G model is unable to accommodate the dynamics in the 
cointegrating regression. Because of these shortcomings of E-G procedure, many 
researchers use Johansen Maximum Likelihood procedures for the test of cointegrating 
model building.
Johansen (1988) suggested an alternative method of obtaining maximum 
likelihood estimate directly. Johansen procedures involves determining the number of 
cointegrating vectors in a system and then estimating them. The Johansen procedure 
starts with a general vector autoregressive model with variables of interest. This is then 
reparameterised as a system of error correction model, so that the vector in the 
autoregression model consists of lagged first differenced terms and a set of lagged level 
terms. Applying OLS can provide consistent long run parameter estimation for each 
equation. Johansen statistics are able to give a decisive test in the cases where other test
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statistics are borderline with respect to cointegration. But the problem of this procedure 
lies with the estimates which may simply represent complex linear combinations of all 
the cointegrating vectors which link these variables together. In this case the OLS 
results will be meaningless.
Error Correction Model
The error correction model (ECM) was first introduced by Sargan (1964) and then 
popularised by Hendry and his associates (Davidson, Hendry, Srba and Yei (1978), 
Hendry and Von Ungern-Sternberg (1981), Hendry, Pagan and Sargan (1984), Granger 
(1990)) at LSE. This model building approach has a number of advantages of which 
the most important is that it provides some answers to the spurious correlation problem 
that has been encountered by economists since the beginning of the century. This 
section focuses on the relative merits of an ECM approach by modelling in differences 
(error correction) for which cointegrating relationships are not identified. An error 
correction model with dynamic and long run relationship between Y and X can be 
written as follows:
Yt = ßo + ßi xt+ ß2 xt_, + a  Ym + pt (17)
by subtracting Y M, equation (17) can be rearranged and reparameterise as
AYt = ßo + ßi Axt+(ß, + ß2)x t.1- ( l - a ) Y t., + pt (18)
where AYt = Yt - Yt_,, and Axt = xt - xt.j
Equation (18) can be further reparameterised as follows:
AYt = ßj Axt - (1- a) (Ym - Y, - r 2 xm ) + pt (19)
where Y l = ß0 /- ( l  - a) and Y2 = ( ßt + ß2) /- (1- a)
Although the E-G two step model building approach for cointegrated variables 
received a great deal of attention, some concerns were expressed over the years that this 
approach has some serious drawbacks. As Banerjee et al. (1986) pointed out even 
though ignoring the dynamics (A terms) in the first step is asymptotically irrelevant,
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ignoring the lag terms in the first step may lead to substantial bias in a small sample and 
result in a spurious regression.
According to Engle and Granger (1987), if Yt and Xt are 1(1) and thus AYt and 
AXt are 1(0), then the long run relationship between Yt and Xt can be estimated 
consistently by OLS even if 1(0) variables are not included in the system. Thus the two 
step approach has been widely used by applied researchers where the interest is focused 
only on the long run behaviour of key variables (Inder, 1993). The long run relationship 
can therefore be estimated by regressing Yt on a constant and Xt in the two step 
procedure as follows:
Yt = X t  + X 2 Xt + wt (20)
A potential problem arises in the E-G approach with OLS estimation as they 
ignored all A terms of a error correction model such as in equation (19). Thus the wt in 
equation (20) has substantial correlation. Therefore, the t-statistics and the precision of 
the estimators of the model are affected and would result in spurious outcomes. As it is 
asymptotically valid to ignore the 1(0) terms while estimating long run relationship, the 
estimation of full model will improve greatly in efficiency in finite samples (Inder, 
1993).
The General to Specific Approach to Model Building
The overall error correction methodology is termed as ‘general to specific’ or LSE 
approach. This approach starts with a large general model, with many parameters 
accepted by data, which is then reduced to an econometrically meaningful model by 
series of tests of restrictions (Holden and Thompson, 1992).
In contrast to ‘general to specific’ model, ‘specific to general’ model chooses to 
estimate particular variables based on relevant economic theory and checks the 
adequacy of the model by standard diagnostic tests. The response to unsatisfied result is 
to modify or improve the equation by adding new variables. Thus a very restricted 
model is generalised in order to fit the data.
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The main problem with a specific to general model is the modified model does 
not totally abandon the original ideas and hypotheses embodied in the original equation. 
These models are thus, criticised as almost axiomatically correct modelling via various 
kinds of ‘data mining’.
The relative merits of the Hendry type general to specific error correction 
modelling procedure to guard against the possibility of spurious relationships in the 
presence of some non-stationary variables in the system. The procedure begins with an 
over-parameterised autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) specification with necessary 
lags. Lag length is chosen by the consideration of available degrees of freedom and type 
of data. With annual data, one or two lags would be long enough, while, with quarterly 
data, a maximum lag of four might be assumed. Under this procedure, the long run 
relationship is embedded within the dynamic specification. Thus, specify the general 
model can be specified as:
Yt = ßo+£aiY t,  + Sßi Xt,+  pt (21)
where ß0 is a vector of constant, Yt is a (nxl) vector of endogenous variable, Xt is a 
(kxl) vector of explanatory variables, oq and ßj are (nxn) and (nxk) matrices of 
parameters.
Assuming one lag, the model can be written as before in equation (17):
Yt = a 0 + a, Yt.1 + ß1xt+ ß 2xt.1 + pt (17.1)
and the error correction version of the model can be written as exactly in equation (18):
AYt = ßo + ß, Axt+ (ßj + ß2 ) xM - (1- a) YM + pt (18.1)
Equation (18.1) can then be reparameterised exactly in equation (19) in terms of 
differenced and lag level form so as to separate the short run and long run multipliers of 
the system as below:
AYt = ß, Axt - ( l - a 1)(Yt.1 -T , - Y2 xM ) + pt (19.1)
where Y1= ß0 / - ( l -  a,) and Y2= ( ßi + ß2 ) / -  (1- aj)
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In this ECM procedure, the short run relationship is captured by the coefficient 
on differenced variables in equation (19.1) while the long run relationships are 
expressed by the coefficients on the lagged level variables Yt and Y2.
The general model is then tested down using OLS by dropping statistically 
insignificant differenced and lagged terms. The testing procedure continues until a 
parsimonious ECM representation is obtained which retains the a priori theoretical 
model. The selection of final equation is made after careful diagnostic check tests on 
the OLS error process.
The major problem of the procedure is associated with the non-uniqueness of 
restrictions imposed and with similar long run properties of different error correction 
model. However, these problems are relatively minor compared with those in the 
specific to general approach which it replaces (Holden and Thompson, 1992).
The development of time series analysis of cointegration and the ECM 
procedure has provided applied economists with a valuable new technique to reach close 
to economic reality. The requirement to check the degree of integration before carrying 
out any regression analysis is particularly relevant and avoids the possibility of inferring 
the spurious outcome of a regression model.
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Appendix 4B
ECONOMETRIC NOTES ON DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
This appendix outlines the diagnostic tests applied in the estimation of equations in 
chapters 4 and 5. These include tests for serial correlation, tests for residual normality, 
functional form, heteroskedasticity and structural stability of the system. Useful surveys 
of these tests are found in Pagan and Hall (1983), Beggs (1988), Gujarati (1995) and 
Thomas (1993).
Serial Correlation
Durbin Watson d-test
The most widely used and celebrated test for detecting serial correlation in the error 
process was developed by Durbin and Watson (1951). It is popularly known as DW d- 
test and is defined as :
d = I  (m-n, - , )2/ X H,2 (DW.l)
t = 2 t = 2
which is simply the ratio of the sum squared differences in residuals to the sum squared 
residuals. The number of observations in numerator is n-1 because one observation is 
lost in taking successive differences. It can be then shown that:
d = 2(1-p) (DW.2)
where p is the first order serial correlation coefficient i.e.,
m = P Ht-i + v, (DW.3)
If p = 0, then there is no serial correlation and the d-statistics takes a value of 2. 
Therefore, as a rule of thumb, if d is found to be 2, one may conclude that there is no
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first-order autocorrelation either positive or negative, p = +1 indicates positive 
autocorrelation in the residuals. Therefore, the closer the d value is to 0 the greater 
would be the possibility of positive autocorrelation. If p = -1, then there is negative 
autocorrelation among the successive residuals. Hence closer the d value is to 4, the 
greater the possibility of negative serial autocorrelation.
The major limitation of d-statistics is that the rejection region consists of a 
region rather than an actual point. Furthermore, DW d-statistics may not be appropriate 
to detect the serial correlation in an autoregressive model, since computed d-value in 
such model tends toward 2 which implies there is a built-in bias against discovering the 
1st order serial correlation. To overcome this problem, Durbin (1970) developed 
another large sample test of first order correlation for autoregressive model which is 
known as Durbin h-statistics and is expressed as:
h = p -Jn /1 -  «(var(ö2) (DW.4)
where n = sample size, and var (a2 ) = variance of the coefficient of the lagged Yt in the 
right hand side of the equation.
If p = 0, then h-statistics follows the standardised normal distribution with zero mean 
and unit variance. From the normal distribution, we know
Pr (1.96 < h < 1.96) = 0.95 (DW.5)
that is, the probability that the h lies between -1.96 to + 1.96 is about 95 %. Therefore, 
the decision rule regarding h-statistics are:
(a) if h > 1.96, there is positive first order autocorrelation;
(b) h < -1.96 implies negative first order autocorrelation; and
(c) i f -1.96 < h < 1.96, we do not reject the null hypothesis that there is no (positive or 
negative) first order autocorrelation.
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Tests for Omitted Variables and Incorrect functional Form
In determining the adequacy of a model, the broad features of standard diagnostic tests
(such as R , estimated t-values, sign of the coefficient, Durbin-Watson statistics etc.) 
are checked. If all these diagnostic tests pass reasonably well, the chosen model is
claimed to have a fair fit. But, if R is very low, or very few coefficients are 
statistically significant or if the d-statistics are too low there is a question about model 
adequacy. In these cases, there are possibilities that some relevant variables may have 
been omitted or a wrong functional form used or first-difference of the time series not 
been taken and so on. Therefore, Ramsey’s Reset Test or the Lagrange Multiplier test is 
used to check the specification error of the model.
RESET Test
A fairly general test for specification error was proposed by Ramsey in 1969, known as 
Ramsey’s RESET test. In this test, a comparison is made between a preferred structural 
model and an alternative model involving a higher order polynomial representing a 
different functional form. Thus the RESET test in its most general form can be written 
as:
Y, = ßi X, + a , Y, 2 + a 2 Y, 3 + a 3 Yt 4 + — + a m Y, m (R.l)
where Yt = ßj Xt is the estimated preferred model. The null hypothesis
oci = a 2 = a 3 = — = a m = 0 is tested using the F-distribution. Adding Yj should
2
increase the ^ of the model containing the higher order polynomial of Yj . If R" is 
significant on the basis of F-statistics, it is concluded that the preferred model is mis- 
specified.
The main advantage of RESET is that it is easy to apply and it is not require to 
specify what the alternative model is. But the limitation of the test is that it does not 
help to choose a better alternative when a model is mis-specified.
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The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test is an alternative to Ramsey’s RESET test. This test 
has an asymptotic exact distribution and is valid in the presence of lag dependent 
variable on the right hand side of the system. This test is a great improvement over the 
Durbin Watson d and h tests as it can be constructed to test for any order of serial 
correlation. The LM test proceeds as follows:
(a) estimate the original model and obtain the residual, pt ;
(b) run a regression on pt on squared and cubic output terms (i.e., on Xj and Xj ) as 
follows:
k
pt = ocj + ot2 Xj + a 3 Xj 2 + a 4 Xj 3 + ^  cq Yt_j + vt (LM.l)
i = 1
where vt is an error term with the usual properties.
(d) Engle has shown that R estimated from equation (LM.l) follows the chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restriction imposed by the 
original model for large sample size and is written as
n R ~  x vvith df= number of restrictions.
asy
(e) if chi-square value is greater than critical value at a chosen level of significance, 
reject the original model as the functional form of the model is mis-specified.
Normality Test
One of the important assumptions under conventional OLS is that the residuals of the 
system are normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Although 
several alternative tests for error normality are discussed in the literature, the Jarque- 
Bera (J-B) normality test is considered for this study.
Jarque-Bera (J-B) Test
The J-B normality test uses estimated pt and the chi-square probability distribution. It 
is an asymptotic test and computes the skewness and kurtosis measure of OLS residuals. 
The test statics is written as follows:
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(J-B.l)J-B = n [ ( s2 / 6) + (k - 3)2 / 24 ] 
where s represents the skewness and k represents the kurtosis. Jarque and Bera (1987) 
showed that the J-B statistics follows a chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of 
freedom (df). The null hypothesis assumes normality of error terms. If computed value 
of J-B statistics is lower than critical value, the null hypothesis of normality of error 
term can be rejected, i.e., the error terms are not normally distributed.
Heteroskedasticity Test
There are several tests for detecting the heteroskedasticity of error terms in the 
literature. The autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test has been used 
for this study to detect the sameness of error variances which is developed by Engle 
(1982).
Since the variance error terms at time t depends on the size of the squared error 
terms of previous period time t-1, this is called an ARCH (1) process. Thus an ARCH 
(n) can be written as:
Var (pt ) = a 0 + otj pM2 + a 2 2 + — + a n pt_n 2 = a 2 (ARCH.l)
The null hypothesis can be stated as error variances are not correlated. If there is 
no autocorrelation in the error variance, the null hypothesis can be symbolically written 
as a, = a 2 = ot3 = — = a n = 0. In this case the error variance is Var (pt ) = 0.
The null hypothesis of homoscedastic error variance can be tested by usual F-test 
or alternatively by computing nR2. If the ARCH value is smaller than the critical F- 
value, we do not reject that the error variances are homoscedastic. Only ARCH (1) test 
have been considered for this study which is the most common form of the test.
Variable Deletion Test (F-test)
In a general to specific model estimation procedure, a restricted (specific) model has 
been obtained from a large (general) unrestricted model by imposing some linear 
restrictions. If RSSUN and RSSr are defined to be residual sum of square from the
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unrestricted and residual sum of square from the restricted model respectively, then the 
F-test can be written as:
F (m, n-k) = [ {( RSSr - RSSUN ) / RSSUN } / { (n-k)/ m}] (F.l)
where n is the total sample size, k is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model
and m is the number of restrictions.
The null hypothesis of the test can represent as 
Ho = ß2 = ß3 = ß4 = -  = ßk = 0 ;
If the computed F is greater than tabulated F (m, n-k) at a level of significance, the null 
hypothesis is rejected of some relevant explanatory' variables are not absent from the 
restricted model.
Structural Stability Test
The Chow-test
To test the structural stability of a model, Gregory Chow (1960) developed the Chow 
test to detect whether there are any structural changes between two periods. The 
assumptions under the Chow-test are (1) the error terms in two different periods are 
normally distributed with same variance, and (2) p lt and p2t are independently 
distributed
Given these assumption a Chow-test follows the F-distribution with 
(k, n!+n2-k) df and can be written as:
F = { Xep2 - (Ee^ + Z e22) / Xej2 + Z e22} {(nj + n2 +2k) / k } (Chow.l)
where Eej2 , X e22 and Xep2 are residual sum of squares of sub-period one, sub-period 2 
and pooled or full period respectively. While nx and n2 are the size of the two sub­
samples, k is the number of parameters. The null hypothesis of the test assumes that 
there is no structural change. If the computed F-value at a chosen level of significance 
exceeds the critical F-value, we reject the null hypothesis of structural stability of the 
model.
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Appendix to Chapter 5
TABLE A5.1: Test for Unit Roots
Variables Data series DF/ADF Statistics
Ho: 1(1) versus 
Ha: 1(0)
Per capita GDP
Financial Institutional development 
Non-mining GDP 
Domestic absorption 
Government consumption 
Gross investment to GDP 
Net official transfers 
Consumer price index 
GDP deflator 
Nontradable price index 
Agricultural value added 
Manufacturing value added 
Nontradable sector 
Construction sector 
Gross domestic savings 
Private savings 
Foreign savings 
Real interest rate 
Expected rate of inflation
PCY -1.62(1)
FD -83.62(0)*
NMY -1.69(1)
DA -3.16(0)*
GC -1.97(1)
GIY -4.45 (0)*
OT -3.14(0)*
CPI -1.25 (1)
DEF -1.72(1)
PNT -2.50 (0)
AVA -2.77 (0)
MVA -2.54 (0)
NT -3.89 (0)*
CONS -3.20 (0)*
RDS -1.85(0)
PS -2.52(0)
FS -4.12(0)*
RIR -2.06(0)
INF -3.73(0)*
Note: The critical value of null hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 10 percent level is -3.13 with total 
number of observation n = 23
The null hypothesis of rejecting there is no serial correlation lies outside 1.54<d<2.46
The null hypothesis of rejecting there is no 1st order autocorrelation lies out side -1.96<h<l .96
* indicates the rejection of null hypothesis. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of lags on the 
differenced variable used in the auxiliary regression to achieve residual whiteness.
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APPENDIX to Chapter 6
Table A6.1: Central Government Revenues and Expenditures 1971-1977
(Million of kina)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Total revenue 74.2 85.1 93.3 136.7 179.7 220.2 223.6
Tax revenue 61.8 71.6 74.5 95.1 134.8 178.7 151.5
Non-tax revenue 12.4 13.5 18.8 41.6 44.9 41.5 37.1
Total expenditure 204.7 233.8 250.4 307.5 374.1 415.2 409.4
Current expenditure 162.5 193.7 213.9 277.0 341.0 369.7 362.7
Capital expenditure 42.2 40.1 36.5 30.5 33.1 45.5 46.7
Source: Constructed from World Bank (1981), Table 4.2 and 4.4, Report No. 1150-PNG, 1976, and 
Table 5.2 and Table 5.6, Report No. 3544a-PNG.
APPENDIX to Chapter 7
Table A7.1: Index of Government Consumption and Domestic Absorption in
PNG, Indonesia and Nigeria 1970-84 
(1970=100)
D o m e s t i c  A b s o r p t i o n G o v e r n m e n t  C o n s u m p t i o n
Year PNG Indonesia Nigeria PNG Indonesia Nigeria
1970 100 100 100 100 100 100
1971 111 109 110 113 116 117
1972 107 133 120 125 141 133
1973 105 195 130 144 244 167
1974 122 288 180 173 287 2 1 7
1975 141 363 250 201 428 367
1976 152 444 320 210 543 500
1977 168 532 370 195 708 6 6 7
1978 183 652 410 204 906 833
1979 209 889 450 214 1162 833
1980 241 1186 510 238 1826 833
1981 259 1560 610 262 2 288 1000
1982 277 1736 670 271 2563 1167
1983 299 2072 670 272 2864 1333
1984 314 2301 700 292 3234 1500
Source: Computed from World Bank (1988)
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